Conflict or consensus: East Germany, the Soviet Union and Deutschlandpolitik 1958-1984. by Petzold, Thomas M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1986
Conflict or consensus: East Germany, the Soviet























The;sis Advisor: Jiri Valenta
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited
T232221

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OP THIS PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
la. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
2b. DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release; distribution
unlimited
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5000
7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5000




9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUM8ER









11 TITLE (Include Security Classification)
CONFLICT OR CONSENSUS:
EAST GERMANY, THE SOVIET UNION AND VEUTSCHLANVPOLITZK 1958-1984
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Petzold, Thomas M.











18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
German Democratic Republic; East Germany; GDR; Soviet Union
USSR; Deutschlandpolitik; Ostpolitik; GDR-USSR relations;
Fasfpm Knrnnp; Detente; Berlin Crisis
'9 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Visible signs of disagreement over foreign policy between the Soviet Union and the
German Democratic Republic have been a rare occurrence. The exception to this condition
has been their differing interests in formulating policy on Germany or VzuJ^ckZandpoLvtLk.
Over the past twenty-five years, several factors have drawn the decisionmakers of both
countries in three specific instances to develop a VzixtAcktcindpO-Lutlk which led to dis-
cernable discord between them. By comparing the leading factors in an organized, method-
ical manner, with the help of historical case studies, one is able to better understand
the most relevant causal factors relative to this discord. When East German and Soviet
foreign policy and economic interests are misaligned and the two leaderships have differ-
ing levels of control over their foreign policy formulation, the development of conflict
or dispute is most likely. The potential for future differences over this policy issue
remains likely as East German leaders work towards alleviating tbeir country's identity
problem via foreign policy actions potentially conflicting with Moscow's hegemonal interest;
20 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF A8STRACT
[1 UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED SAME AS RPT DTIC USERS
21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
2a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL
JDFORM 1473,84 mar 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted.
All other editions are obsolete
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Conflict or Consensus:




Captain, United States Air Force
B. A. , Western Michigan University, 1978
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





Visible signs of disagreement over foreign policy
between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic
have been a rare occurrence. The exception to this condi-
tion has been their differing interests in formulating
policy on Germany or Deutschlandpolitik. Over the past
twenty-five years, several factors have drawn the decision-
makers of both countries in three specific instances to
develop a Deutschlandpolitik which led to discernable
discord between them. By comparing the leading factors in
an organized, methodical manner, with the help of historical
case studies, one is able to better understand the most
relevant causal factors relative to this discord. When East
German and Soviet foreign policy and economic interests are
misaligned and the two leaderships have differing levels of
control over their foreign policy formulation, the develop-
ment of conflict or dispute over their respective German
policies is most likely. The potential for future differ-
ences over this policy issue remains likely as East German
leaders work towards alleviating their country's identity
problem via foreign policy actions potentially conflicting
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Close relations between Germany and Russia go back three
centuries or more. The determining factors drawing them
together have covered a broad spectrum from fascination to
survival. To be sure, these relations have developed over
the years into an ambivalent historical legacy. Ranging
from alliances formed to counter Napoleon, Bismark's intri-
cate web of treaties, to wars between each country's Emperor
or Totalitarian despot, the fabric of Russo-German relations
has been woven of various complex fibers, mixing enmity and
entente. CRef. 1]
Today this legacy continues despite the division of
Germany. Relations with Moscow are held in both the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) as crucial to their primary national interests.
Despite the innumberable forces impeding closer relations
between Bonn and Moscow, both sides understand their unique
reasons why they must pursue certain interests involving the
other.
B. THE FOCUS
While this is a most interesting topic, and an important
element in this paper, the primary focus of the study will
be on Moscow-East Berlin relations. For the East Germans,
these relations have indeed been unique since the beginning.
Because their state was created by the Soviets they owe its
existence to them. While the GDR depends upon Moscow to
guarantee this existence, the Soviet Union needs the GDR for
ideological, economic and security reasons. Obviously, the
dependencies are not symmetrical, but both countries find it
advantageous, if not sometimes necessary, to foster the
8
growth of mutual interests. [Ref. 2: p. 33] Despite this
consensus in Moscow and East Berlin on strengthening their
close relations, the ambivalent historical legacy does not
disappear. Tense or unsettling situations do arise from
time to time in their relations. It has been argued by
Peter Marsch, for example, that East German leaders will
exploit their position as the more dependent partner by
manipulating its dependent status vis-a-vis the USSR to
defend their own domestic and international interests.
CRef. 3: p. 79] Although not too surprising, the very exis-
tence of this conflict does present the political analyst
with questions about its causes.
C. THE THESIS
The main thesis in this study is that conflict between
the GDR and the USSR is inherent in their relationship over
questions of policy towards Germany (Deutschlandpolitik)
.
The sources of this conflict arise out of the fact that the
two states are operating from two quite different objective
conditions, each establishing a unique set of political and
economic interests. While their interests usually converge
in these areas, each state's different perspective will tend
to pull these interests apart when certain opportunities and
costs arise. Decisionmakers in Moscow place their
Deutschlandpolitik objectives within an overall global
power perspective, while the Socialist Unity Party (SED)
leadership develops its all-German policy almost strictly
from a European perspective. CRef. 4: p. 136] Another root
1The term "conflict" as used in this study denotes a
level of policy disagreement between the two countries
decisionmakers,
' which is clearly discernable to Western
observers. Because this is not the "normal" state of
affairs expected among allies, we use this term as a
starting point to emphasize the unusual. In some cases, the
term dispute may be more appropriate.
cause of this conflict are Soviet hegemonical interests in
the East European Socialist bloc, particularly when dealing
with the GDR.
Although according to Soviet ideology there can be no
"antagonistic contradictions" between states belonging to
the "socialist community", conflict has proven to be a fact
of life within this community. And the Soviets have over
the past decades shown varying degrees of success in
resolving or controlling it. Conflict between states does
not just appear, however. In a given situation, choices are
made, based upon priorities of perceived interests, which
may be congruent, unrelated or opposed to those interests of
another state. The concept of interest is defined here as
positive or negative expectations which motivate policy
actions designed to promote or counter those expectations.
CRef. 4: p. 2]
D. THE METHODOLOGY
This study is designed to analyze the GDR-Soviet
conflict through a focused comparison of a selected set of
three historical cases involving their relations over the
past 35 years. Each case may be viewed has being composed
of specific East German and Soviet external and internal
interests. The three cases selected for study are: (1)
Ulbricht-Khrushchev disagreement during the Berlin Crises
1958-1962; (2) Ulbricht-Brezhnev/Kosigin conflict during the
advent of European detente 1968-1971; and (3) Honecker-CPSU












The extensive historical data available must be applied
in such a manner that it can be analyzed for the purpose of
explaining past motivations and forecasting future deci-
sions. In recent years, a number of scholars have empha-
sized the need for a systematic comparison of case studies,
particularly when comparing a small number of cases.
CRef . 5: pp. 682-693], ERef. 6: pp. 79-138] Alexander George
and his colleagues have utilized a method called "structured
focused comparison", according to which "the investigator
deals selectively with only those aspects of each case that
are believed relevant to the research objectives and data
requirements of the study." CRef. 7], [Ref. 8: pp. 43-68]
The selected factors are then compared to develop context-
dependent generalizations about the phenomenon under inves-
tigation. Because this study is an attempt to analyze
historical evidence within a relatively small number of
cases, it is necessary to be extra cautious in transitioning
from the simple narration of past events to forecasting
likely or probable future events.
I have therefore, chosen Dr. George's structured focused
comparison methodology, which is quite useful in analyzing a
broad set of variables inside a small number of cases in the
search for new causal patterns to conflict or discord in
GDR-Soviet relations.
1. Independent Variables
In the search for the "why's" behind a government's
policies in its foreign relations one quickly realizes that
there are an infinite number of possible sources within
which may be the solution or merely part of the solution. I
have therefore, selected, as a starting point, a limited
number of interests and other factors which are considered
the most influential in these policies. The following
factors, called independent variables if we can measure them
in some way for comparison purposes, for this study are:
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1) Primary East German and Soviet Foreign Policy
Interests; (Grouped as such: Eastern Europe; Western
Europe and the remaining world.
)
2) Primary East German and Soviet Economic Interests; and
3) East German and Soviet Leadership Foreign
Policy-Making Control.
Obviously, foreign policy interests encompass
numerous topic areas and nearly places one back at the
starting point. Yet we will discuss the interests of both
governments regarding Eastern and Western Europe, the U. S.
and China and the Third World where they appear to have been
influential in formulating a Deutschlandpolitik by either
East Berlin or Moscow. The same limitations apply to
economic interests, which, fortunately, are easier to
uncover and measure than the political ones. The next step
is to compare these interests within each respective case to
see if they coincide or diverge. While the former situation
would leave little likelihood for dispute, the latter might
well increase tensions leading to disagreements or conflict
between these two states. The hypothesis behind these inde-
pendent variables is: The greater the convergence of polit-
ical and economic foreign policy interests between them, the
lower the potential for conflict between them over questions
of German policy.
The final factor above attempts to deal with an
influence upon foreign policy most affected by totalitarian
regimes; the effect of personal control by the effective
party leader over the formulation and implementation of
foreign policy. Since the death of Stalin the level of
personal control has varied significantly in both the USSR
and the GDR. An attempt is made in this study to correlate
the level of control in both countries with the level of
discord among them over Deutschlandpolitik. The hypothesis
here is: The greater the synchronization of foreign policy
control (whether very much, little or in between) between
12
the East German and Soviet leaderships, the lower the poten-
tial for conflict over questions of German policy.
2. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the level of conflict or
discord between the East Germans and the Soviets over their
respective Deutschlandpolitik. Although the implications
are different from our Western concept of the term, we can
label this variable, the German Problem, since there are
apparently periods when one side views the other's policy
as, in fact, problematic. Inextricably tied up with the
German Problem, from the Eastern European side as well, is
the problem of Berlin policy. Because of the crucial impact
the Berlin issue has on both governments, it will be
discussed in detail throughout this study and may tend to
give the reader the impression that it is itself and inde-
pendent variable. I am treating the Berlin issues, however,
as a vital part of the whole problem both leaderships face
in determining an appropriate Deutschlandpolitik.
3. Measurement
For necessary comparison reasons, the measurement of
these variables will be expressed in terms of their relative
position along a spectrum extending to both extremes.
Figure 1. 1 shows how the foreign policy and economic inter-
ests will be placed on a Converge-Diverge spectrum, meaning
that in a particular case, the East German and Soviet
foreign policy and economic interests in a particular area
will be assessed to have a specific level of convergence.
This level is indirectly related to the dependent variable--
conflict over Deutschlandpolitik.
The "black box" area of foreign policy control will
be analyzed in terms of the level of coincidental synchroni-
zation between the control level by East German and Soviet
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the foreign policy apparatus by the Soviet General Secretary
and a high level of control in this area by the East German
Communist Party leader would be considered less synchronized
than high control by both leaders during a given case
period. Here, again, there is an indirect relationship
between this independent variable and the dependent vari-
able, which will be measured by the relative level of
conflict between the East Germans and the Soviets and
assessed a given point along a High <--> Low spectrum.
How will we arrive at selecting a point along the
spectrum for any particular variable in any given case?
This is accomplished by focussing on specific elements in
each case. While accepting that each case is unique in
itself, there are several common variables, which, when
analyzed as a set, hopefully, will help us explain the
outcome of these cases.
The focus comparison method is built around a set of
general questions to be asked of each case. The questions
are designed to illuminate the selected variables under
investigation so that a reasonable attempt can be made to
assess the variables' relative value (or place along the
spectrum above) in that case. The following questions have
been selected for this study:
1) What were the main Soviet and East German foreign
policy interests in Eastern Europe, Western Europe and
in other parts of the world (USA, China & Third World)
which most affected their Deutschlandpolitik formula-
tion?
2) What role did economic interests play in affecting
both countries' Deutschlandpolitik'*
3) How was foreign policy decisionmaking conducted in
East Germany and the Soviet Union and what affect did
it have on their Deutschlandpolitik'? Did consensus or
conflict prevail within their respective political
leaderships?
4) What was the level of success by the dominant Party
leader in controlling the definitions of the vital
issues of that state s Deutschlandpolitik? In other
words, how successful was that leader in controlling
his country's policy on Germany?
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5) What were the primary goals established by the Soviet
and East German leadership towards the German Problem?
What means were pursued to accomplish these goals?
Were they a source of conflict between the two coun-
tries?
6) What were the main points of conflict between these
two countries over the German Problem? What was the
relative level of conflict and how was" it resolved?
E. THE FORMAT
The first half of this study is designed to set apart
the primary variables affecting East German and Soviet
foreign policy decisionmaking during the three case study
time periods. It is necessary to compare East German and
Soviet interests in their relations with East European and
West European states and their extra-European interests. *
Unfortunately, Western observers have very limited
insight into to political operations at work within the
leading circles of the Warsaw Pact (WTO) states. Our anal-
ysis, therefore, must be based on the interests as they are
advanced by influential foreign policy spokesmen in these
countries and put forward as official policy and as we can
best interpret their expression through a particular course
of action.
The other independent variables analyzed are relevant
Soviet and East German economic interests, which have a
bearing on their policy on Germany and the foreign policy
decisionmaking apparatus in both regimes. Understandably,
uncovering the foggy data in the "black box" area of the
internal decisionmaking processes is extremely difficult and
imprecise business. The apparent importance of this
variable on Deutschlandpolitik decisionmaking, combined with
The term "East European" is meant in this study to
consist of the Warsaw Pact countries and, in some instances,
when specified, Yugoslavia.
The term Extra-European is used to express those rele-
vant Soviet and East German foreign policy interests which
lie beyond Europe, yet are not such in the East German case
to be labled global or world interests.
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recent constructive contributions in this area, provide
sufficient motivation to attempt to reveal the most signifi-
cant factors involved as best possible. C Ref . 91, CRef. 10]
The third chapter reviews the dependent variable. This
is done by focussing on the Deutschlandpolitik interests of
both regimes during the study time periods. Through this
manner we may view the level of conflict or discord between
the Soviets and their German comrades over German policy.
The principle objective in Chapter IV is to examine in
closer detail the variables already outlined as they occured
in the historical context. It is then easier to relate how
they affected the Deutschlandpolitik decisionmaking and led
to conflict between East Berlin and Moscow in the three
cases during the years 1958-1984. Conveniently, the cases
occur at about ten-year intervals. The first case revolves
around the Berlin crises 1958-1962, our emphasis being on
the Ulbricht-Khrushchev struggle over concluding a peace
treaty with the GDR and a settlement of the Berlin problem.
The second case, 1968-1971, focuses on Ulbricht's resistance
to Brezhnev's concerted efforts to establish a rapprochement
with the Federal Republic. The last case, 1979-1984, is
less concrete in defining the East Berlin-Moscow conflict
due to a lack of available data. The emphasis is on the
factors behind the SED leadership to preserve a detente
atmosphere with Bonn despite sometimes ambiguous messages
from the Kremlin regarding policy between the two Germanies.
F. THE OBJECTIVE
Despite the relatively limited historical perspective
available since 1945, the analysis of the selected cases is
meant to illuminate the relative importance of specific
variables held most causal in East German-Soviet disagree-
ment. The conclusions of the study are presented in the
final chapter which hopefully lead to a better understanding
17
of the causes for future discord between these two countries
over their Deutschlandpolitik. The German Problem is not
likely to be resolved for years to come, meaning that
Deutschlandpolitik will likewise remain an important policy
issue in Europe on both sides of the inter-German border.
Hopefully, this study will therefore have contributed to a
better theoretical knowledge of this topic, through the
application of historical data, to arrive at useful general-
izations about future East German-Soviet relations. We
might then be better prepared to formulate and conduct
policy in this area of the world.
18
II. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
A. EASTERN EUROPEAN INTERESTS
1. Soviet Union
Since 1945, Eastern Europe has been the principle
Soviet sphere of influence. For primarily security consid-
erations, which are supported by ideological and political
requirements, the Soviet Union has shown more interest in
this part of the world than anywhere outside her own
borders. Political failures in this region have a dramatic
effect on the Soviet role as a major world power; e.g.,
Poland in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Similarly, ideo-
logical failures negatively effect her role as leader of the
world socialist movement; e. g. , Yugoslavia 1948 and Albania
1961. Over the years the Soviets have learned many hard
lessons and have subsequently modified earlier policies in
Eastern Europe. As stability was slowly established in this
region, the Soviet leadership could afford to turn its
attention to other interests, particularly as they gradually
developed their global role.
In the late fifties and early sixties, Soviet inter-
ests in Eastern Europe were focused on two major concerns:
achieving greater Eastern bloc integration and ideological
conformity based on Moscow's definition of the term. The
goal of these concerns was to hold on to the post-war
advances gained in East-Central Europe. East Germany was
fast becoming an important member of the East European
communist bloc, which Moscow felt it needed to control.
The first goal of integration and conformity meant
transitioning from direct Soviet involvement in the mili-
tary, political, and economic affairs of individual Eastern
bloc states to utilizing • institutions geared towards
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legitimizing Soviet hegemony. The effects of the events in
Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956 were still strongly
evident during this period, leading Khrushchev to make
substantial efforts toward mending fences.
These efforts began with a "unity" "meeting of East
European communist leaders in Budapest in January 1957 and a
series of bilateral talks with East European delegations in
Moscow. These resulted in new bilateral agreements with
various Warsaw Pact allies, which incorporated economic
concessions and status-of-forces arrangements aimed at
reducing East European resentment against the Soviet mili-
tary presence in the region. C Ref . 11: p. 82] This bilat-
eral policy approach under Khrushchev was still part of the
Stalinist legacy which was devoid of any multilateral
arrangement to facilitate relations within the bloc.
Potential areas for mutual cooperation and integra-
tion was found through common economic and security inter-
ests. However, a prime institution created to achieve this,
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), founded
in 1949 in response to the Marshall Plan, remained a paper
organization until the late 1950s. Likewise, for the first
five years after its founding in May 1955, the Warsaw Treaty
Organization (WTO) was little more than a shell for future
development of intra-bloc ties. It had virtually no central
staff and was totally subservient to Soviet designs.
[Ref. 12: pp. 20-29], C Ref . 13: p. 258-264] Until 1961-62
the WTO amounted to little more than a symbolic presence.
Between 1959 and 1962 the slow transition was begin-
ning to be made to put these two important institutions to
use for integration purposes. Focus on the military as well
as the political functions of the WTO first became apparent
in March 1961, when it was agreed to convene regular consul-
tative meetings by the national defense ministers, hold
joint military maneuvers and initiate a Soviet-assisted
20
modernization of East European combat forces. The first of
these multinational exercises, Brotherhood in Arms t was held
in the fall of 1961 in connection with the Berlin crisis.
CRef. 13: p. 262] Khrushchev also used these signs of
increased cooperation politically in his repeated boasting
of the new "relationship of forces" existing in the world,
whereby the capabilities of the coalition of socialist
forces are rapidly surpassing the fragmented imperialist
forces. Communist controlled East Germany was becoming an
ever increasingly important member of this coalition.
After some success in 1956 in the areas of produc-
tion specialization and coordination of national economic
planning, the CMEA showed practically no further development
until 1962. It was then that Khrushchev introduced the
first serious steps toward socialist economic integration
CRef. 12: p. 25] Despite the lack of practical measures
implemented during the Berlin crisis period to improve the
integration of the Eastern European states into a coopera-
tive alliance system, the alienated atmosphere of the Stalin
years was dissipating. Although perhaps somewhat
overstated, Wolfgang Leonhard's observation in 1962 of this
change in Soviet emphasis is instructive.
In practice, however, brutal methods of political
suppression and colonial exploitation are no longer
applied to the satellites. On the contrary, the Soviet
Union tries to link economic and political interests of
the communist countries so closely with one another that
a more or less voluntary interdependence is created.
CRef. 14: p. 330.]
Khrushchev himself is much to blame for the ideolo-
gical divergence within the socialist movement following his
"secret speech" at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956.
For the next 12 years Moscow would be trying to make clear
to its East European allies and others in the "socialist
commonwealth" that a "different road to socialism" did not
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reduce the fact that ultimate power remained in the hands of
the Soviet Union. The Soviets "never accepted the concept
of multiple centers of authority on ideology and doctrine,
and asserted the right to determine which policies were
correct and which were revisionist" CRef. 15: p. 9].
Tito's action's since 1948 and Albania's divergence
in 1960-61 threatened ideological anarchy in Eastern Europe
and elsewhere in the socialist movement. Every communist
party in Eastern Europe with the exception of Bulgaria had
shown signs of possible disengagement from following the
Soviet vanguard example for socialist development. In an
attempt to restore the shaken unity of the communist world
movement, Khrushchev invited the leaders of sixty-four
communist parties to Moscow to celebrate the fortieth anni-
versary of the October Revolution and participate in an
International Communist Conference in November 1957. At
this conference Khrushchev worked towards documenting the
Soviet leadership role in the movement and to redefine the
earlier thesis of "different roads to communism". Overall
this conference and another held in 1960 reflected a quasi-
successful effort by Moscow to discipline "institutional
diversity with ideological conformity", making it quite
clear that the Soviet Union claimed the leading role and
would determine the primary principles which all partici-
pants would have to accept. CRef. 14: pp. 260-264] »
CRef. 15: p. 9.]
During this period the Kremlin leadership was well
occupied with establishing its legitimacy in East-Central
Europe while not wanting to lose any of its control. Soviet
Deutschlandpolitik was mostly concerned about the latter
during this time period. It was still too early to expect
legitimacy among their defeated foes-turned-allies, but
could recognize the necessity of keeping Germany a non-
threat for the future. The German Question was well as
22
policy on East German relations were still kept as separate
entities from East European policy. Therefore, Khrushchev's
East European foreign policy interests had only moderate
affect on Soviet Deutschlandpolitik during the period of the
Berlin Crises.
An estimation of Soviet interests in Eastern Europe
during the period 1968-1971 rests primarily on three charac-
teristics: 1) Their interests were formed more through
reaction to events than through their own strategic plan-
ning; 2) Eastern European relations were not of primary
concern to Kremlin leaders relative to their other foreign
policy interests (or distractions), i.e. global policy vis-
a-vis the U.S. and rapprochement with Western Europe; and 3)
Soviet interests did not change much during the period,
showing a good deal of consistency. C Ref . 15: p. 17]
The reform experiments within some East European
communist parties in the late 1960s, culminating in the
Prague Spring situation under Dubcek, forced the Soviet
Politburo to make some very difficult decisions. Without
dealing in depth in the processes leading to these decisions
CRef. 163 « substantial internal and external pressures grew
unabated as a result of a lack of USSR control in this
reform movement. The advocates of intervention in
Czechoslovakia, comprised primarily of the internal group
such as party leaders in the western non-Russian republics,
the military and security forces and those members respon-
sible for ideology, and the external group, led by Walter
Ulbricht and Wladislaw Gomulka, finally won the debate, but
not until after several months of discussion and negotia-
tion. Although the intervention did reestablish the credi-
bility of Soviet military power as the ultimate instrument
of Moscow' s control in the area, Brezhnev had to interpret
the move as a failure of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe
23
and, subsequently, as a demand to reorganize and redevelop
the alliance system.
To guard against such a reemergence of a loss of
control within the alliance, Brezhnev set . forth plans to
"normalize" the Czech situation and to tighten and improve
integration of the Eastern bloc alliance system as a whole.
This involved internal measures aimed at increasing Soviet
hegemony within the bloc but also simultaneously, to improve
coordination relationships and reduce intra-bloc divisions.
[ Ref . 173 The primary reemphasis was on 1) Ideological
orthodoxy; 2) Tightened discipline among member states and
3) Strengthening the major institutions which did not ques-
tion the leading role of the USSR. The latter represented a
significant restructuring of the WTO military relations,
particularly regarding the role of the Political
Consultative Committee (PCC), and the CMEA. The Soviets
apparently hoped to establish some sort of supranational
scheme for socialist integration in all spheres of intra-
bloc relations. [Ref. 12:. p. 89] Bilateral security
treaties were renewed or renegotiated and the East European
leaders were invited to meet with the CPSU General Secretary
much more frequently, such as the "informal" visits each
summer to- the Crimea. Also the term 'Socialist
Commonwealth' made popular by Khrushchev was slowly replaced
by the term 'Socialist Community' (Obshchina) , without the
same connotation of equality. [Ref. 15: p. 17]
Just as the Dubcek reforms directed Soviet interests
toward a reemphasis on the need for a tightened alliance,
increasing signals from the Federal Republic of an evolving
Ostpolitik demanded Soviet attention be given to possible
East European responses. Beginning prior to the Grand
Coalition, the Eberhard government proposed Renunciation of
Force agreements in March 1966 to all foreign Eastern bloc
nations, with the exception, of course, of the GDR.
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Followed shortly thereafter by the Grand Coalition' s new
emphasis on Entspannung ( relaxation of tension) policy based
on bilateral contacts, the Soviet leadership faced a new
challenge of keeping alliance unity in tact in coordinating
a communist bloc response to these growing opportunities.
As will be discussed below, the Kremlin placed much weight
on West Germany's recognition of the post-war status quo in
Eastern Europe. Many aspects of the emerging Ostpolitik
suggested this recognition as a likely bi-product of future
negotiations.
At the same time, however, opening contacts with the
alliance's "number one" enemy was fraught with great dangers
which very possibly could result in a dismemberment of the
alliance itself. Most sensitive as well was not to disad-
vantage the GDR in the course of these contacts. This
desire was almost an impossibility from the start since Bonn
excluded East Berlin from these agreements.
The Soviet Union, with obvious support from the GDR
leadership, insisted on a unified, multilateral approach to
Westpolitik and a European Security Conference (ESC). With
the exception of Romania, this policy held together through
1968.
The year 1969 was a watershed for developing poli-
cies on both sides of the Elbe. The multilateral coalition
was reduced to only Poland and East Germany, while the
momentum increased for bilateralism, promoted by Romania,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Kremlin, although desiring
the multilateral approach, could not bring together the
various conflicts to forge a united design and could not
afford to pass up increasing opportunities with Bonn. Here
it is interesting to note that while the Soviets preferred a
multilateral approach to a critical policy issue, it had
never really exercised multilateralism among the Eastern
bloc alliance. Despite significant efforts to make
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institutional changes to foster greater multilateral
cooperation within the WTO and CMEA, together with increased
bilateral consultations, the major planning and communica-
tions still flowed much like spikes of a wheel through
Moscow in major interactions among the individual members.
Through a series of very important Warsaw Pact
summit meetings in 1969, in Budapest in March, in Prague in
October and in Moscow in December, there evolved a
"controlled bilateralism", according to which Moscow would
lead the way to a bloc-wide rapprochement with Bonn. This
was to set an example for other Eastern European-FRG
contacts as well as lay the groundwork for a European
Security Conference. CRef. 12: pp. 62-64], CRef. 18: pp.
196-2283. The Soviets were able to stick to this scheme
fairly well which began with the Moscow-Bonn treaty,
followed by the Warsaw treaty, a normalization treaty
between East Berlin and Bonn, known as the Basic Treaty, and
then separate treaties with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Bulgaria respectively.
The final aspect to mention regarding Soviet-East
European interests during this period of detente was the
Soviet need for support within Eastern Europe to project the
USSR as a new global power. As John Campbell states: "It
was not enough to be a superpower in size and military
strength. An essential element of the new status was having
other states, making up a large part of Europe, in the
socialist camp" CRef. 15: p. 133. East Europe's role in
Moscow's correlation of forces was important to the Soviets
in both their superpower and their world communist leader-
ship role. This would have its most significant application
during USSR-US SALT negotiations, which were high on
Moscow's list of priortity interests at the time.
As can be seen above, during the 1960s the GDR was
increasingly integrated into the Soviet's East European
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policy. As an important political partner in the socialist
camp, East Berlin had to have been considered and consulted
in making significant changes in East European policy. The
advent of detente policy with Western Europe forced the
Kremlin to consider possible effects on their
Deutschlandpolitik from the eastern borders of the GDR as
well as from the western borders. During this period, what
the other East European states did could have lasting
effects upon Soviet interests in Germany; possibly affecting
both of the individual German states and/or the German
Question as a whole. Therefore, Soviet East European
foreign policy interests played a very important role in
their Deutschlandpolitik formulations.
Through the detente experiences of the 1970s, the
Soviets entered the eighties much the wiser in regard to
East European relations. Integration of member states into
the decisionmaking group was to continue, but with institu-
tional guarantees that Moscow was informed of, and involved
in" the medium and high level decisions made among alliance
member states. Although individual states demanded their
share of "uniqueness" within the alliance, greater cohesion
was still an important goal to be achieved through ideolo-
gical orthodoxy and economic, i.e. social, stability.
The effect detente had on both East and West Europe
could not have escaped Soviet attention. Eastern European
economies were boosted and then struck with ill affects of
West European economic setbacks. They also gradually devel-
oped substantial hard-currency debts to Western banks. The
Soviets, since Lenin, have insisted on economic autarky and
the negative affects of Western economic troubles on Eastern
European economic goal proved a good reminder to Moscow why
their forefathers had done so. Although limiting Soviet
options in some areas, the debt situation did create some
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positive results from Moscow's perspective. These debts
created a lasting West European interest in East Europe's
economic and social stability. One example of the potential
usefulness of this situation may have surfaced after the
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. The evident desire among
leading West Europeans to return to "business as usual"
shortly after the invasion was obviously supported by many
with vested interests in Eastern Europe and the USSR.
The growth of dissident movements in many Eastern
bloc countries emphasized the need for greater internal
control in some countries while the need for economic
stability mandated Soviet leniency in response to Hungarian
economic reforms. C Ref . 19: pp. 109-120] Had the latter not
proved successful, or created instability in the single-
party control apparatus, we probably would not have seen
this permissiveness. The point is that Moscow has come to
recognize some of the cultural, historic and geographic
distinctions related to the various members of their East
European alliance. Respecting the limitations and capabili-
ties unique to these states, the Soviets appear to have
utilized economic and political roles appropriate for them.
All the East European states could be employed in
doing their part in the on-going "peace offensive" engi-
neered by the Soviets after Helsinki. Following the
Afghanistan invasion, Soviets and East European leaders
understood the necessity of reviving the spirit of European
detente, and the East European contacts were in a much
better position than Moscow to lead the campaign. [Ref . 12:
p. 1113
Although every country had established their own
peculiar contacts over the decade of detente, Hungary and
Romania were most deeply involved in relations with the
West. In many ways they were probably assigned as leaders
in promoting the peaceful nature of East European interests
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in Western Europe. As leaders of the "peace team", although
not altogether a homogeneous one, the Soviets, through the
assistance of their East European allies, hoped to exploit
fissures in NATO and the failing image of American leader-
ship throughout the free world. C Ref . 12: pp. 113-114]
East Berlin was alloted an ideological watchdog role
to be shared with Prague. East Germany also quickly devel-
oped an important technical support role in Soviet Third
World involvement. Like East Berlin, the ideological
strictness adhered to by the Husak regime earned Prague the
shared ideological watchdog role among East European WTO
members. C Ref . 19: p. 115] Additionally, Czechoslovakia
shared a military hardware production role with Poland for
intra-alliance deployment and sales to fit Soviet Third
World needs. In other areas, East Germany, Czechoslovakia
and Bulgaria were dependable supporters of Soviet foreign
policy, while Romania and Hungary's lack of enthusiastic
support would have to be muffled or the affects contained
whenever possible.
Poland appears to have been too unstable over the
past decades to have inherited any significant role outside
Eastern Europe. Her political and economic problems
demanded much attention from her Soviet and East European
neighbors, who did their best to "help" her through the
Solidarity crises in the early years of the new decade.
Despite the economic problems developing in the
region and the subtle challenges to Moscow's control over
Pact foreign policy, the Soviet Politburo remained quite
preoccupied with other problems and interests, e.g.
Afghanistan, INF, Third World adventures and the CPSU lead-
ership succession.
Although relative stability in Eastern Europe domi-
nated the period, with the exception of Poland, the mere
fact that that East Germany participated in any discussion
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of increased room for individualism in socialist foreign
policy making drew significant attention in Moscow. But the
possible implications this had on Soviet hegemonical inter-
ests in East-Central Europe must have kept the Soviet lead-
ership alert to the potential GDR influence within the WTO.
Therefore, Soviet East European foreign policy interests
were a substantial part of their Deutschlandpolitik during
this period.
2. East Germany
Walter Ulbricht had his hands full with domestic
concerns when the Fifth SED Party Congress met in July 1958,
and for the following five years gave little priority
towards relations with other Soviet bloc countries. This is
not to say that he did not have any substantial interests in
Eastern Europe but that these interests were mostly oversha-
dowed by domestic demands. Only during the three months
prior to the Fifth Party Congress had Ulbricht removed the
last formidable opposition group to develop from
Khrushchev's de-Stalinization movement, i.e. the Schirdewan
and Wollweber group.
At this congress he further purged members of the
Central Committee (CC) and tried to down-play the near
desperate economic situation in the GDR by calling for "the
building of a material-technical foundation of Socialism".
Following Khrushchev's example of setting totally unreal-
istic economic goals to prove socialist ascendency over the
capitalist system, Ulbricht announced that the "chief
economic task" in the next three years was to surpass the
Bonn government's per capita production of consumer goods.
Futile attempts to accomplish this task through an "enticed"
collectivization program, the intensification of Party
control over State functions and the growing refugee problem
kept Ulbricht' s attention focussed primarily on internal
problems. CRef. 20: pp. 935-9371, CRef. 21: pp. 60-75]
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Having only three years earlier been granted sover-
eignty status through the 20 September 1955 Treaty of
Friendship with the USSR, Ulbricht was still very dependent
on Moscow for any legitimacy he might claim. For many
reasons, Ulbricht had minimal contacts with his East
European neighbors, despite his need for their support for
any foreign policy he might propose to conduct. Of course,
this may not have been of Ulbricht' s own choosing. Memories
of Nazi Germany were still coloring the image of East
Germany held by Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia.
Poland and Czechoslovakia were slow to agree, for example,
to the open development of the East German National People's
Army (NVA) and to the sale of advanced military equipment to
the GDR. ERef. 22: p. 65] Another example was Poland's
opposition to the Peace Treaty which Khrushchev threatened
to conclude with the GDR. Warsaw feared at the time that it
would result in the severing of trade relations by the West,
something the Polish economy could not afford to lose.
Ulbricht also needed to keep some distance from
remnants of the 1956 reformers in Hungary and Poland. The
latter was the only country Ulbricht went to for a bilateral
visit during the time period 1958-1962. During this visit
in the summer 1958 with Gomulka, Ulbricht found an indirect
way to remind his host of his dissatisfaction with Poland's
internal policies. Erwin Weit, Ulbricht' Polish interpreter
during the visit (and many subsequent visits), describes how
Ulbricht, at a much-publicized factory visit, had accom-
plished this. "Using the pretext of answering questions
from the workers, Ulbricht attacked, one by one, all the
reforms which had been introduced by the Polish Party lead-
ership in the last two years since Gomulka had come to
power." [Ref. 23: p. 49]
Politically, the East European socialist countries
were the only international entities willing to recognize
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the Ulbricht regime as legal. Erich Honecker, in a speech
some twenty-five years later marking the 30th anniversary of
the GDR remembered:
Acting in a truly fraternal spirit, the Soviet Union and
the other socialist countries admitted our young
republic into their community, always standing by its
side in the struggle against the diplomatic blockade the
imperialists imposed on it. C Ref . 24: p. 485]
The degree of willingness on the part of the individual
states is subject to speculation, but, nonetheless, only
through their recognition and support did the Ulbricht
regime hold any legal evidence of their state's interna-
tional status. Throughout the Berlin crises, certainly
Ulbricht needed his eastern neighbors more than they needed
him.
For almost solely survival reasons, Ulbricht had to
develop his Deutschlandpolitik around the support derived
from his eastern neighbors. So far as his sense of respon-
sibility for cooperation as an alliance partner was
concerned, he did not appear much interested beyond that
necessary for their continued recognition of his state, nor
did he expect much more in return. He well understood that
the important decisions were made in Moscow and that is
where he focussed his attention. During the period, then,
Ulbricht' s East European policy interests only moderately
affected his state's Deutschlandpolitik.
By 1968 the situation above had changed dramati-
cally. East German leader's concerns about their East
European neighbors struck at the nerve cells of the Ulbricht
regime. Political and economic reform as practiced by
Czechoslovakia and Hungary could possibly destroy the
internal stability finally established by the hard-liners in
the SED. Three years earlier they were able to suppress and
32
4
redirect the reform elements within the Party. At the same
time, the few external legitimacy gains achieved by Ulbricht
could be washed away by her allies if they each jumped for
the new bait offered by Bonn, without looking out for GDR
interests. In this way Ulbricht was quite preoccupied with
the internal and external policies of her Eastern allies.
Most important to East Berlin leadership was the
possibility of ideological contamination from Czechoslovakia
or Hungary. The two and one-half year reform period did
have some positive affects on the population and the
external image of the GDR. Through gradual, but consistent
economic improvements, a relative satisfaction, both
economic and political, was developing among the worker and
technical-scientific classes. Concurrently, an East German
identity was beginning to establish itself within the popu-
lation, primarily through the prominent role achieved by the
GDR economy among the East European states. Apparently, the
educational and propaganda system was "breeding" a new post-
war generation by 1968 and this was the socialist environ-
ment in which this new^ identity was emerging. All of these
improvements could be wasted if events in Prague could not
be brought under control.
Understandably then, Ulbricht, together with
Gomulka, was a staunch supporter of military intervention in
Czechoslovakia during the summer of 1968, if that is what
was necessary to to repel the "infection of liberalism"
spreading in that country. Ulbricht also found a Soviet
colleague in a very similar situation in Petr Shelest, a
This group included economic experts, Erich Apel and
Gunter Mittag, and Premier Willi Stoph. The clamp-down
occurred at the 11th CC plenum in December 1965, ending the
economic and social reforms gradually in effect since 1963.
The end of the short-lived reform era was highlighted by
Economics Minister Apel s suicide on the day a long-term
trade agreement with the Soviet Union was signed. See Use
Spittman article, "East Germany: The Swinging Pendulum", in
Problems of Communism , July/August 1967.
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Politburo member and First Secretary of the Ukrainian
Communist Party, who was concerned about such infections
carrying over into his Ukraine population. C Ref . 16: pp.
102-102, 114-116] Neither Ulbricht or Gomulka kept their
dissatisfactions secret.
They became outspoken critics of the Prague reformers
and persistent advocates of a hard line policy toward
Czechoslovakia in the early stages of the crisis, as
demonstrated by their performance at the Dresden
Conference in March 1968. C Ref . 16: p. 24]
At that early stage Ulbricht was forewarning doom if things
continued in Prague as they were.
East German leaders had other reasons for criticism
of the Czech reforms. Internal reforms could lead to
changes in foreign policy. For Ulbricht this meant possibly
Prague responding to the Kiesinger government's offers of
bilateral Renunciation of Force agreements in such a manner
which would disregard GDR's interests. The Romanians had
already broken out of line through recognition of Bonn in
1967, and a border state like Czechoslovakia doing anything
similar would sell out East Berlin's requirements: Full
international recognition by Bonn and territorial indepen-
dence for West Berlin prior to East European negotiations
begin with Bonn. Ulbricht needed Moscow's support in his
demands for a unified, multilateral response to West German
overtures, and possibly hoped to strengthen his hand with
Moscow by backing the military option to the Prague crisis.
Dr. Valenta suggests another payoff that Ulbricht may have
been seeking by pressing the military solution; namely, the
prevention, or at least a delay, in the move toward
rapprochement between Moscow and Bonn due to the resultant
reactions to intervention in the West. [Ref . 16: p. 25]
In any case, any independent bilateral action within
the Eastern bloc in establishing improved relations with
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West Germany threatened the frail international scaffolding
erected by Ulbricht within the diplomatic world. He knew
the incentives offered by Bonn, or potentially offered, were
a much greater motivating force than his demands for
socialist unity. As long as the WTO viewed the Federal
Republic as its principle enemy, the GDR could portray
itself as the vanguard in the struggle against the West
German "revanchist" threat and continue to demand solidarity
from its allies in support of East German interests. As the
enemy image (Feindbild) of the FRG began to lose its credi-
bility in Eastern Europe, the SED leadership found it
increasingly difficult to retain the political support of
their allies. CRef . 4: p. 1433 At the same time, Ulbricht
could not fail to realize the political and economic depen-
dence of the East German regime on the other WTO states. Of
the 13 states that granted full diplomatic recognition to
East Berlin, the Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavia comprised 8 of
these. Over 40% of East German foreign trade was with the
USSR, 68% was with CMEA members.
Up until the Prague Warsaw Pact meeting in October
1969, East Berlin held closest to Moscow, knowing they were
the best hope for protecting GDR's interests within the
alliance since Ulbricht probably realized the limited influ-
ence he held at these meetings. Together, however, the two
partners were only able to get away with the above-mentioned
"controlled bilateralism", with Moscow leading the Pact in
Westpolitik.
The failure of Ulbricht' s attempts to gain support
for his multilateral approach had many unsettling aspects
for East Berlin. First of all, Ulbricht expressed the fear
of the lack of control while others, namely Moscow, negoti-
ated with Bonn on issues affecting the GDR. CRef. 18: p.
255-2593 Second, Ulbricht genuinely distrusted the parties
involved, fearing a Soviet "deal" with the West with
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disastrous outcomes for the GDR. According to Mr." Weit, his
polish interpreter, Ulbricht distrusted the Soviet Union
considerably, and the other East European leaders even more.
He claims Ulbricht 1 s ultimate nightmare was- a deal between
the USSR and the Federal Republic, a deal in which Moscow
agreed to German reunification on Bonn's terms in return for
economic and political concessions by Bonn. [Ref . 23: p. 5]
It can be pointed out that during the period December 1969 -
September 1971, during which the Soviets were negotiating
with Bonn on the Moscow Treaty or with the Western Powers on
Berlin, all the actors to this dream were in place, creating
an ideal setting for conjuring up such nightmares.
A third major interest of the SED leadership during
this period in respect to their East European allies was to
reinforce its German "socialist" role in the alliance. Not
disconnected from the desire to gain influence for future
leverage in dealing with the above two interests, Ulbricht
hoped to benefit from East Germany's relatively high produc-
tion capability which could be imbedded into bilateral
agreements. The 1968 growth rates in CMEA trading patterns
suggest that the East German economic potential was trans-
forming into political power within the Bloc. The limited
political clout which Ulbricht was able to carry to the many
WTO meetings on Westpolitik was derived from this economic
potential. East German expert Peter c. Ludz said in 1969 of
Ulbricht on this subject:
His efforts at isolating Czechoslovakia in the Bloc, and
simultaneously, at preventing the isolation of the GDR,
have also met with some degree of success. [Ref . 25: p.
683
The goal of this policy was to establish the GDR in a domi-
nant position within the Eastern bloc that would, hopefully,
develop into a self-sufficient "socialist economic system".
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East Berlin might then be able to better assert itself in
the community, and, subject to Soviet veto power, issue the
basic "edicts" to the other non-Soviet, CMEA members.
CRef. 25: p. 69]
Quite clearly one can note the value of the East
European allies which the East German leaders hac come to
appreciate. Not only their continued international recogni-
tion rested upon outward support in the other East European
capitals, but also any leverage for effective pressure
against the West or vis-a-vis Moscow could only result from
collective positioning by the East European leaders. The
East Germans came to understand themselves an important
element in this equation. East Berlin's East European
foreign policy interests were crucial to their conducting a
successful Deutschlandpolitik according to their perceived
interests during the period 1968-1972.
In the 1970s, Honecker led the GDR through the most
important developmental period in East German history. Out
of the growth from a regional, semi-recognized East European
state to an internationally recognized European state active
in all parts of the world, East Berlin' s dependencies on her
Eastern neighbors declined significantly. This change in
external legitimacy requirements together with relative
stability in Eastern Europe during the early 1980s,
excluding the Polish crisis, allowed the SED leadership to
place foreign policy emphasis on concerns mostly outside the
Soviet bloc while still pursuing certain important East
European relationship interests.
The primary GDR interest in East Europe continued to
be social and political stability within the WTO member
states. Honecker and other SED leaders repeatedly praised
the Soviet leadership in all major party matters and
demanded close adherence to the Soviet official Party line
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among neighboring Pact states. Poland's crisis with
"Solidarity" caused significant concern to SED officials,
although the publicly declared dangers were presented as
much more serious as they actually were. For the most part,
workers in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, the area of greatest
concern for the SED, felt themselves disassociated from
Polish workers, who were seen as lazy and ungrateful for all
the assistance provided them by other countries. CRef. 26:
pp. 1009-10143, CRef. 27: p. 84] Obviously, over time the
ideas, both political and economic, espoused by "Solidarity"
could develop limited opposition in East Germany or
Czechoslovakia, but before Martial Law was declared on 13
Dec 1981, there were no signs of such developments in either
country. CRef. 28: pp. 1048-1058], CRef. 29] Reacting,
nonetheless, on fears of a possible spread to the GDR of the
"Polish disease", Honecker ordered travel restrictions
leading to border closings after eight years of visa-free
movement between the two countries. CRef. 30: p. 21]
Honecker took other steps to correct the situation in Poland
as well. Together with open criticism of Polish internal
policy and suggestions of "fraternal assistance" during
their time of need, the GDR was among the first states to
provide economic aid after Jarelzelski took control. There
have been no notable indications of East Berlin dissatisfac-
tion with Polish policy since stability was established in
1982.
By the end of the seventies, East Germany had
installed itself as the leading technological producer
within the CMEA. The many reasons for this condition aside,
Honecker appears to press the GDR's development in this area
to its maximum output. At the Tenth SED Party Congress in
April 1981, he listed ten economic priorities of the
"strategy for the eighties", of which seven noted the
scientific-technical revolution as means for achievement or
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greater exploitation o'f present capabilities. CRef. 31]
Moscow placed increasing pressure on CMEA members to improve
their high-tech production capabilities in the late 1970' s.
This was perhaps in response to their dissatisfaction with
the level of technological transfers received from the West
through detente policies. This pressure was most visible
when the Soviet representatives "scolded" the other CMEA
members for lacking high-tech export equipment during the
annual CMEA conference in East Berlin in 1983.
Leading in this high-tech area and in per capita
standard of living among its allies, East Berlin has set
tough, but realistic, goals for economic development during
the 6th Five Year Plan 1981-1985. CRef. 32: pp. 30-43] A
major motivation for East Berlin to achieve even better
economic standards is the fact that East German performance
is not measured by the population primarily against its East
European neighbors, but against the FRG, with whom it has
never favorably compared.
Another important interest in Eastern Europe was the
Euromissile issue, particularly in regard to Soviet counter-
measures to NATO deployment. The response by the WTO of
putting SS-21 and SS-22 in the GDR and Czechoslovakia after
the Soviets failed to stop the NATO deployment was used by
Moscow as an inward and outward sign of cohesion. Within
the Warsaw Pact the Soviet Union hoped the increased threat
would pull the Pact closer to realization of their need of
Soviet protection against NATO aggression. Publically, the
move was meant to be a sign of the Pact's cohesion and
unanimity.
To East Berlin, however, it was no secret that they
were again pawns within the Superpower competition for
nuclear superiority. Soviet commitment and capability to
defend the East German state were appropriately valued, but
involving them in the SS-20 MRBM issue by deploying two
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additional families of nuclear missiles on East German
territory was questionably needed for defense of the WTO.
Although they both publicly supported the counter deployment
move, East Germany continued emphasis oh the need to
continue their dialogue with Bonn by "limiting the damage"
and Prague allowed the publication of citizens' doubts of
the necessity of the decision. These were some signs of
both regimes' discomfort with Moscow's hard line missile
policy. C Ref . 33]
Political and economic cooperation became a fact of
life among the East European states by 1980 and each state
had a big stake in the uninterrupted flow of Bloc affairs.
East Germany was no exception and as stated above, Honecker
intended to involve the GDR much further in these relations.
Although Honecker has almost always been the leader in
claiming Moscow's great role in any achievement in East
European affairs, it appears as though Honecker may have
gone "European" on a few occasions, leaving the Soviet Union
in the background.
During the summer 1984, following NATO's initial
deployment of cruise missiles, the Kremlin came down hard on
East Berlin's continued dialogue with Bonn. During this
criticism, both Hungary and Romania provided verbal support
for Honecker' s policy. [Ref. 34] Poland and Czechoslovakia,
in the meantime, continued to publish Moscow's criticisms.
In August, Honecker was the only WTO member to attend
Romania's (Anti-NAZI) celebrations. The other Bloc coun-
tries were supposedly protesting Romania's participation in
the Los Angeles Olympic Games. In the fall 1984, after
Honecker' s decision not to visit the FRG, and later in the
Winter 1985, Keues Deutschland quoted Hungarian sources
emphasizing the importance of the special role East European
socialist countries can play in securing and furthering
detente, particularly, the special inter-German "community
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of responsibility" CRef. 35], C Ref . 36: pp. 9-13] These
appear to have been signals from East Berlin of a desire to
pursue their intra-German interests despite Moscow's disin-
terest in the policy, not with any intention of destabi-
lizing the area, but in the belief that their
Deutschlandpolitik was for the good of all Pact members.
East Berlin's place within the East European
socialist community was realistically realized by Honecker
in the 1970' s. While appreciating the real power relation-
ships within the WTO, the East Germans well understood the
common interests shared by the smaller East European states.
These interests would compel the East Germans to not only
cooperate in the development of future regional policy, but
perhaps even to take a leading role in it. As such, East
Berlin's formulation of its Deutschlandpolitik was substan-
tially affected by its East European interests during the
latter seventies and early eighties.
In summary then, East European interests had some
effect on the decisionmakers in East Berlin and Moscow
during the Berlin crises, but were very important in influ-
encing these leaders during the Detente period. These
interests, although on the periphery of the main contro-
versy, assumed a substantial role in the latest dispute over
Deutschlandpolitik during the 1980s.
B. WESTERN EUROPEAN INTERESTS
1. Soviet Union
Soviet West European policy has been and continues
to be determined by Soviet control over its East European
empire, the course of its competition with the United States
and the degree of change existing in Western Europe itself.
[Ref. 37: p. 80] Robert Legvold suggests that we view
Western Europe as a pivot between Moscow's imperial and
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global interests — that is, as both a contributor and threat
to Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe and the world at
large, particularly vis-a-vis the United States. CRef. 37:
p. 803
During the 1950s, the Soviet Union was witness to a
period of European cooperation and integration in political
and economic spheres like never before experienced.
Unfortunately, the philosophies creating thes cohesion ran
counter to Soviet goals, particularly in light of the fact
that the U. S. was so deeply involved and committed to it.
It was therefore of primary interest to Moscow to slow down,
stop or even reduce West European integration developments
during the 1958-1962 time period.
The formation of NATO, and particularly West
Germany's entry into the organization in 1955, were viewed
as serious challenges to Soviet post-war achievements in
Eastern Europe. The NATO decision in 1957 to deploy nuclear
medium-range missiles on the continent, including West
Germany, raised the level of serious concern to a new
threshold. Soviet interests in Western Europe during the
Berlin crises were consequently substantially affected by
the need to respond to the missile dilemma.
The primary interest has already been alluded to:
the prevention of further military, political and economic
integration in Western Europe under U. S. influence which
could challenge the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. The
greater the disunity among NATO members, the greater the
possibilities for attaining a neutral, disarmed Germany(s)
along Soviet designs. On the political level, Moscow could
continue to take advantage of the strains that had arisen
within the western alliance over the Suez crisis or initiate
a crisis situation whereby the major players would find it
difficult to agree to an appropriate, common solution. The
situation in Berlin was a perfect, or almost perfect, candi-
date for this purpose.
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Khrushchev was well aware of the differing interests
among Western alliance members regarding the German Problem
and Berlin, and he needed only to stimulate the debate.
Jack Schick points out quite well the quarreling positions
within the Western team, with the Americans and British
working toward one direction and Bonn and Paris toward
another in response to Khrushchev's ultimatum note in 1958
and 1959. [Ref. 38: pp. 49-963 He suggests, in fact, that
De Gaulle and Adenauer had reached an understanding that if
the latter supported De Gaulle on certain Common Market
policies (.inter alia, keeping the UK out), De Gaulle would
support Adenauer on his Berlin interests. C Ref . 38: p. 62]
Leadership disagreements aside, the Soviets had by that time
an appreciation of how public opinion in the Western democ-
racies could complicate and aggravate the differences.
The prevention of nuclear missile deployments in the
Federal Republic was another major interest to Moscow.
[Ref. 11: p. 82] The possible control of these weapons by
Bundeswehr forces was for a Soviet statesman in the late
1950s a greater danger than China's development, or the
American possession, of atomic weapons. [Ref . 39: p. 610]
The United States' intial proposals for the deployment of
IRBMs in Europe included the consideration of possible
allied control, including West Germany. This possibility
staggered the Soviets. They could not fathom giving such
weapons to a country which had only recently been the major
world threat. Bulganin expressed the Kremlin's fear when he
wrote
One likewise cannot fail to take into account, for
example, the fact that the placing of nuclear weapons at
the disposal of the Federal Republic of Germany may set
in motion such forces in Europe and entail such conse-
?uences as even the NATO members may not contemplate.
Ref. 40], CRef. 38: p. 8].
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The methods the Soviets employed in trying to prevent the
missile deployments ranged from fanning popular Western
opposition to the deployment decision through such proposals
like the Rapacki Plan for a nuclear free zone in Central
Europe, to warnings that European governments which
permitted nuclear bases on their territory risked having
their countries totally annihilated in case of war.
CRef. 11: p. 84]
These threats of "country busting", targeted prima-
rily against Great Britain and West Germany, had another
purpose as well: the attempt to drive a wedge between
Washington and her European allies. To achieve this would
not only serve to unravel the alliance, but also drastically
reduce American military capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviets
in Europe and create a void in Western Europe for increased
Soviet influence. The Soviets trumped up many themes for
this purpose, pointing out differences between American,
French and British interests in the Suez Canal crisis and
the danger of peace inherent in their relationships with the
United States. CRef. 11: p. 83]
A further attempt to reduce U. S. influence in Europe
was in undermining European confidence in the American
European commitment. The creation of the Berlin crises
would place the question of commitment at the forefront of
discussion, and possibly, debate.
The above three interests could possibly all be
better served within DeGaulle's foreign policy objectives if
Khrushchev had played his cards correctly. [Ref. 18: p.
165] DeGaulle's fear of Anglo-American control within NATO,
his adamant refusal of U. S. control over nuclear weapons in
France and fear of a rearmed Germany all amounted to similar
5
-'The Rapacki Plan, first proposed by Poland on 2 October
1957, and offered in an amended version on 14 February 1958,
after Polish-Soviet consultations, called for a nuclear-free
zone to include the two Germanys, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
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interests as those mentioned above, except one. DeGaulle
understood and disliked Soviet influence even more than
American. Khrushchev never allayed this fear.
Also of importance to Moscow during this period was
the continuation of the enemy image or Feindbild given to
West Germany and the United States. This policy, when
successful, established the raison d'etre for the Warsaw
Pact and, more important perhaps, justified continued Soviet
presence in East Germany and Poland. Signs of an actual
teutonophobia, as mention above, were noticable, but the
exaggerated rhetoric has a critical role in the ideological
solidification in Eastern Europe. A clear example may be
drawn from passages from a chapter titled "Nature of Modern
War" in Sokolovskii ' s classic book, Military Strategy
,
appearing in 1962.
The American monopolists and their allies in NATO have
again aided the rise of West German imperialism after
defeat. Thus a breeding ground for war, a breeding
ground for new aggressive power, threatening the peace,
has been created in the center of Europe
CRef. 41: p. 1863
A final important Soviet interest to mention was
Khrushchev's desire to impress Western Europe of the Soviet
Union' s great power capabilities. Perhaps to prove its
qualifications for the exchange of one superpower for
another in Europe, or a Russian misinterpretation of West
European political culture, the reasons behind this remain
unclear. Khrushchev used technological and imaginary mili-
tary gains to engage in what the Russians had accused the
Americans of using - namely, "nuclear diplomacy". A certain
ambivalence emerged in his policies which entailed attempts
to outwit and scare the West combined with a desire to score
technological and military "firsts" that would confound the
United States, add prestige to the Soviet Union and glory to
Khrushchev's regime. CRef. 39: pp. 609-610 3
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As noted above, Moscow was greatly motivated in its
approach to Berlin and its Deutschlandpolitik by political
and security interests in Western Europe. To the Kremlin
the future security of Europe and the level of Soviet influ-
ence there was dependent upon a solution to the German
Problem. The Soviet interests in Western Europe were
crucial determinants in their selection of solutions and how
they could be accepted in the West. Hence, these interests
were also crucial to their formulation of a viable
Deutschlandpolitik
.
Under the slogan "Peace and Cooperation in Europe",
Moscow appealed to Western European nations during the mid-
to-late 1960s for a reduction of tensions and the normaliza-
tion of relations between East and West European countries.
Publicly highlighting the need to recognize the post war
status quo in Europe and to reduce the large military forces
on both sides, the ultimate Soviet goal remained to increase
their influence in Europe while decreasing U. S. influence in
the area.
Soviet efforts from 1966-1975 to realize a European
Security Conference (ESC) placed renewed emphasis on this
goal at a time when U. S. power and prestige was on a defi-
nite decline in Europe, primarily due to American involve-
ment in Vietnam. At the same time, increasing problems for
the Soviets on their eastern frontiers with China increased
their desire to cool off the potential for conflict in the
west. CRef. 39: pp. 748-750] Several shorter term goals
were also motivating Moscow to improve relations with the
West Europeans in the latter half of the 1960s.
First, the diffusing of the potential West German
military bomb was still important to the Soviets. Bonn was
still projected as the "number one" enemy on the European
continent by the Soviets, who could continue to conjure up
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nightmares of another 22 June 1941, given the Federal
Republic's incredible postwar economic and political
recovery, combined with certain revisionist voices within
the West German political leadership who refused to recog-
nized the eastern borders. Despite the risk of weakening a
useful ideological tool within the WTO, the Soviet leader-
ship found it necessary to come to terms with the changing
power structure in Bonn. Their primary goal in this
interest was to get Bonn to accept under International Law
the border changes made after WW II, thus eliminating the
major potential cause for a revisionist war from the West.
This turn of attitude with the West Germans would have other
useful effects as well. By reducing the Soviet Union's
Feindbild in the Federal Republic, the West Germans' psycho-
logical dependence on Washington would be weakened. After
West German acceptance of Soviet hegemony in East Europe,
the road would be open for a European-wide security confer-
ence which would further recognize the Soviet empire in
Eastern Europe.
Second among the Soviet interests in Western Europe
was to involve them in arms reduction talks, hoping to
reduce and limit both U. S. and West German troops in Central
Europe. This would serve not only Moscow's military inter-
ests in the area but also create new possibilities for
greater Soviet political influence. Third, the desire for
economic and technological benefits was part of the new
Soviet Westpolitik. Increased trade and technological
transfers were needed to replace aging industrial equipment,
revitalize slagging productivity and fill gaps in the
Soviets' high- technological research program. This was felt
not only beneficial to the Soviet domestic economy, but
could possibly draw West European countries closer to the
Soviet Union economically. Increased dependence on Western
industrial deliveries to the USSR combined with greater
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amounts of raw materials from the Soviets could increase
Moscow's influence over West European policies. CRef. 42:
p. 17]
Fourth, by creating a complex foreground of improved
East-West relations, the Soviets could carry out the most
extensive conventional and nuclear military modernization
ever accomplished by the Soviets. Massive armor, artillery
and aircraft deployments have taken place in the groups of
Soviet forces in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary
since 1970 and are still continuing at present. This was
accompanied by extensive SS-20 nuclear missile deployments
along with shorter range nuclear missile deployments, whose
primary targets are found in Western Europe. Beclouded by
an era of detente, reaction from the West was delayed six to
ten years into this modernization.
A final interest for the Soviets in Western Europe
at the end of the sixties was their perceived need to
advance a Westpolitik that stayed at least one step ahead of
the East Europeans in responding to the West's Ostpolitik.
As mentioned above, Moscow was caught between the desire to
control the resumsion of contacts and the fear of missing
developing opportunities.
In the process of pursuing these interests, the
Soviet Union had to redevelop its image in Western Europe
from the bullying enemy to that of the respectable business
partner. Adam Ulam states, for example, that
the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership, in contrast to
Khrushchev s of 1956-1962, set about to reduce American
influence in Europe not through dramatic tactics of
threats and ultimatums, but through a more patient and
subtle policy intended to emphasize Soviet Russia's new
responsibility as contrasted with America's recently
displayed irresponsibility. CRef. 39: p. 722]
The Kremlin's West European interests ranked high on
the list of priorities in Brezhnev's foreign policy in this
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period. To begin a new phase of Soviet-West European rela-
tions, Moscow realized that a shift in their
Deutschlandpolitik would be necessary. During the advent of
detente, the Soviet's West European interests were a vital
consideration in how they could reconfigure their overall
German policy to fit in with these changes.
Most Western Soviet analysts would agree that the
Soviet Union by 1979 had developed into a status quo power.
The long sought-after and complex relationships developed in
Western Europe over the postwar decades have come to rest on
fairly consistent principles. The long-term Westpolitik
certainly lacks the pendulous, and sometimes surprising,
characteristics of West European or, more often, American
Ostpolitik.
In contrast to the "long-shot" attempts by
Khrushchev to pry West Germany from NATO or West Berlin from
Western control, or Brezhnev's radical shift toward
rapprochement wit Bonn in 1969-70, the Moscow leadership in
the past decade has settled into a West European policy that
is quite consistent, although complicated. Given the policy
is drawn from other external factors (East Europe and global
concerns), it cautiously follows a major thrust emphasizing
certain prominent interests, avoiding risk, but taking
advantage of opportunity. This low-risk, high continuity
aspect carried Moscow through the period of leadership tran-
sition without any major crises or failures in this impor-
tant policy area.
As it was back in 1958, the Soviet interest to exert
influence within the NATO alliance remained very important
during the early 1980s. Over the past decades, however, the
Soviet's perception of the degree of influence available to
them has become more realistic. Although generally referred
to as "driving a wedge into NATO", this wedge can have many
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sizes and purposes. The prospect of causing a total break-
down of the Western alliance has probably not been consid-
ered possible, or perhaps, desirable, since the late 1960s
prior to the conflict over reformist Czechoslovakia.
Another possibility is to weaken the alliance, particularly
through attempts to exclude the U. S. , but not dissolve it
altogether. Its existence provides a stability factor
against which the Warsaw Pact can remain aligned. A third
option is to use West European NATO members, the best choice
being the Federal Republic, as a lever for a moderating
influence on American policy. C Ref . 43: pp. 40-42] *
[Ref. 44: p. 373
The degree to which these interests have been
pursued is more a matter of opportunity than design. In
their reactions to opportunity the Soviets created great
pressures within the alliance with such issues as Human
Rights, INF and appropriate responses to Soviet involvement
in Poland and Afghanistan. Obviously, the alliance itself
created many of its own problems through policy occilations
and misunderstanding Soviet interests, but Moscow would
waste little time in exploiting such fissures.
Within two weeks after the Soviet Afghan invasion,
for example, a Brezhnev declaration insisted that Moscow
still adhered to their commitment to detente in action and
in spirit and criticized those in the West who were under-
mining it. Intended to play into the hands of those
Europeans who questioned the Carter Administration's sanc-
tions, Brezhnev claimed the Kremlin remained "strongly in
favor of consolidating and multiplying everything positive
that has been created over the years on the European conti-
nent". [Ref. 45: p. 2643 And in April 1980, Pravda printed
an article within hours following the abortive U. S. attempt
to rescue the American hostages in Iran. It was designed to
question the responsibility of U. S. foreign policy, particu-
larly in the eyes of the West Europeans.
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Thus the 'complaisance' of the Western European allies
has led to results quite opposite to those which were
expected. The policy of 'appeasement' has make the
American President even more impulsive, adventurous and
unpredictable. This policy threatens to draw the West
European countries, against their will and contrary to
their interests, into a dangerous conflict in the Middle
East. CRef. 46]
In the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces issue, the
Soviets gave some real efforts toward exploiting and
fostering West European and West German anti-missile senti-
ment. Through peace-laden media releases, empty proposals
and probably a sizable indirect flow of organization funds
to demonstration organizers, the Soviet campaign against the
NATO missile deployment was based on the outside hope that
such efforts might prevent the stationing of the missiles,
and the sure conviction that any increased political polari-
zation within the alliance would make future Western arms
decisions that much more difficult. CRef. 44: p. 37]
Although a great security concern to Moscow, the
NATO missile deployment was not as great a perceived threat
by them as the 1957 IRBM deployment decision. The earlier
IRBM deployment plans included possible non-U. S. control,
meaning possibly the Bundeswehr . Despite a subsequent deci-
sion by the NATO council for sole U. S. control, this will-
ingness on Washington's part to allow West German control,
left room for the belief in Moscow of future nuclear weapons
in German hands. Twenty years later, it was more credible
to Moscow that neither Washington or Bonn wished the
Bundeswehr to control nuclear missiles. Also the Soviets
did not have such a superiority in theatre nuclear weapons
capability in 1958, which they unquestionably possessed in
1979. Needless to say, the Soviet leaders would not be
gDespite Western perceptions at the time to the
contrary, the Soviets had only begun to deploy their IRBMs
( SS-4 and SS-5) in 1959 and 1960 respectively, with larger
numbers of these systems building up rapidly in the early
1960s. In 1979, the West had only France's 18 IRBMs (the
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displeased if the anti-missile movement could prevent the
deployment, but they were probably more realistic and can
appreciate the divisive and confidence-breaking effects of
the decision within the alliance.
The West European governments had invested a great
deal in Ostpolitik as did the Soviets in their Westpolitik
during the 1970s. These relationships comprised many impor-
tant sectors within the two societies, excluding military
and social. The Soviets may not have benefitted as they had
hope for in technological and economic areas, but they did
succeed in achieving a degree of subtle political influence
through improved contacts. This investment in improved
relations was the mechanism by which Moscow pursued another
important interest in Western Europe: the maintenance of
detente era relationships, particularly with France and West
Germany.
All the NATO governments were in concert in their
emphatic demand that the Soviets pull their troops out of
Afghanistan. Simultaneously, however, they continued empha-
sizing the need to avoid abandoning the West-East dialogue
and argued against the economic sanctions proposed by the
U. S. West European leaders acknowledged that detente must be
global to hold its meaning, but their actions showed the
determination not to antagonize Moscow as long as Europe
itself or its interests were not directly threatened by
Soviet actions. CRef. 45: p. 268] Indeed, the U.S. and
Western Europe were dealing with Moscow on two different
levels of interests and Washington was asking the Europeans
U. S. had already pulled out their earlier intermediate range
systems), yet the USSR had over 500 launchers ( SS-4/5 and
SS-20) facing Western Europe. See John Collins, American
and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis ,
Center1 for Strategic and International Studies, Washington,
D. C.
, 1978, pp. 340 & 365, and also The Military Balance
19 7 9-80 , The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, 1979, pp. 2 & 90.
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to compromise their regional interests in favor of American
global interests. Gerhard Wettig argues the European view
rather convincingly in stating how the West Europeans were
not so surprised by the Soviet action in Afghanistan and,
although they did not condone such actions, they even shared
a certain understanding of Moscow's motives. C Ref . 43: p.
47]
The wedge driving effect aside, this need to
continue dialogue with West European leaders at times of
strained superpower relations was based on Soviet hopes to
influence a U. S. hard line course or restore valuable tech-
nological and economic for herself and her East European
partners. Why the FRG and France? The Federal Republic
understands that increased U. S. -Soviet tensions can play
their worse scenario out on their soil at their expense.
Bonn also realizes that West Berlin and intra-German
contacts are subject to Soviet approval. While the Berlin
card was not played during the past ten years, Honecker's
cancellation of his long-anticipated visit to the West was
undoubtedly a sign from Moscow reminding everyone who has
the final veto power. On the other hand, the Soviet leaders
must not appear too tough on the West Germans because this
would diminish their "peaceful country" image and possibly
force the West German public toward closer U. S. military
ties.
France has always played a balancing role in the
Superpowers' West European policy. During times of improved
U. S. -Soviet relations, the French have taken an independent,
almost provocative, position between the two greater powers.
However, during times of tension, Paris has clarified her
Atlantic preferences yet preserved her independent course in
Franco-Soviet relations. The entire while, during tension
or detente, the French maintain their Soviet trade connec-
tions on a near constant course.
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A final word need be mentioned on the Soviet
Feindbild of West Germany during the latest period. By and
large, it was used sparingly to verbally castigate the
conservative voices in the Federal Republic. However, it
had other uses at various times during the Moscow-East
Berlin, Moscow-Bonn conflicts. Throughout the Polish crisis
in 1980-81 and before and after the cruise missile deploy-
ments, Moscow attacked the West Germans as "revanchists"
,
depicting them as a source of unstability in Europe.
One use for this propaganda was to send messages to
East Berlin, by reminding them of the "danger of revanchist
tendencies" in the FRG, of the possibility of economic
leverage employable by the West Germans and to remind both
sides of their sovereign status. It also was to indirectly
inform the SED that their inter-German relations were being
well monitored in Moscow. During the Polish crisis Moscow
increased her attacks on the West Germans, usually in vague
terms, in an attempt to create the necessary Feindbild in
the East in order to direct the workers thoughts towards
national security needs rather than "solidarity" meetings.
Finally, throughout the period articles and speeches warned
of segments in the FRG who were too militaristic or revi-
sionist for their country's good. These are assessed to
have been more reminders to Bonn that Moscow has a deter-
mining voice in the level of intra- German relations and the
maintenance of good communications with West Berlin.
It is not too surprising, then, to see that the West
Europeans continued to demand much attention in Moscow. In
their Deutschlandpolitik, interestingly enough, East Berlin
actions helped to highlight Soviet West European concerns.
It is reasonable to believe that the Kremlin would not have
come down so hard on Bonn, and certainly not on East Berlin,
had Honecker not insisted on his "limit the damage" approach
to West Germany following the first missile deployments.
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During this period, Moscow's West European interests played
a substantial role in determining their Deutschlandpolitik.
2. East Germany
The viability of its success aside, the primary GDR
interest in Western Europe in the late 1950s was full recog-
nition of her sovereign status. As long as Bonn claimed
sole legitimate representation of the German people as an
international state and the West European states respected
this claim, Ulbricht's regime had no legal standing west of
its borders. Throughout the 1958-1962 period East Germany
was most frequently referred to in the West as the "Soviet
Occupation Zone" or the "Eastern Zone", denoting the lack of
legal status granted to Ulbricht's government. Other major
East German interests included the withdrawal of all foreign
troops from German territory and the declaration and recog-
nition of West Berlin as a free city, totally disconnected
from the Federal Republic. These will be discussed in
greater detail in a section below.
The Berlin Question and the German Question were
considered in the West as still very open, and quite proble-
matic in 1958, subject to settlement by the four major
allied powers. This is most evident in the intense diplo-
matic activity in Western Europe and Washington during the
Berlin crises. Although the solutions to the problems
varied significantly between the participants, the Question
was considered open for solution until the Berlin wall was
constructed in August 1961. The problem then still
remained, but the viable options considered for solution
were cut enormously.
Ulbricht, in his desire to see the German Question
closed, with full sovereignty to his regime, of course, was
able to squeeze some degree of de facto recognition from the
Western powers during the German conference on German Unity
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from May to August 1959. Both Bonn and Pankow were granted
observer status during the conference, which was understood
and publicized by Ulbricht as de facto recognition of his
legal status among the governments involved. Short of any
other signs of achieving his recognition goals, Ulbricht
kept the East German-West European government relations on a
level best described as "hostile".
There was no "in between" option for either East or
West German state during the first two decades of their
existence. Their orientation had to be fully East or West,
since their establishment was under the auspices of major
powers in one of these camps. By 1958 the East option deci-
sion, which Ulbricht had intensely implemented since his
"construction of socialism" proclamation at the Second SED
Party Congress in 1952, had placed the East German stated
firmly in the Soviet orbit. CRef. 22: pp. 43-76], CRef. 25:
pp. 4-6] The sovietization-integration was successful in
most major areas, political, economic, military and social,
but not psychological.
In order to win the minds of the people, the SED
developed a program geared towards a total reorientation of
public values from West to East and from capitalism to
socialism. This involved defining the enemy as coming from
the west, future security and happiness from the east and
severing all positive images of things western. Combine
this reorientation policy with the hostile foreign policy
towards Western Europe, particularly Great Britain, France
and the Federal Republic, one can quickly appreciate the
lack of East German foreign policy interactions with Western
Europe at this time. Trade relations were the only level of
"normal" contacts, yet their relative importance was
consciously being reduced annually by East Berlin until
1964.
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Although East German leaders could not yet afford to
develop complex interests adventuring far from their East
European and Soviet protectors, the fact of West Europe's
existence could not be ignored. Trade with the West was a
reality with which they somberly dealt and political recog-
nition in the West was their most secure assurance of their
continued existence.
This unceasing desire for recognition lie, however,
underneath the fear of being swallowed up or traded away by
the very same Western powers, from which they demanded
recognition. Therefore, within the vacuum of any substan-
tial relations with Western Europe, existed very important
West European interests in Ulbricht's Deutschlandpolitik
namely, their placing a stamp of approval on his regime.
Although one can point out that the East German
regime has always offered to establish normal diplomatic
relations with West European countries, in actuality, their
relations with these countries shifted from hostility to
defensiveness during the 1960s. One of East Germany'
s
leading foreign policy experts and long-time Deputy Foreign
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Peter Florin, noted in 1967
that
. . already on 24 October 1949 the government of the
German Democratic Republic informed the governments of
all other states of its desire to attain and promote
?eaceful and friendly relations with other states and
hat the government of the GDR considers it desirable
and necessary to establish normal diplomatic, economic
and other relations with any government which is
Erepared to establish such relations with the GDR on the
asis of mutual respect and equality. CRef . 47: p. 76]
No more than a paragraph further in his book on East German
foreign policy, Florin claims that the imperialists states
wish to destroy the GDR because of its influence on the
working class in West Germany and fears of a German-USSR
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coalition against them. C Ref . 47: pp. 77-78] The important
connection here is that the road to relations with West
European countries must lead right through the Federal
Republic. As long as Bonn could hold the support of its
West European allies in its claim as sole representative of
the German nation and East Berlin was not willing to nego-
tiate with Bonn on the latter' s terms, normal relations
between Western Europe and the GDR were not going to
develop.
As was noted earlier, Bonn's support within the
western alliance was base on trade, national security, and
political relations as well as a bit of indirect coercion
through the declared "Hallstein Doctrine" since 1955.
Bonn's conditions were impossible for SED leaders to accept
since the Adenauer sole representation and reunification
policy meant nothing less than the forfeiture of power by
the SED. On the other hand, in order to establish some
degree of legitimacy in the GDR, the SED leadership could
not afford to begin discussions with Bonn regarding their
respective status for a future Germany(s). For Ulbricht, the
West German population over the border was better seen in
the GDR as the enemy, in both ideological and military
terms, and as a foreign state than as German neighbors.
Within the Soviet plan for an ESC, Ulbricht came out
in strong support for the conference beginning in 1966. His
call for an ESC, together with renunciation of nuclear
weapons and establishment of diplomatic relations, were
combined as a major theme that year in Ulbricht' s speeches.
CRef. 47: pp. 150-154] Within a multilateral context, the
Soviet ESC plan could very likely achieve East Germany's
goal of gaining widespread diplomatic recognition within
Europe and possibly even the settlement of the Berlin
problem.
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In 1968 no West European state had yet established
formal diplomatic relations with East Berlin. However, the
desire to trade with the East Germans was strong enough to
circumvent the recognition void. Twelve non-WTO European
states had established East German foreign trade representa-
tive in their capitals. Leading the way was Bonn itself,
who managed to retain about 10% of the total annual GDR
foreign trade. To the north, the Scandinavian countries
continued to hold high priority in East Berlin's foreign
policy interests in so far as they might be the first to
break the non- recognition block in the West. Ulbricht
continued his unsuccessful attempts to arrange multilateral
and bilateral Friendship treaties with his Baltic neighbors.
The great diplomatic breakthrough for the GDR, of
course, was the completion of the Normalization of Relations
Treaty, called the Basic Treaty, with Bonn in December 1972.
The treaty opened up the way for the entry of both German
states into the United Nations, and by the end of 1973, East
Berlin had formal diplomatic relations with most every West
European state. Ulbricht' s difficult task of having to deal
with Bonn to achieve his other West European goals will be
discussed in greater detail in another section below.
Strangely enough, East Berlin's Deutschlandpolitik
was less dependent upon its West European interests during
this period than it was during the previous one. The
greater self-confidence developed by Ulbricht' s regime,
combined with its stronger role in Eastern Europe, took off
much of the earlier pressure for recognition by Western
Europe. While it remained important to East Berlin and
probably had a substantial affect on their
Deutschlandpolitik, Ulbricht could well believe that his
state was a fairly secure entity, and that time was on his
side. Unfortunately for Ulbricht, Moscow decided to force a
new time-schedule on intra-German relations.
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The transition from years of bitter relations to
detente with Western Europe created in East German policy,
and to an even greater degree than in other East European
states, an ambivalence between external and internal inter-
ests regarding these relations. Following the Basic Treaty
and in the spirit of the Helsinki accords, Honecker endeav-
ored to prove East Germany's credibility as a worthwhile
"business-like" partner in East-West relations. This
included, for example, the conclusion of over 100 treaties,
agreements or protocols with EEC or EFTA countries in areas
of economic, technical, cultural or media policy. C Ref . 20:
p. 100]
The main motivation has been to be accepted as an
equal partner state in Europe through gradual economic and
political normalization, where possible, given its
geographic location between two conflicting social, polit-
ical and military blocs. High level, bilateral relations
with such countries as Great Britain or France are consid-
ered by the SED that externally the GDR is a viable interna-
tional partner and domestically that the regime's legitimacy
is no longer questionable. [Ref . 48] These contacts should
develop interrelationships which can be used, when needed,
to influence West European policy on matters related to
Germany or Berlin. They could also contribute to forming a
European identity which can be exploited to highlight
differences in American and West European interests. Both
of these options were exercised in East Berlin, and in other
East European capitals, after the Soviet invasion in
Afghanistan. West European governments realized they had
much to lose by following President Carter's "sanction"
policy and, likewise felt Carter did not properly appreciate
the West European interests. [Ref . 4: pp. 48-48]
Another important motivation to improve relations
with Western Europe has been to improve the East German
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economy through advantageous exchanges needed to make
greater progression in the scientific-technical revolution.
The East German leadership can exploit Western desires for
greater contacts by acquiring products and technology from
the West which are vital to future GDR economic
developments.
Counter to this whole drift towards increased East
German interests in West Europe are East German limitations
on West European influence in the GDR. The closer the East
Germans come to rubbing shoulders with their Western neigh-
bors, the more emphatically the differences between the
imperialists and the socialists must be pointed out. This
had already been referred to in inter-German relations as
Abgrenzung , and is quite similar in concept. The Abgrenzung
policy is more specific and nationalistic than the differen-
tialization policy needed vis-a-vis the West Europeans in
general.
Another important interest to East Berlin was to
play its role designated by Moscow as a messenger of peace
in Europe. The purpose of carrying out this role, together
with other East European states, is to stir up controversy
among the popular opinion in the West. If East Berlin and
her allies can convince some major portions of the
electorate in the West of their sincerity and seriousness in
formulating a peaceful socialist foreign policy, then the
groundwork is laid for Soviet interests in the area, partic-
ularly for WTO disarmament proposals. Honecker stressed
this theme in his address marking the 30th anniversary of
the GDR:
Peace is vital to all the world's nations ... It is
with this in mind that the German Democratic Republic
has always perceived and carried out the special respon-
sibilities resulting from its position at the boundary
between the two social systems, socialism and imperi-
alism, between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO alliances.
CRef. 24: p. 492]
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Honecker would like the West to believe that the GDR has the
greatest responsibility towards peace given the results of
the last World War. He mentions this topic in his autobiog-
raphy published for Western readership:
What we have rebuilt from the ruins of the Second WW in
a period of over 30 years - this is how the citizens of
the GDR see it - must not be reduced to ashes again.
Therefore the GDR makes every effort to prevent a war
ever being started again from German soil. CRef . 24: p.
383]
It is therefore in East Berlin's own interests that Central
Europe be "turned from a continent of tension and war into
an area of lasting peace, good neighborliness and
cooperation." CRef. 24: p. 490 3
Although silent on the Warsaw Pact's largest mili-
tary modernization in its history, the GDR was then able to
create out of its peace-minded image incredible arguments
against the proposed NATO cruise missile deployment.
Honecker again in his 30th Anniversary speech,
The most aggressive imperialist circles are pushing for
increased armaments on the part of NATO to a hitherto
unheard-of level and are leaving no doubt in regard to
their intentions vis-a-vis socialism and the national
and social liberation of the peoples. They do not even
rule out the possibility of plunging Europe - and not
only Europe - into a nuclear Armageddon. CRef. 24: p.
490J
Such pronouncements are meant to have desired
effects on both domestic and foreign audiences, i. e. the
West European "peace movement". Here we run into another
ambivalent aspect of GDR West European policy interests.
Despite East Berlin' s true interest in eased tensions
between the East-West alliances, the SED must retain, for
domestic purposes, the highly visible impression of "height-
ened tension" between the aggressive West and the peace-
makers in East Berlin and Moscow. This is certainly not new
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in Leninist-model regimes, but it must present some diffi-
culties trying to argue simultaneously that "developing a
wide range of equal and mutually beneficial relations" with
capitalist states is very significant, yet these same states
are trying to launch an unprecedented arms drive which is
threatening the very survival of mankind.
In this third period, the pendulum of the importance
of West European foreign policy interests had swung back to
the very important side. To prove its rightful role in
European affairs and to retain its potential value to Moscow
in this region, East Berlin has shown an interest in dealing
with both the East and the West according to its own needs
and abilities. In its Deutschlandpolitik it invested much
stock during the 1970s in its intra-German relations. East
Berlin's relations with Bonn, Paris and London have now
become very important determinants in its
Deutschl andpol itik.
In summary, interests in West European relations
formed the crucial motivations for Soviet actions during the
Detente period and could be valued as having very important
influence on both leaderships in both the Berlin crises and
during Honecker's detente attempts in the last case.
Western Europe plays a dual role, one as bilateral relations
between Moscow and East Berlin and the individual West
European countries and another role of Western Europe as a
single player, i. e. in terms of its effect on Soviet and
East German decisionmakers as a unified institution, such as
NATO and the EEC.
In both roles, West European interests have always
been a focal point, around which both countries'
Deutschlandpolitik objectives were determined. Likewise, a
malalignment of these interests could easily provide fuel




After Khrushchev's consolidation of power by the
Twenty-First CPSU Party Congress in 1959, he became the most
widely traveled Soviet leader in areas outside the USSR.
Khrushchev's journeys abroad in 1959-60 included trips to
the United States, China, Southeast Asia, France and
Austria. Although these trips may have been to focus atten-
tion away from growing domestic problems, they signify, more
importantly, Khrushchev's desire to project the USSR as an
active world actor. It was a rare occurance, indeed, for a
Russian leader to journey beyond his own borders. In doing
so, Khrushchev was signalling at home and abroad that new
roles were developing for his country.
More than anything else, as the USSR adventured in
the late 1950s into increasing global concerns, her leaders
found their policy increasingly dominated, as Adam Ulam puts
it, "by the triangular relation between the United States,
China, and the USSR". [Ref. 39: p. 6133 Within this
triangle the other two players pulled Moscow in opposite
directions; attempting with the United States to reach an
accommodation to end an era of tense cold war relations and
minimize the chances of nuclear annihilation, and to appease
Peking's expansionist demands in an attempt to avert an open
break between the two largest socialist countries.
During the Berlin crisis period, Moscow pursued two
major levels of global interests; one to meet survival needs
and the other to maintain their external empire. Both of
these were constantly influenced by the triangular relation-
ship mentioned above.
The Soviet Union's survival interests demanded
attention be given to the growing nuclear threat. For
Khrushchev, this threat had three major sources: the United
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States; China; and West Germany. The latter has been
discussed and we will return to again. Although the United
States was behind in missile technology, as Sputnik had
proven, American potential in this field did not escape the
CPSU First Secretary's strategic thinking. The potential
for nuclear conflict with the U. S. , and the ultimate phys-
ical destruction of the Russian empire, was perceived as
quite real.
By 1958, Soviet military strategy had made a tran-
sition in reflecting this fear to defining the future
conflict with the West as inevitably a nuclear exchange. At
the same time, the earlier thesis that war itself was inevi-
table was dropped, leaving room for other solutions for
survival. CRef. 49: p. 32] Soviet military developments
likewise corresponded to this strategy with the creation of
the Strategic Rocket Forces in 1959 and the deployment of
surface to surface medium- and intermediate-range missiles
( SS-4s and SS-5s) in the western USSR in 1959 and 1961,
respectively, to counter the U. S. nuclear assets in Europe
at that time. Although the Soviets had developed the first
ICBM, the SS-6, due to technological limitations and stra-
tegic military needs, i. e. the need to first counter the
European-based, American nuclear capabilities, only a very
small number of these ICBMs were ever deployed prior to the
development of the next generation ICBM in 1952. CRef. 49:
p. 663
The next Soviet approach to serve their survival
interests was to improve relations with the Americans to
reduce the risk of conflict. "The fear of a Soviet-American
general war involving the use of nuclear weapons led U. S.
and Soviet leaders to develop rules and procedures for the
management of nuclear weapons." CRef. 50: p. 44] These
rules and procedures meant the establishment of a deterrence
policy, conducted and understood by both sides. Beyond
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this, the fear of accidental breakout of war led both the
U. S. and the USSR to begin developing rules for crisis
management and crisis avoidance, which by 1962 were well
established, even though they were informal and tacit.
ERef. 50: p. 471
This very interest involving the establishment of
rules meant to avoid war, and demanding the opening of
contacts between Washington and Moscow, struck at the heart
of the widening Sino- Soviet conflict. This entire concept
of peaceful coexistence, the retreat from the inevitability
of war and the usefulness of East-West contact was consid-
ered unacceptable by the Peking communists. The divergence
of views on these questions and others was only exacerbated
by Khrushchev's visit to the United States in the Fall of
1959. The split was growing in both foreign and domestic
policy by mid 1960. CRef . 51: pp. 240-242]
Adam Ulam points out two essential elements of
Khrushchev's foreign policy at this time. First, Khrushchev
feared the development of nuclear weapons by the Chinese and
probably had been trying to get the U. S. to make a deal with
them; no nukes in Bonn, none in Peking. Whether this was
within their power, which was unlikely, is less important
than the motivations to establish such an arrangement.
Second, the growing troubles with Peking played a most
important role in Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin in 1958.
Before taking on an open conflict with the Chinese in the
communist world, or possibly further, Moscow first needed to
solve their greatest fear--that of West Germany receiving
nuclear weapons. CRef. 39: pp. 619-623] The low-risk ulti-
matum placed Khrushchev in a position to settle for an
agreement less than the original demands, yet still achieve
his primary goal of arranging for an nuclear-free West
Germany. The fact that the ultimatum failed in this goal is
another matter showing the complexity of the issues and
perhaps mismanagement on Khrushchev's part. CRef. 52]
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Another "Chinese" motivation behind Khrushchev's
actions on Berlin was to prove his capability to present a
hard line stance in facing the West, and to utilize the avid
support from the Chinese.
And the timing of the Berlin crisis leaves no doubt as
to the wider context in which the Soviets make their
move, nor, even more forcibly, does the fact that the
Soviet note to the Western Powers of November 27 which
opened the crisis was followed on December 21 by an
official Chinese statement from Peking endorsing it. The
Soviets were going to squeeze the last ounce of benefit
from their fast-waning alliance with China. The latter
complied for her own reasons, welcoming any new confron-
tation between the United States and the USSR.
ERef. 39: p. 619]
In response to interests aimed at the maintenance of
the Soviet world position, Khrushchev pursued somewhat
contradictory policies. While he searched for accommodation
with the United States to meet his survival interests, he
also applied expansionist policies in the Third World aimed
to weaken the West's position there. In such areas as the
Middle East, Africa and Latin America, Moscow was in fine
position to step in as the new alternative source of support
in countries where the European colonial powers were
leaving. In these places, the Kremlin wished to prove
communist ideology was the "wave of the future". CRef . 39:
p. 606] In the Middle East, for example, the British impe-
rial power vacuum, combined with U. S. -European disagree-
ments, left Khrushchev with repeated low-risk opportunities
for advancing Soviet influence in the region. Although
pressured by Peking to constantly expand the communist
empire, the Third World remained during the Berlin crises
mostly an area of foreign policy opportunity rather than
grand strategy.
Moscow's emerging role as a world power during this
period left its leaders very much concerned about the
actions and potential actions by the Americans or the
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Chinese. The Deutschlandpolitik pursued by Moscow during
the Berlin Crises was very much affected by these concerns.
Khrushchev's interests vis-a-vis the U.S. were likely
crucial to his German policy at the time, whereas vis-a-vis
China they were somewhat less critical, yet nevertheless,
very important. Third World interests played little noti-
cable role in affecting his Deutschlandpolitik during this
period.
Moscow's increasing global interests during the late
1960s created many influential factors for many decisions
made in their European relations during this period.
Although in not way totally independent or separate, Soviet
extra-European interests can be classified into three
groups: Strategic; Defensive; and Ideological. The
Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership was determined to erase the
image of the Soviet Union as a power strategically inferior
to its major adversary, the United States. CRef. 11: p.
441] On the nuclear weapons level, Soviet policy through the
late sixties was to catch up with the United States in
ICBMs, while holding its MRBM superiority in Europe. By
1969, the Soviet Union surpassed the U. S. in total number of
ICBM launchers, although behind in SLBM launchers and in
accuracy technology. CRef. 49: p. 43] David Holloway
stresses the goal of parity in the Soviet nuclear weapons
program during the late 1960s in stating
The ICBM program made it clear that the Soviet Union was
intent, at the very least, on matching American stra-
tegic power. By the end of the decade the Soviet Union
was close to attaining strategic parity with the United
States. CRef. 49: p. 44]
At this juncture of achieving parity, the Soviets agreed to
discuss arms limitations, which caused much confusion among
western analysts as to their motivations. Although it is
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still debated, most Soviet foreign policy analysts in the
West today agree that the Brezhnev leadership needed a
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreement as public
verification by the U. S. of the strategically "equal" role
thereby granted the Soviet Union.
Concurrent with the nuclear arms competition with
the U. S. were Soviet strategic moves aimed at breaking out
of its continental power role into one with a global power
projection capability. Although the latter developments
were hampered by priorities given to attaining parity in
nuclear weapons with the United States, the strategic arms
modernization and build up also strengthened the Soviet
Union in world affairs through opening a range of opportuni-
ties in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere. CRef. 11: p.
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The regime's military preparations involved what might
be described as a parallel attempt to improve the reach
and mobility of Soviet conventional, or general purpose,
forces. CRef. 11: p. 44]
The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership placed much impor-
tance on transforming the Navy and Air Force, particularly
the Long Range Aviation and Transport components, into
effective military and political instruments in support of
Soviet global interests. The need for a capability to
project both military power and presence was clearly stated
in 1972 in a book published in the Soviet Union by the
Institute of World Economy and International Relations. In
the book, Military Force and International Relations , the
rapidly growing mission is stated quite clearly:
Greater importance is being attached to Soviet military
presence in various regions throughout the world, rein-
forced by on adequate level of strategic mobility of its
armed forces. . . Expanding the scale of Soviet military
presence and military assistance furnished by other
socialist states is being viewed today as a very impor-
tant factor in international relations. [Ref. 53: p. 58]
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In practice, this policy involved sending consider-
able numbers of advisors, instructors, and technicians to
"fraternal states" like Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea,
Syria and Egypt, as well as providing these countries with
military and economic aid during this period. One of the
reasons why the Soviets could appear to their allies as
willing partners in negotiating nuclear arms limitations was
the fact that the number of "socialist oriented" states had
expanded to all parts of the globe; extending from the
Carribean to the Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa to
North and Southeast Asia. According to the Soviet view,
this correlation of forces is a political factor giving the
Soviets and their allies the overall advantage in a polit-
ical and military show-down with the imperialist forces.
The maintenance of ideological and political control
over their socialist allies necessitates remaining at the
head of the world socialist movement. Since 1960 this
leading role was challenged by Peking. It was therefore
necessary to prove to members and aspiring members states
that the Soviet Union was the one and only leader on the
correct path to communism. This took the form of unending
criticism of Peking and rivalry for influence in the Third
World. In fact, this need to preempt or replace Chinese
influence in the Third World, particularly in Africa and
Asia, may be a major reason by the Soviets stepped up Third
World expansion efforts after the Sino-Soviet split.
CRef. 54: p. 26]
Increased tensions in Sino-Soviet relations finally
led to a military crisis between the two states along their
joint border in 1969. Furthermore, fears of a U. S. - Red
China rapprochement increasingly grew during the late 1960s
and early 1970s because of Nixon and Kissinger initiatives
in the area.
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Finally, the macro position of the Soviet Union in
international relations must also be highlighted, i. e. the
global role of the USSR among its two greatest rivals. Adam
Ulam emphasizes the interconnection of these relations.
And as Communist China began to emerge from the chaos of
the Cultural Revolution, what should have been clear and
perhaps was to some Soviet leaders long before became
obvious: Sino-Soviet relations could not be divorced
from those between the Soviet Union and the United
States. Whatever Moscow's intentions, fears, and hopes
concerning Peking, the Soviet position vis-a-vis China
was bound to be weakened" by a continuing high level of
tension with the West. E Ref . 39: pp. 748-7491
Soviet relations with Washington and Peking during
the Moscow's press for a European Security Conference in the
late 1960s and the first half of the seventies strongly
influenced the formulation of Soviet Deutschlandpolitik . In
short, Brezhnev's desire to conclude the SALT accord and
other agreements with the United States and the growing
tensions with China affected the Soviet's willingness to
negotiate on Berlin and come to better terms with the
Federal Republic.
Entering the 1980s, the major Soviet extra-European
interests, as they had been through the earlier decades,
were concerned with the protection of its strategic inter-
ests at its borders and beyond. These included efforts to
stabilize the government in Afghanistan, to achieve further
arms control advantages from the United States, to prevent a
U. S. -China coalition against the USSR and to maintain
Moscow's superpower image among the Third World.
In many respects the Kremlin leadership's interests
in Afghanistan resembled similar interests in Warsaw or
Prague, only that they were of a greater priority and at the
other end of Moscow's continental empire. In two cases on
Soviet intervention, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan
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in 1979, the Soviets displayed their determination to use
military intervention when the government within that
external empire was perceived in Moscow as unreliable .and
unable to maintain proper control. [Ref. 9: p. 218] The
primary motivations in both situations was the Soviet lack
on confidence in the regime's ability to stay in control of
political and military events as is absolutely necessary in
a Leninist, vanguard party state. Beyond these motivations,
Jiri Valenta relates other domestic and strategic considera-
tions involved in these decisions to intervene.
In the Soviet's view Alexander Dubcek and Hafizullah
Amin were charting independent courses in domestic poli-
tics in disregard of Soviet counsel, and future develop-
ments in both countries were as unpredictable as they
were dangerous. [Ref . 9: pp. 218-219]
The Afghan situation was viewed in many respects as
even more dangerous than in Czechoslovakia. The Amin regime
was unable to defeat the growing resistance from the Muslim
rebels, which costs the Soviets lives and resources, given
the heavy Soviet military assistance provided for the
struggle. These concerns, combined with genuine Soviet
fears about spillover effects upon the non-Russian republics
of Central Asia and the Caucasus, especially aggravated by
the growing militancy among Islamic fundamentalists in Iran
and Turkey, left the Moscow leadership in a need-to-act
situation. Soviet inaction might possibly have led to
repercussions in other parts of their empire, i. e. Eastern
Europe, the Third World or within the USSR itself. [Ref . 9:
pp. 220-221]
Beyond the defensive motivations, many analysts
point toward Moscow's offensive goals behind the Afghan
invasion. Although probably not part of any grand strategy
to advance in the near future to the Indian Ocean, there is
substantial credibility to the assessment by Holloway and
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others, that, given the defensive requirements and limited
risks, there were strategic gains to be made by the move as
well. CRef. 49: p. 98]
In Europe, the leadership in Moscow showed repeated
signs of concern over the NATO dual-track decision to deploy
the 464 Ground- launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) and 108
Pershing II intermediate-range missiles if the Soviets did
not agree to dismantle their SS-20s targeted at Europe.
From the Soviet perspective this would not simply, mean
losing whatever technological edge they had gained from the
SS-20 deployments, "it would confront them with a new and
terrifying threat". CRef. 55: p. 17] These American
missiles represented a new generation of nuclear missiles
that could threaten Moscow and the Western USSR within
minutes of a launch from their NATO bases. Although not
considered part of NATO's strategic offensive system, such
as the UK's SLBM force or France's ICBMs, Moscow holds these
weapons to be a substantial strategic threat, significantly
increasing " the complexity of Soviet strategic defense
requirements. To be sure, Mr. Brezhnev and his Politburo
colleagues perceived the Pershing lis as a real increase in
the strategic threat that would drastically change the
entire U. S. -Soviet nuclear balance.
Soviet fears of Chinese aggression had receded mark-
edly since the fall of the "gang of four" and the stabiliza-
tion of the present leadership in Beijing. Improved
political relations between the two even resulted in the
visit by high Soviet officials in late 1984 to China, which
was the first such visit in 15 years. Not underestimating
Russian xenophobic tendencies, Moscow continues carry its
fear of a possible United States-China military coalition
directed against it. Although their warnings show concern
over this possibility, Reagan policy never presented signs
of any willingness to move in this direction. Soviet
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analysts most likely realize that the U. S. would not
perceive such actions to be in its own best interests.
CRef. 56]
Finally, Moscow showed an interest in preserving its
global superpower status through its policy in the Third
World. To appreciate Soviet interests in this field in the
early 1980s it is helpful to look back to Soviet activities
in the mid-to-late 1970s. During this period of weakened
American leadership, the USSR took advantage of growing
opportunities in the Third World. They combined these
opportunities, created through political and social insta-
bility in young governments, in Africa, the Middle East and
Asia, with their developing power projection capability.
Their principle tool in these policies was their military.
As other Soviet means of influencing world events showed
themselves relatively ineffective, the Soviets placed
greater emphasis on military competition, the Third World
providing the forum. E Ref . 57]
Since the successes in Angola, Mozambique, Zambia,
Ethiopia, Grenada and Nicaragua, the Soviets have experi-
enced several setbacks and dilemmas. The Israelies pushed
unopposed through Lebanon, the South African states are
readjusting their relationships with Pretoria and the U. S.
put an end to Soviet gains in Grenada, to name a few. In
some cases the Soviets have been forced to assume the uncom-
fortable role of a counterinsurgency power in Third World
states.
The Soviets appear to maintain their interests
through direct or proxy support to a degree based upon the
level of priority and associated risks a particular Third
World commitment involves. [Ref. 58]
It must be noted that these are usually not
security- related interests, but for prestige purposes neces-
sary to prove Moscow's power projection capability and
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superpower status. Peter Clement lists the following goals
for Soviet policy in south African Third World interests
which are also instructive in appreciating their goals in
other Third World areas.
1. Supplant or undermine global competitors, the United
States, or regional competitors, Western Europe, Japan
or China, in political, economic and military spheres;
2. Promote pro-Soviet or leftist change corresponding to
broad Marx-Leninist ideological principles, leading to
an enlargement of the Soviet side in their
"Correlation of Forces ;
3. Reinforce its superpower status and its perceived
indispensability in being involved in settling major
international disputes;
4. Gain access to strategic air and naval facilities; and
5. Win increasing political support for initiatives in
international forums. C Ref . 59]
One may note a change in the make up of Soviet
Extra-European foreign policy interests which affected their
policy decisions regarding Germany. Washington' s leading
role in the NATO dual-track missile decision left its affect
very high on the influence spectrum, while the importance of
Chinese interests fell. Soviet Third World interests did
not appear to have played any notable role in influencing
Soviet Deutschlandpolitik during this period.
2. East Germany
East German interests lying beyond the European
continent during the Berlin crises dealt mainly with the
United States, China and a few countries in the Third World.
Short of given any satisfaction to their desire for recogni-
tion from Washington, the Ulbricht regime maintained an
antagonistic attitude towards it relations with the United
States. An accommodation between East and West was not one
of Ulbricht' s relished dreams, due to the possibility of a
'German deal" between Washington and Moscow which would
strip Ulbricht of his power in East Berlin.
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The SED's interests in Peking were rather complex in
1958-1959. During this time there was notable evidence of
an incipient Peking-Pankow axis. E Ref . 51: p. 396 3
Ideologically, there were disputes within the leadership
over supporting the Chinese commune program, which for some
long-time East German communists seemed to be a solution to
many problems long evaded in Moscow. Questions on the path
to communism and the Chinese success in mobilizing mass
initiative and revolutionary fervor were vital to developing
some domestic legitimacy and in energizing a sluggish
economy. In foreign policy interests, both China and East
Berlin feared a sell out of their positions through a
Soviet-U. S. rapprochement. In addition, both states were
struggling in the international environment to break out of
their status as "persona non grata". [Ref. 60: pp. 85-87]
M. J. Esslin highlighted this point in an article on the
subject of Chinese-East German relations in 1959:
Every time Communist China can score a point in making
it evident how unrealistic it is of the United States or
the United Nations to refuse to recognize the reality of
the existence of a government ruling over six hundred
million people, the East German government, although it
only rules over sixteen millions, can feel that a blow
has been struck in its own interests. [ Ref . 60: p. 86]
At the same time, however, it must be remembered that while
recognition was number one in the minds of East German and
Chinese leaders, it was only secondary to Moscow's
interests.
This Pankow-Peking axis was clearly broken by 1960.
The SED held a conference in East Berlin in January 1960 on
ideological problems, the primary purpose of which was
clearly to reassert Soviet ideological primacy in East
Germany after the confusion in the previous 12-18 months.
Donald Zaggoria suggests that Khrushchev "tightened the
screws" on Ulbricht and offered concessions in renewing the
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Berlin crisis to induce Ulbricht to get his "house" back in
order. Given the pro-Chinese arguments within the SED and
Moscow's fear of a "fourth Rome" in Peking, Ulbricht may
well have utilized this tool to improve this bargaining
position vis-a-vis Khrushchev on German policy. C Ref . 51:
p. 369] To emphasize his pivotal position, perhaps, Ulbricht
delivered a speech at the Chinese Embassy in Berlin during
Khrushchev's visit to the United States. In it he supported
Khrushchev's actions, while also implying that the Soviet
leader's visit to America was merely following the teaching
of Mao Tse-tung, "thus making it appear that the Soviet
leader's visit was nothing more than a clear tactical move
in the ups and downs of flexible marxist strategy.
CRef. 60: p. 87] At the same time this bargaining chip must
be kept in proper perspective, for in the last resort, the
Soviet Union is geographically closer to the GDR, China is
far away, and there were twenty-one Soviet divisions
stationed in East Germany while the Chinese were remote and
ineffectual.
During the late 1950s and early 1960s East German
interests in the Third World were to seek ways to affirm its
own legitimacy. Ulbricht was keen on using international
relationships and commitments as a mark of sorely-needed
prestige, both within the international community and in the
eyes of the East German population. Ulbricht, however, was
much less interested in accomplishing the latter than the
former goal.
During this period GDR relations with the outside
world were primarily limited to trade contacts. North
Korea, North Vietnam, China and Mongolia were the only
non-European states to recognize the Ulbricht regime with
full diplomatic status until the late 1960s. The United
Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, Indonesia and Burma had estab-
lished official representatives in East Berlin but for
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various reasons withheld full diplomatic recognition until
several years later. This diplomatic isolation was largely
the result of the Third World states' fears of political and
economic retaliation by the industrialized Western states
who supported Bonn's Hallstein Doctrine. Thus the Federal
Republic was able to keep many Third World states just
outside the reach of their recognition of East Germany,
although East Berlin recognized most Third World states,
many within days or hours of their newly, found
independence.
The GDR reaction to the non- recognition by the Third
World was twofold. First, Ulbricht attempted to act as
though the problem did not exist. The SED leadership
dispatched official messages of greetings to their heads of
state and sent a constant flow of official GDR position
papers to the United Nations Secretary General and the
National Security Council on issues perceived as relevant to
East Berlin's interests. On the other hand, Ulbricht used
the non-recognition to create purely negative and abusive
propaganda directed against the Federal Republic and the
United States. Printed in the national languages and
distributed in Third World countries, a major purpose behind
their release was to stimulate interest in the German ques-
tion outside of Europe. Additionally, their propaganda may
have been directed at Western audiences as well. CRef. 61:
pp. 112-113]
Ulbricht' s Deutschlandpolitik during these years
were little affected by extra-European interests.
Washington was too far away in political terms and the Third
World countries were too far in geographic terms to affect
Ulbricht' s dilemma in Berlin. The GDR's relationship with
China, however, may have had some impact on East Berlin's
German policy during this period.
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As of late 1967 the East Germans held embassies in
only thirteen states. Outside of the Warsaw Pact countries,
very little had changed outwardly during the 1960s. Since
the western industrialized nations would not establish open
diplomatic relations with the GDR, East Berlin continued to
seek out such recognition from "socialist oriented" nations
and newly established Third World states. These were prima-
rily Middle East Arab states, African and Asian states which
had well-established political ties with the Soviet Union.
The next level of international relations was
furthered by commercial trade relations. These extended
deeper into Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe. In most
cases these eventually developed into full diplomatic
status. However, only the smaller, newly formed Third World
nations were willing to recognize East Berlin prior to the
1970s, leaving Ulbricht to focus East German non-Warsaw Pact
foreign policy only on these developing countries and
national liberation movements. Ulbricht spoke of the impor-
tance of these relations at the Seventh SED Congress in
March 1967:
The creation and cultivation of normal relations with
Asian. African and Latin American states is of great
importance. Generally, it is true that mutually advan-
tageous interests, for example, in foreign trade rela-
tions, can develop their potential possibilities in an
unhindered manner only when political relations are
normalized. C Ref . 47: p. 74]
Under guidance from Moscow, East German policy set
to foster these relations was based on a two step process.
First, East Berlin would provide political support and
limited economic assistance. ' Second, after their "revolu-
tionaries" had formed a government, East German aid and
7 Such as, for example, 5000 bicycles to North Vietnam in
1965. Later, medicines and medical supplies were often
provided to national liberation movements during their
struggle for power.
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cooperation would help them to consolidate their power.
According to the official East German view, this was to help
the new government establish their political and economic
independence. CRef . 20: p. 101] In this latter stage, the
SED would quickly establish scientific, cultural and social
exchanges between the two countries, CRef. 47: pp. 68-71]
which was meant to gain influence in the area as quick as
possible. The close ties to the "progressive" movements
also was meant to project a widening gap growing between the
two German states for domestic propaganda purposes. The
official SED line on the differing traditions between the
two German states is given in the book, Aussenpolitik, which
was a common text for classroom discussion in the GDR:
The West German militarists and imperialists, in very
close association with the American capitalists, would
like to turn back the wheel of history, place the people
of Africa. Asia and Latin America in chains and force
the recent established national states in the name of
neocolonialism once again under imperialist
control. .. The GDR follows another tradition of the
German people in relations to those countries and
peoples who suffered under colonial repression and led
national liberation struggles. CRef. 47: p. 63]
This same emphasis on "differing" traditions in East and
West Germany was to later form the basis for Honecker's
Abgrenzung policy initiated in the period just prior to
intra-German rapprochement.
East German relations with China, with few excep-
tions, followed Moscow's hard line attitude throughout the
time following the Sino-Soviet split. There are indications
that Ulbricht respected Mao and some of the changes he
introduced in China, however, as a realist, Ulbricht kept
his personal views as such on a very low key. By 1969-1970
Sino-East German relations had, like Sino-Soviet relations,
reached an all-time low, although Ulbricht tempered his
corresponding criticism of Peking at times to show his
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disagreement with the Soviet leadership over their Berlin
policy.
In its Deutschlandpolitik during the period, East
Berlin' s Third World interests had the greatest influence
upon it among the extra-European interests. Ulbricht's
demands for recognition within Europe were done so with the
probable understanding that most Third World countries would
quickly follow suit if he succeeded with the West Europeans.
This would, of course, be a great boost for him both domes-
tically and internationally. Other than noting a similar
effect which U. S. recognition would have on Third World
relations, East Berlin's U.S. and Chinese interests
displayed minimal affects on their Deutschlandpolitik at
this time.
The main thrust of East German interests in
extra-European affairs during the early 1980s has been to
continue its integration into international organizations on
a multilateral basis, and to increase its bilateral influ-
ence in its relations in the Third World. Following East
Germany's vault into the "real" international scene in
1973-1974, -East Berlin placed increasing importance on coop-
eration with states outside the Soviet bloc system.
Although the latter held the top priority in East German
foreign policy decisionmaking, GDR officials were quickly
competing with their West German counterparts in capitals of
western states as well as with most nonaligned states. The
goal, of course, was to prove her legitimacy and equality
vis-a-vis Bonn, both to the population at home and in the
diplomatic circles abroad. In the United Nations, East
Berlin sat on five of the seven main directorates (organs),
to include the Security Council in 1980-81, and on seven of
o
fifteen U.N. special organizations.
pEast Berlin chose not to participate in six special
organizations.
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Competition with the FRG is again a primary motiva-
tion to be active in these international forums. Since
their simultaneous entry into the United Nations in 1973,
the German Question, including Berlin, had not been an issue
of debate. This fact can be attributed to an era of non-
crisis on these issues as well as Honecker's desire to gain
international acceptance of his claim that the German
Question is no longer open. Apparently there are signs of
success in these efforts. In an interview with West German
Ambassador Rudiger von Wechmar in December 1979, reporters
raised the issue of whether the Federal Republic should
bring the German Question before the U.N. His response was,
basically, that the Bonn government knew when not to force
an issue before the assembly when the majority would block,
or even hurt, its position. The Third World states,
according to the Ambassador, must be better informed on the
issue first because "the lack of knowledge about the history
and the current situation as it has developed in the German
Question is staggering". CRef . 62: p. 114] Furthermore, as
Wilhelm Bruns has claimed in his study on the two German
states in the U.N. , developing nations, themselves, consider
the German Question closed. His argument is that exactly
for that reason, that the issue has not been brought to
center stage in the U.N. , it has never been an issue for the
many Third World states to consider and about which to
become informed. CRef. 62: pp. 114-115]
Coinciding with their entry into the United Nations
and its associated organizations, the East Germans greatly
enlarged their proxy role for the Soviet Union in the Third
World. By 1979 East Berlin was reported to have been
providing various types of military-related assistance to at
least fifteen different governments or organizations in
Africa and the Middle East.
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A turning point in GDR Third World activity appears
to have taken place in 1979. In February a high-level GDR
delegation headed by Honecker, but also including Willi
Stoph, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the GDR
Foreign Minister and leading SED Central Committee special-
ists on International Relations and economic affairs
travelled to Libya, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique. At each
major port of call major agreements were concluded,
including 20-year treaties of friendship and cooperation
with Angola and Mozambique. These were the first of their
kind with any Third World countries outside the immediate
Soviet orbit. CRef. 63: p. 213 Ethiopia, fast becoming the
primary recipient of Soviet and East German military aid,
joined this exclusive club in May 1979 with a military coop-
eration agreement, and in November with a 20-year friendship
and cooperation treaty. CRef. 64] Herr Honecker visited
Africa on at least two occasions that year and allowed the
government to officially acknowledge for the first time that
the GDR had supported African states and liberation move-
ments with not only military training but also with military
hardware. CRef. 65: p. 75] By the end of 1979, it was clear
that the major emphasis in their military assistance program
was with Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola and Mozambique. It
is not surprising to find that these were major targets for
Soviet involvement in the 1980' s.
Other areas were also opening up to East Berlin' s
internationalist duties, namely Nicaragua, Kampuchea,
Afghanistan and Iran. In the latter case, East Germany lost
no time in attempting to fill the void created in Iran by
the decrease of U. S. and Western European influence. For
example, less than 24 hours after the Common Market
governments threatened economic sanctions against Iran
because of the hostage crisis, East Germany and Iran signed
a trade agreement in East Berlin. CRef. 66] A month
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earlier, in March 1980, East Berlin signed a 20-Year friend-
ship and cooperation treaty with the Kampuchean government.
CRef. 67]
Through the early 1980 's the geographic pattern of
primary GDR involvement remained relatively consistent:
Africa (Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola and
Mozambique); the Middle East (Syria and Iraq); Southwest
Asia (Afghanistan and Iran); Asia (North Korea, Kampuchea
and Vietnam) and Latin America (Nicaragua, Chili and El
Salvador)
.
There exists a broad spectrum of East German mili-
tary assistance rendered to the Third World. This ranges
from direct military equipment deliveries to and combat
training of guerrilla forces to medical airlift support
during combat operations or construction assistance in the
building of harbors and airports. Table I provides a
picture of the number of GDR military personnel abroad in
recent years as reported by two sources: the West German
Q
magazine Per Spiegel and The Military Balance . — Table II
sketches out an overview of reported GDR military assistance
during the latest period. The data for the table are
derived from various western media sources and are
unverified. The data is, therefore, intended for
generalization purposes only.
The political motives behind the GDR's extensive
military involvement in the past decade are quite compli-
cated and substantial. Overriding among these is the rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union. Melvin Croan best
summarizes East Berlin's role in Soviet Third World strategy
in calling the East' Germans "practitioners of 'applied
proto-Leninism' ". CRef. 63: p. 22] In its disciple role,
9The figures from Per Spiegel for 1980 fill in a gap
created by a lack of numbers reported in Military Balance
1980-81




REPORTED EAST GERMAN MILITARY FORCES ABROAD
Country 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 198U
Algeria NR 250 NR 250 250 250
Angola 1500 1000 800 450 450 500
Ethiopia "hundreds" 300 550 250 550 550
Iraq NR NR NR 160 160 160
Libya NR 400 1600 450 450 500
Mozambique NR 600 NR 100 100 100
South Yemen 100 NR 100 325 75 75
Syria NR NR NR 210 210 210
Notes: "NR" indicates lack of reporting on numbers of personnel.
Sources: 1979, 1981-1984: The Military Balance , IISS,
London; 1980: Per Spiegel , Ho7 10/1980.
East Berlin pays into the Soviet-led, socialist movement pot
the most valuable commodity it has to offer: German tech-
nical skills and mission-oriented efficiency. Aircraft and
tanks are out of the question, and every worker is dearly
needed at home. The solution lies in specialists; high in
know-how, low in numbers.
Their present role is meant to elevate the political
position of the GDR within the "socialist world system" and
particularly to create a stronger voice within the East
European bloc. The ultimate payoff is to hold a stronger
card when policy toward the FRG and Berlin are brought to
the discussion table, as has been proven in the U.N. thus
far. Internally, the SED leadership must continue in its
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population. Certainly a government which makes treaties and
agreements with states all over the globe must be legiti-
mate. Suffering from a chronic political inferiority
complex, rooted in the undeniable superiority in size,
wealth and popularity of West Germany, the SED plays out its
demarcation or Abgrenzung policy vis-a-vis the FRG in its
Third World assistance programs.
These Third World interests continued to grow during
the latest period in terms of their relative importance to
East Berlin's Deutschlandpolitik. During this latest case,
they appear to have played a substantial role in possibly
providing Honecker both motivation and psychological support
for his German policy actions. Again, East Berlin's foreign
policy interests relating to the U. S. and China do not
appear to have had any notable affect on its
Deutschl andpol itik.
In a brief summary, then, in foreign policy inter-
ests beyond Europe, two main players, the United States and
China, were decisive elements in Moscow's decisionmaking
throughout this entire period of study. In the Berlin
crises, the Kremlin's American interests were crucial to the
initiation and the conclusion of Khrushchev's gambling poli-
cies over Berlin, and Moscow's Chinese interests were very
important factors effecting these decisions. In the
decisionmaking process during the Brezhnev-Kosygin
leadership on detente policies with the West Germans, this
relationship was reversed; the Chinese concerns played a
crucial role and the American a very important one. In the
final case study, the Soviet's Chinese interests were rather
dormant, while the overall confusion over how to respond to
American security strategy in Europe was a very important
factor effecting Moscow's response to the West German
deployment decision. For the East Germans, on the other
hand, neither their interests with the U. S. nor China were
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significant determinants in their German policy. While
Third World interests developed only background influence on
the Soviets, these interests were in some ways more influen-
cial in East Berlin, although to what degree is difficult to
determine. Perhaps in the latest period, the expansion of
East Berlin's involvement in Soviet strategy in the Third
World bolstered Honecker's self-confidence in the level of
East German influence in Pact affairs. This, in turn, may




The purpose of this section is to analyze economic
interests in Moscow and East Berlin as they might influence
their German policy decisionmaking during the three cases
under study. The discussion of economic variables is
fraught with fewer changes and reversals than are so
frequently experienced with political variables. From the
Berlin crisis to the present day some general trends appear
to have been developing. First, beginning with Khrushchev,
the Kremlin leadership has become increasingly aware of the
need for western input into the Soviet economy if it wishes
to compete in the world markets or to stay abreast of
western technological advances. Second, the irony of the
above realization is that while following through with
increased western economic exchanges may lead to potential
destabilizing conditions within the Soviet's internal and
external empires, ignoring the need to deal with the West
will also lead to destabilization. The solution to this
dilemma has haunted Soviet leaders since Khrushchev.
Finally, the trade relationship between the Soviet Union and
the German Democratic Republic has always resembled a trade
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relationship common between industrialized and developing
countries. The Soviet Union provides the raw materials and
energy supplies while the East Germans build the machines
and technical products. (See Table VII and Figure 2.1. ) The
perceived value of this relationship may be what has changed
more than the substance over the decades.
The finished product supplier role for the GDR was
most appreciated by both Moscow and East Berlin during the
Berlin crisis period. The East Germans had a large guaran-
teed market for their goods and, for the most part, a sure
source of raw materials. Had East German products had to
compete with western products in the CMEA marketplace, then
the East Germans would not have faired very well indeed.
Moscow, on the other hand, had a dependable source of
finished products, the skilled labor for which was lacking
in the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s East Germany
claimed about 17% of the total Soviet foreign trade, the
largest single trading partner. ( See Table IV.
)
During this same period, USSR trade with the western
capitalist countries was rebounding from its lowest post WW
II level, comprising only about 17% of the annual Soviet
foreign trade. (See Table III. ) One of the factors moti-
vating Khrushchev towards a new accommodation with the West
was an appreciation of western economic growth and
technological capability. Soviet emigre and Khrushchev
expert, Zhores Medvedev, recalls this aspect of Khrushchev's
economic interests:
Khrushchev challenged the nation to study the achieve-
ments of other countries, thus supplanting the old
Stalin/Zhdanov doctrine of resisting cosmopolitanism"
and rejecting everything foreign; this new approach was
extremely important for the development of Soviet
science and technology and also make the government pay
greater attention to the production of consumer goods.

























1 tH 1 CO 1
1 CO 1 I
i cr> i cn i
1 H 1 O I
tH 1
i in i r> 1
i r> i I
i en i O 1
1 rH I in i
tH 1
1 O 1 • 1
i r-» i CN 1
1 Cn 1 CN 1
1 rH 1
ID 1
i in ' 1
1 vD ^ 1
i cn tH I
1 tH
rH 1
1 o • |
1 vD 1 O 1
i cn 1 tH 1
1 tH
1 v£ i co i
1 ^ • 1




1 . CD 1
1 [X4> 1
1 1MCI

























1 \Q 1 O 1 en




1 T~\ 1 CN 1









1 iH 1 ^ 1 U* 1









1 Cn CN 1 1 »*U 1
1 tH 1 tH 1 1 ^0 I
1 COICQ 1
1 CO






1 ID CO 1 1 rH v |







1 A -H. |
| 1 p. 03
i w i cd CD
1 CO 00 1 1 CD 1 CD u
1 CO 1 >H 1 >H 3
I XI i '01
I 3 i cd •H
1 1 1 1 1 i cd i Gu
1 t-\ w i clui i 1
i cd d) l 1 1 *+-4 1 u
1 +J-H 1 rH-H 1 I 1 3 fl
1 -H P 1 CD P 1 1 w O
1 cuj 1 >P 1 i m 1 -H
i cd C 1 CD C 1 i C 1 fi
i U3 I Q3 i I i »D
1 I O I 1 -H i to ;
1 ^o i ,CU I 1 rH 1 CDP
1 p 1 p 1 1 rH 1 U CD
1 -H-P i -h cn i 1 -H 1 P •H
1 ^ CQ i ££ t 1 CQ i a >
1 -H 1 -H 1 1
1 ^ 1 ^ 1 I * 1 C/] w
90
Primary GDR Goods to USSR Primar y USSR Goods to GDR
1. Factory Machinery 1. Petroleum
2. Tractors 2. Natural Gas
3. Chemical Products 3. Coal
4. Agricultural Machinery 4. Iron Ore
5. Hydraulic Lifts 5. Diesel Machines
6. Cranes 6. Foodstuffs
7. Furniture 7. Radio Receivers
8. Clothing 8. Cotton and Wool
Figure 2. 1 Summary of Basic Commodity Exchange: GDR - USSR.
TABLE IV
EAST GERMAN - SOVIET TRADE 1950-1980
(Millions of East German Exchange Marks)
Total Trade % Total % Total Trade























11 UR - 169 18
15 GDR - 425 50
17 UR - 125 100
17 GDR - 441 134
14 UR - 855 196
11 UR - 191 254
11 UR - 1229 441
10 UR - 2779 539
N/A N/A N/A
N/A GDR - 600 N/A
Sources: Europa Yearbooks ( 1960-1 983 ) : Soviet Union
Figures , Facts , Data ; DDR Handbuch ; COMECON Foreign Trade
Data 1 982.
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Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Soviet trade with western
capitalist states and other free world states incrementally
increased until in the detente period trade grew much more
rapidly. (See Table III.)
Of particular interest is the growing attention the
Moscow leadership gave to trade with West Germany. Besides
a set of treaties signed in 1958, which increased
Soviet-West German trade in return for increased emigration
of German nationals from the USSR, Khrushchev gave several
signals indicating a desired change their economic rela-
tions. In his first meeting with the newly arrived West
German ambassador, Hans Kroll, in May 1958 Khrushchev
clearly stated that next to the rejection by Bonn of atomic
weapons, the leading Soviet interest involving their future
relations was in improved economic cooperation, particularly
the development of a joint chemical industry. C Ref . 69: pp.
361-364] Khrushchev was not alone in this thinking; a few
days later in Kroll 's meeting with Mikoyan, the older Soviet
statesman expressed his great respect for West German
economic achievements and was particularly interested in the
prospect for improved future trade relations. [Ref. 69: p.
365]
How may these interests have affected Moscow's
Deutschlandpolitikt If the Soviets placed significant value
on trade with both German states, substantial data suggests
in fact that they did, particularly on technical products,
this might then have strongly influenced Khrushchev in his
German policy on Berlin. It is probably not incorrect to
assume that much of the pressure Khrushchev felt to placate
Ulbricht stemmed from the Soviet's significant stakes in the
GDR economy. It is also quite plausible that Soviet inter-
ests in West German trade advantages may have exercised some
limiting effects on the Kremlin's actions during the Berlin
crises.
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Erosion in the growth in productivity in the Soviet
economy during the 1960s and 1970s has had a significant
effect on Soviet foreign policy. By 1969 it had become
evident that the 1965 reforms would not be enough to elimi-
nate the economic difficulties. In efforts to counteract
this lagging productivity, Soviet leaders began a program of
massive imports of advanced technology and machinery from
the industrialized capitalist countries. C Ref . 70: p. 177]
Besides the desire to increase productivity, Soviet leaders
regarded western trade essential to keep up with the West in
terms of industrial modernization. Closely related to this
theme is the emphasis Moscow had placed on the need to fully
exploit the "scientific-technical revolution" through
exchanges created through increased international economic
relations.
During the late sixties and even into the seventies,
leading Soviet economists, scientists and other participants
in the Soviet decisionmaking hierarchy began publicizing the
need to intensify trade with the United States and Western
Europe. When considering the latter proposition, the most
attractive trading partner for Moscow was the Federal
Republic, who was the leading economic power in Europe.
Stephen Larrabee suggests other factors which increased the
West German appeal to Moscow:
As a result of intensity of scientific-technical cooper-
ation with the GDR, there was a widespread familiarity
with the German language among the Soviet technical
elite. Then, too. memories of the intensive trade
between Germany and the Soviet Union during the inter-
war years when Germany had been Moscow's major trading
partner also helped to stimulate hopes regarding the
prospects for wider cooperation. [Ref . 18: p. 1781
In his memoirs, Willy Brandt notes the great
emphasis Kosygin placed on establishing a program of joint
Soviet-West German economic cooperation when the former
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Chancellor was visiting Moscow in the summer 1970. Besides
trying to tempt the West German leader with offers of
massive energy-supply projects, Kosygin also spoke of
economic cooperation programs for periods up to twenty years
in duration. [Ref. 71: pp. 323-324] Later, in discussions
with Brezhnev, the question of relations between the EEC and
the CMEA was raised. Brezhnev said: "We are against self-
contained blocs, but we are realists: the EEC exists.
Possible co-operation with the CMEA can be discussed at
expert level. The results could be very interesting.
"
[Ref. 71: p. 341]
The other CMEA states wished to bolster their econo-
mies through increased East-West trade during the late 1960s
as well. Moscow gave reluctant approval of increased
contacts in both political and economic spheres in 1969.
The Soviet allies, excluding East Berlin, must have greeted
Alexie Kosygin' s speech in 1971 before the Supreme Soviet
with pleasant endorsement. In the speech he openly invited
western participation in the development of the Soviet
economy:
With the transition to the practice of long-term agree-
ments, which guarantee stable orders for industry, new
possibilities are opened up on our relations with
Western nations. Considerations can be given to the_
Ref. 7'< p. 189-190]°
mutually beneficial^ cooperation with foreign firms
The needs of the small-scale East European economies
for Western trade benefits in high technology and consumer
goods are probably greater than those of the much larger
Soviet economy. Because the other CMEA members have
received relatively little technological aid from their
senior ally, the East European countries have reacted to
this pressing need for Western technology by adapting rela-
tively greater institutional flexibility and had developed
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superior techniques to absorb the imported technologies than
the Soviets. The Soviets, in turn, have taken advantage
of both their allies' need for, and therefore their efforts
to acquire, the imported technology and their allies'
ability to adopt it, by drawing from the technology gained
through these East European states. CRef. 73: pp. 178-179]
We can thus see that economic interests played a
very important role in prompting Moscow to move towards
detente policies with the West. The Soviet
Deutschlandpolitik that we focus upon during this period was
very much determined by this detente policy. Therefore,
Soviet economic interests were very important influences
upon Soviet German policy at this time.
As the Soviet Union entered the 1980s, most of the
problems recognized by Kosygin and Brezhnev in the 1960s
were still present. And the Kremlin leadership most likely
no longer hoped, as it had going into detente, that painful
decisions about management reform and capital allocation
could be avoided by injecting Western technology into the
ailing Soviet economy. CRef. 44: p. 45] According to Hannes
Adomeit, the motivations in the near future for East-West
economic exchanges for the Soviet leadership will be out of
domestic necessity than any external political objective.
CRef. 57: p. 13]
Western economic troubles in the late 1970s, U. S.
political preconditions on U. S. -Soviet trade and Reagan's
overall toughened approach to East-West relations have set
rigid limits on Soviet access to Western technology in the
present decade. As part of the overall deterioration in
Soviet-American relations, the Soviets themselves have
shifted much of its trade to Western Europe and Japan.
Foreign trade with the United States dropped about 50% in
the 1980s from its previous level in the late 1970s. ( See
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Table V. ) This shift has led to widely shared impressions
in the West, particularly in the U. S. , that this "punish-
ment" of the U.S. has been successful, that this has created
significant increases in Soviet-West European trade and that
the USSR can easily go without such trade exchanges with the
U.S. C Ref . 57: p. 14] Despite these impressions, there is
sufficient reason to believe the Soviets are still inter-
ested in American economic and technological benefits. They
continue to lack certain technology as before which is only
available through the U. S.
TABLE V
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE WITH THE WEST
American and West German Trade Examples*
Total U. S. FRG
Year Trade Amount % Total . Amount % Total
1976 56. 8 2. 2 3. 8 3. 5. 3
1977 63. 4 1. 5 2. 4 3. 4. 7
1979 80. 3 2. 8 3. 5 4.2 5. 2
1980 94. 1 1. 5 1. 6 5. 8 6. 2
1981 109. 7 1. 8 1. 6 6. 5. 5
1982 119. 6 2. 2 1. 8 6. 6 5. 5
* Billions of rubles.
Source: Europa Yearbooks (1979-1984)
Trade with Western Europe did not change signifi-
cantly during the later period. Using West Germany as the
best example, since it conducts the most trade with Moscow,
trade increased in real terms in 1980 and dropped to a level
for the next two years that was still greater than during
the pre-Afghanistan invasion period. (See Table V. ) The
basic reason behind this difference between Soviet trade
relations with the United States and Western Europe is the
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fundamental divergence between the two on the appropriate-
ness and effectiveness of using economic leverage for polit-
ical purposes. France, for example, outright rejected
President Carter's economic sanction policy while the
Federal Republic gave it lip-service and little more. As
has been pointed out above, the Europeans simply did not
accept the U.S. Administration's argument that economic
punishment could bring about any desired Soviet reversal,
namely the withdrawal from Afghanistan or reduced pressure
on Poland. CRef. 73: p. 185 3 Throughout the period, the
Europeans have requested, sometimes demanded, that the U. S.
leave East-West economic relations, except the military-
related technology, out of the realm of political difficul-
ties. Not only are there many West European jobs at stake,
they argue, but it may also serve as the last important
thread holding the two blocs together within talking
distance.
A final economic factor that has taken on greater
importance in Soviet economic interests are Soviet-East
European economic relations. As a result of the hard
currency debts accrued during the late 1970s and the sudden
rise of the world market price of energy, the East European
communist party leaderships have reemphasized in their
1981-1985 economic plans and within the CMEA meetings the
need to further improve bloc economic integration efforts.
Also important, they note, is the need to improve production
efficiency within the system, which has created internal
disputes as how to better divide specialization within CMEA,
and the need to use the utmost discretion in obtaining
credit from the West. Except for Poland and the GDR, most
East European debts to the West are relatively manageable.
Whereas East Berlin occupies a special status with Bonn and
the EEC, and has deeper production capablities for western
markets, Poland's debt situation has been drastically out of
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hand. Moscow must be sensitive to Western banks' interests,
and to governments who are guaranteeing the hard-currency
notes which Warsaw has drawn. Furthermore, they must be
willing to bail Warsaw out with large doses of aid in times
of crisis, as in 1980-1981.
In the early 1980s the Soviets have had to readjust
their trade relations with its partner East European allies.
Since then Moscow has had to gradually cut energy subsidies
to these countries to bring its price of gas and oil up to
the market price. This has been extremly difficult on some
of the East European economies, who must sell more of their
products each year in order to receive the same amount of
energy materials from the Soviet Union. Charles Gati makes
the point that the effect of this change in relations is a
feeling of indignation on the part of the East Europeans:
They wonder whether the Soviet Union could not afford to
do more for them if it did not waste it resources
fighting an elusive enemy in Afghanistan, keeping a vast
army along its Chinese border and installing modern and
expensive intermediate-range missiles in the GDR and
Czechoslovakia. CRef . 74: p. 753
During this latter period, Soviet economic interests
seem to have little overall influence on their
Deutschlandpolitik . While strong interests in Western trade
continued to exist, they appeared not to affect Moscow's
German policy. The slow change in Soviet economic interests
in Eastern Europe, however, may have affected East Berlin's
and other East European states' actions.
2. East Germany
As in the Soviet case, there exist principle charac-
teristics of the East German economic structure which gener-
ally hold true for the entire three periods under
investigation. The first is the geographic and historic
relationship of the two German economies. While the Western
98
part inherited the agricultural and heavy industrial base of
the pre-war German economic infrastructure, in the East
highly skilled and widely dispersed light industry predomi-
nated the pre-war areas which later became the GDR. The
earlier, highly disciplined command-based infrastructure was
not destroyed after the war, but reconfigured to serve new
masters, thus facilitating a transition from nationalism to
proletarian internationalism as the new leading motivator.
The peaceful competition between the two German
states since the early 1950s has forced the East German
leaders to behave pragmatically and conduct their economic
policies with a certain degree of moderation. This was in
stark contrast to the other East European regimes who
applied the irrational elements of the Soviet system very
early in the post war years. Primarily because of the
inherited economic system and the strong competition with
the leading West European economic achiever, the East
Germans have developed the leading industrial economy in
Eastern Europe.
The geographical and historical realities, however,
lead the East German population to judge the economic
performance of their system based on its success or failure
vis-a-vis the Federal Republic rather than on its superior
accomplishments in contrast to its eastern or southern
neighbors, Poland and Czechoslovakia. This competition is
all the more important since the two systems can be best
"compared not according to political or ideological values
but according to facts and figures which are politically
neutral and comprehensible to all." ERef. 75: p. 60]
Second, because of the light industrial character of
the East German economic base, and the fact that the raw
materials, energy sources, and agricultural and heavy indus-
trial sectors of a complete pre-war economy are now located
in the West, the present day GDR economy is heavily foreign
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trade dependent. In order to produce those products it is
most capable to produce, and to feed its people in reward
for such production, the East Germans must rely on outside
trade to obtain the necessary raw materials, energy sources
and foodstuff s. ( See Tables VI and VII.)
TABLE VI
GDR PRINCIPLE FOREIGN TRADE COMMODITIES
(Shown as % of Export/Import Trade)
1960 1970 1977 AVE
EXPORT
1. Machines, Equipment
Vehicles 49 51 53 51
2. Fuels, Mineral Raw
Materials, Metals 16 10 11 12
3. Other Raw Materials
& Processed Products
& Foodstuffs 6 7 7 7
4. Industrial Consumer
Goods 15 20 15 17
5. Chemical Products &
Construction Materials 14 11 13 13
1960 1970 1977 AVE
IMPORTS
1. Machines, Equipment
Vehicles 13 34 33 27
2. Fuels , Mineral Raw
Materials, Metals 39 28 29 32
3. Other Raw Materials
& Processed Products
& Foodstuffs 39 28 22 30
4. Industrial Consumer
Goods 5 5 5 5
5. Chemical Products &
Construction Materials 4 6 11 7
Source'. Statistical Year
1978.
book of Member States of CMEA
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TABLE VII
USSR-GDR PRINCIPLE FOREIGN TRADE COMMODITY EXCHANGE
Soviet Imports from East Germany
(Shown as % of Total USSR Imports from the GDR)
Consumer Machinery Raw
Goods Equipment Fuels Materials/
( Incl. Transport & Industrial
Foodstuffs) Vehicles Lubricants Supplies Other
1960 12 62 2 10 14
1965 20 59 0. 7 9 11
1968 21 58 0. 6 8 12
East German Imports from the Soviet Union
(Shown as % of Total GDR Imports from the USSR)
1960 21 4 15 50 10
1965 11 8 16 53 12
1968 13 15 12 45 15
Source: Soviet
Paul Marer.
and E as t European Foreign T rade , 1946-1949.
The Soviet Union realized very early after the war the
potential for trade advantages for themselves in estab-
lishing a solid trading relationship with the East Germans.
It was also important for the Soviets to assure that few
other trading options were available to the East Germans as
time went on. From Table IV one can see the growth of
Soviet-East German trade and the dependency of the East
Germans on their allies in Moscow.
Third, since 1960 GDR foreign trade trends have
appeared fairly constant. (See Table VIII.) Although the
CMEA states receive the lion's share of its trade, there has
been a gradual swing towards increased trade with the
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non-socialist West at the expense of intra-bloc trade.
Although the data are still sketchy, due to East Berlin's
reluctance to release regular and complete foreign trade
statistics, there are indications that trade with the CMEA
partners has increased in the present decade almost to 1970
level (67%). Western imports have been chosen based on
their lack of availability within the bloc system and the
need to modernize certain industries through western tech-
nology in order to become more competitive in the world
markets.
Finally, the East German economic potential had made
them partners for cooperation as well as competition with
their western counterparts across the Elbe. Despite the
purposeful trade restrictions and long-standing foul polit-
ical climate between Bonn and East Berlin, the latter has
retained about 10% annual trade with Bonn, who, until
recently, has been the largest single East German trading
partner, excluding the Soviet Union. Also potentially
important is the advantages the East Germans .enjoy in the
EEC through the Federal Republic, although this is held to a
minimum through controls by Bonn.
During the mid- to- late 1950s, the East German
economy began reestablishing an industrial production base
and Ulbricht pushed for closer alignment with the Polish,
Czech and, especially, the Soviet economies. This meant
access to steady markets, sources for raw materials, accom-
panied by slowly disengaging the East German economy from
its dependence on West German production. By 1960, East
German industrial capabilities showed much potential,
despite severe deficiencies, and was well integrated into
the CMEA foreign trade net. CRef . 22: p. 74-75] Over two-
thirds of her trade was with CMEA members, the leading part-
ners being the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
(See .Table VIII.) Although mutual trade benefits were
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becoming evident at this time, it was not until 1964-1968
that the East German economy took its real prominence within
the bloc through economic improvements and greater CMEA
integration. CRef. 76 3 CRef. 77]
Internal economic problems during the late 1950s,
however, were threatening the very continued existence of
the state. As the number of refugees fleeing to the West
grew, so did the economy's present and future skilled labor
force, upon which the East German economy was so dependent.
Along with the master craftsmen and engineers went thousands
of doctors, lawyers, teachers and their families. Without
control over these losses, Ulbricht was left to watching the
basis for his downfall.
Ulbricht' s policies leading up to and during the
Berlin crises were most strongly influenced by these
economic considerations, which were, in other words, his
only road to survival. Externally, the had to build upon
new Eastern European economic relationships and internally
he needed to gain control over his state's most important
economic resource, its skilled and professional work-force.
East Berlin pursued between 1966-1968 an active
foreign economic policy designed to strengthen its links
with the East European states and discourage them from
developing trade links with the Federal Republic. This
policy was aimed particularly at Poland and Czechoslovakia,
who were the natural trading partners with the GDR in terms
of geographic location and industrial trade structure. As a
result, in these three years East German trade with the
smaller East European states grew faster than did trade with
the USSR and the FRG. CRef. 3: p. 108]
Ulbricht decided in the mid 1960s, after disposing
of the reform opposition, to bind the East German economic
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use the GDR's highly developed industrial capabilities to
create a position where East Germany provided the USSR with
her most vital machinery and technical products, thereby
increasing East Berlin's importance in Moscow. In the
process, domestic economic considerations would be placed
second to satisfying Moscow's needs. By 1969, however, "it
had become apparent to the USSR that the GDR' s capacity in
this respect would not suffice and that extensive reliance
on Western economies was difficult to avoid." C Ref . 4: p.
53 It was during the same period, late 1969 through 1970,
that, for multiple reasons, the East German economy experi-
enced considerable difficulties.
East Berlin's Deutschlandpolitik during this period
was affected very little by its economic interests. The
successful sealing off of its population during the earlier
period greatly improved the internal economic situation.
And as mentioned above, the East Germans proved themselves a
worthwhile economic partner with their eastern neighbors.
Despite the tense political atmosphere created between Bonn
and East Berlin in the late 1960s, economic relations were
help fairly aloft and remained at a constant level. Perhaps
Ulbricht may have felt that he failed to build GDR's
economic influence among its allies to a level great enough
to influence their political decisionmaking in his favor
during the period. Yet, the fact remained, that they wanted
more than what his state could offer economically.
If the GDR economy was fairly comprehendable during
its first thirty years in existence, by 1979 it had evolved
into a much more complex system. The competition situation
with the Federal Republic was providing East Berlin some
advantages in view of the growing unemployment and inflation
in the West. Despite the relief many workers in the East
felt for not having to rely on capitalistic successes for
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their jobs, the overall economic situation in East Germany,
and in the entire Socialist bloc, was in a poor state. In
1980 the socialist economic planners revised their next Five
Year plans to include greater intra-bloc growth.
The position gained within CMEA through successful
economic and political developments has helped the GDR to
fulfill vital assigned tasks within the Socialist community.
Fulfilling these tasks was used, as before, as a mechanism
to buy greater influence in Moscow and in other East
European capitals. A sign of SED leadership's value placed
on trade within the CMEA, and perhaps to improve their
influence stature, was the signing in 1980 of trade agree-
ments or protocols geared to increase trade 20-40% with
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary over the period
1981-1985. CRef . 78] East German 1984 trade with CMEA coun-
tries continued to rise, showing an increase that year of an
.average of 9% over 1983. Although trade with Moscow also
continued to increase (10% over 1983), and now comprises
over 38% of the total East German foreign trade, East
Berlin's terms of trade are believed to continue their dete-
rioration. CRef. 79] Considering that Moscow commited the
East Germans to increase their deliveries of better quality
consumer goods to the USSR at the CMEA summit meeting last
June, and that both countries signed a 15-year trade agree-
ment shortly thereafter, which also pledged an increase in
GDR exports of machinery and electronic products, one can
expect this troublesome trend, for East Berlin, to continue.
CRef. 79]
From the western analyst's perspective, it appears
as though East German leaders have been more willing in
recent years to shuffle their foreign trade accounts around
to accommodate a constant flow of Western imports into East
Germany, but will not exacerbate their debt situation. The
West German role in East German economic planning is quite
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A) Post, Telephone & Telegraph
-- DM 200 million per Year (1983-1990)
B) Swing Credit ( Interest Free)
DM 800-600 million/Year
(Decreasing scale 1982-1985)




Transit Route Payments -- DM 525 million/Year
Autobahn" Construction/
repair Costs -- DM 1,887 million *
West Berlin Local Transit
Construction/repair Costs -- DM 1,010 million
* Includes DM 156 million in West German Construction
equipment.
Figure 2. 2 FRG Payments to the GDR for Intra-German Contacts.
complex. East Berlin receives annually billions of Ostmarks
from Bonn as part of the the various intra-German agreements
on transit to West Berlin and improve contacts between the
two countries. ( See Figure 2. 2. ) Aside from the yearly
interest-free credit allotment, called the Swing, private
West German banks have been willing to provide East Berlin
large loans with advantageous terms. Additionally, since
1981, the East Germans have maintained a surplus in
intra-German trade, reversing the opposite trend that
existed since the 1950s. In fact, in overall Western trade,
the West Germans have recently taken a back seat to other
Europeans, e.g. Austrians, French and Finns. Whatever the
reason for this shift, the East Germans badly need the prod-
ucts they receive from the West to modernize their produc-
tion capability for further competition. The East German
economy is under foreign trade pressure from East and West.
While they need to improve the quality and quantity of
107
foreign trade production to maintain their place in the
Western markets, in order to sustain the flow of Western
imports, the Soviet Union wants its share of quality prod-
ucts which it demands in return for their deliveries of
essential raw materials and energy supplies.
Honecker's decision to attempt to set his own pace
for intra-German relations in the early 1980s was likely
largely founded upon the GDR's economic interests. Trade
and other economic contacts with the West Germans, including
large advantageous loans, were essential to foster East
German economic and political influence during the coming
decades. This occured during a time when Moscow was not
showing much sympathy for East European economic problems.
These economic interests, therefore, were crucial motivators
behind East Berlin's Deutschlandpolitik during this last
case study period.
In summary, beyond a doubt, economic interests
played an extremely important role in determining East
German and Soviet leaders' Deutschlandpolitik in all three
cases. The importance of these interests to each state did
not match so well during the three cases with that of the
other state's. Whereas the other interests were, perhaps,
primarily formulated through perceived images by the leader-
ship of how their regime should fit into a broader interna-
tional system, such as being granted superpower or hegemonal
status for Moscow or international recognition for East
Berlin, the economic interest were basically rooted in
domestic necessity. To ingore the latter would create risks
far greater than not fulfilling these visions of status.
Ironically, perhaps, the East Germans were following their
most vital economic interests during the Berlin crises in
shutting off the contact with the West, while in the latter
case, Honecker was pursuing opportunistic economic policies
in hanging on to contact with Bonn. While economic benefits
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from increased Western trade contacts had a very important
influence on Brezhnev's detente policy, and therefore
affected his German policies, the East Berlin leadership was
much more driven by political concerns in the second case
and based little of its Deutschlandpolitik on economic
concerns at that time.
E. FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKING CONTROL
1. Soviet Union
Conflict between two governments, including very
often among allied partners, arises out of not only opposing
foreign policy viewpoints, but also from the inconsistency
of a policy line taken by one of the disputing parties.
Most frequently this is the result of internal debate within
the foreign policy decisionmaking apparatus, weak or unclear
transmissions of the policy direction, misperceptions by one
side of the other's policy objectives, or a combination of
all three of the above situations. The study of the foreign
policy decisionmaking mechanism and how it transmits its
decisions to those who must carry them out is critical to
understanding relations between two states. This is even
more important in analyzing the relations between a super-
power and a smaller, dependent state, such as in the Soviet
Union-East German relationship. Not only does the smaller
state have to fear foreign policy shifts which might
endanger its vital interests, but the smaller state must
always be ready to exercise its "bargaining" rights when
such opportunities present themselves. A divided or weak-
ened leadership in the larger state may open for short
periods of time opportunities for the smaller to press for
its interests which earlier were not possible. The larger
state, in this case, the Soviet Union, inversely, can often
times manipulate the factions within the smaller state's
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decisionmaking group to assure agreement in foreign policy
interests. This much less likely, however, when within the
smaller state exists a decisionmaking apparatus that is
solidly consolidated under the control of one leader, or
among a very small and chiefly homogeneous group.
Political decisionmaking authority, particularly in
foreign policy matters, is one of the primary symbols,
accepted as rewards, of power available to the strongest
member within a leninist-model government leadership.
Because decisionmaking influence, not economic wealth, is
the symbol of power in these systems, the logic of their
politics induces the leader to seek absolute power within
the leading group, while at the same time this logic impels
the other group members to try to prevent the prime leader
from acquiring it. CRef. 80: p. 14] This can be rather
subtle, as for example, when Brezhnev brought his supporters
into the Politburo, who were, for varying periods of time,
totally dependent on him for their position. The incentive
is still there to limit the leader's power, regardless of
the ability of the other individuals to act.
Policies are made of various issues which are asso-
ciated with given definitions. As power is consolidated by
a leader, he will seek to sustain his definition of the
issues, i. e. peaceful coexistence, detente, socialist
commonwealth, European Security or Deutschlandpolitik. A
leader's ability to control the definitions relates directly
to his success in determining the course of foreign policy
decisionmaking. As we look at the Soviet and East German
foreign policy decisionmaking consensus, or lack thereof,
during the three periods under investigation, it is useful
to focus on the leader's success in holding on to his defi-
nition of the vital issues regarding Deutschlandpolitik
.
Nikita Khrushchev's power and prestige were, to a
far greater extent than his predecessor/ dependent on the
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success of his policies. Running through the heart of most
of his policies was a reform tendency, reflecting
Khrushchev's personal character as well as a general Russian
response to the Stalin years. In the Khrushchev era, the
competition between reform and orthodox tendencies, given
free play without the application of terror tactics,
pervaded the Soviet political scene. ERef . 80: p. 53] There
was also a need within the Soviet leadership to establish
the proper balance of dictatorial and oligarchical forces
necessary to advance the Soviet Union in the post Stalin
world. The result was that in the 1957-1962 period there
still existed submerged conflicts within the Kremlin, which
did not allow a stable leadership condition to develop.
This, according to Carl A. Linden, accounts in part "for the
stormy and dynamic quality of Soviet politics in the
Khrushchev era. " CRef . 80: p. 37]
In reviewing Khrushchev's decisionmaking authority
in foreign affairs during the Berlin crises we have to begin
with the fact that in 1957 the "anti-party" group attempted
a true palace guard coup which, although it failed at that
time, succeeded in a less dramatic fashion seven years
later. This removal was, of course, the only purge of a top
Soviet leader who actually held significant control within
the party. In light of these facts, there were some distin-
guishing policies promoted by Khrushchev which most likely
weakened his foreign policy decisionmaking authority.
The reforms in the domestic economy formulated by
Khrushchev, particularly in agriculture and light industry,
were, according to some Soviet specialists of that period,
the greatest single set of factors leading to the erosion of
his power. ERef. 68] The failures during 1960-1963 were
accentuated by the grandiose claims, along with proper prop-
aganda campaigns, made in 1957 and 1959 about surpassing
U. S. production in farm consumer products by 1960-1961.
CRef. 68: pp. 75, 97]
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Khrushchev also set in motion several designs to
reform the CPSU and its associated bureaucratic structure.
His efforts in early 1957 to decentralize the economic state
bureaucracy and the party contributed to the formation of
the anti-party coalition later that year. His reform
campaign, which continued for the next several years and
also included significant reshuffling in regional party
organizations and the military, became a significant gener-
ator of discontent after 1957 and emerged as an underlying
issue in his downfall in 1964. CRef . 80: p. 33]
In foreign policy, the Soviet leadership tended to
polarize around two main factions. Khrushchev led the
moderate group, and the conservative group was led by F.
R. Koslov and M. A. Suslov. In general, the moderates
favored a relaxation of East-West tensions, even at the
expense of a Chinese ally, while the conservatives saw
little value in detente policies with the United States and
were particularly concerned about the growing conflict with
their largest ally in Peking. C Ref . 81: p. 567]
Khrushchev's emphasis on peaceful coexistence with
the West, particularly the United States, ran counter to
many in the party leadership, albeit for various reasons.
Too many party leaders had risen to their positions assisted
in large part by the longstanding CPSU doctrine insisting on
friction and unreconcilable conflict between the two ideolo-
gical and social systems and were not mentally prepared for
the abrupt turn about in this doctrine. This subtle
conflict is so difficult to notice because of the adherence
to Lenin's concept of democratic centralism, according to
which all segments of the Soviet bureaucracy are expected to
implement the decisions of the Politburo without much
discussion once they have been reached. The U-2 affair and
the growing split with the Chinese communists brought out
some of these latent disputes. Michel Tatu, who was living
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in Moscow at the time, had dealt with the effect of the spy
plan incident and its aftermath in great detail. He states,
for example,
. . . it seems clear that, in the Presidium, Khrushchev
was in trouble on at least two occasions after the U-2
incident owing to his past policy of rapprochement with
the United States. This was on May 3 and 4 and then on
May 10 and 11. His policy was largely reversed, which
was a clear indication of the attitude of the Presidium
majority. CRef. 82: p. 78]
Finally, the often heavy handed manner in which
Khrushchev dealt with the ensuing Chinese problems were also
cause for growing disagreement with Khrushchev's authority
among certain Presidium members. Adam Ulam contends that
the reason the Twenty-First Party Congress in June 1959 went
over rather uneventfully, given the numerous problems and
tense issues at the time, was due possibly to the cancella-
tion of original plans because of a divi-sion among the
Soviet leaders. CRef. 39: p. 6213
Presidium disagreement probably became most substan-
tial following a Bucharest meeting of communist parties in
June 1960, where Khrushchev openly and vehemently attacked
the Chinese leadership for the first time among third party
observers. Linden proposes that Peking was well aware of
allies in the Presidium, namely Koslov and Suslov, and
utilized this to possibly affect Khrushchev's position.
Hence the Chinese made it abundantly clear at that stage
that their complaint was with Khrushchev personally and
not with the Soviet leadership as a whole. The Chinese
purpose seemed clear: to zero in on Khrushchev as the
prime dismantler of the Sino-Soviet axis and communist
unity and to drive a wedge between him and his Presidium
colleagues. CRef. 80: pp. 102-103]
Besides Koslov and Suslov mentioned above, Kosygin
also became an opposition member within the Presidium. The
old-timers, Mikoyan and Voroshilov have been noted as
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fulfilling a "braking" role in Khrushchev policies.
Additionally, the old anti-party group from 1957, who still
had visible support from all of the above Presidium members,
were, according to Tatu, showing signs of backstage lobbying
in 1961 causing Khrushchev's decision to launch another
destalinization attack against them at the Twenty-Second
Party Congress. Also wrapped in these anti -Khrushchev
maneuvers was supposedly a "Chinese sympathies" factor.
CRef. 82: pp. 145-147]
What effect did this have on his Berlin demands?
Basically, we can assume that Khrushchev was not fully alone
in determining the important decisions regarding Berlin.
Hans Kroll has pointed out that before Khrushchev 10
November 1958 speech and again between that speech and the
21 November "Deadline" note to the three Western Allied
powers, the Berlin issue was strongly argued within the
Presidium. He notes particularly- Mikoyan, Kosygin and
Voroshilov's warnings to Khrushchev about overplaying the
Soviet position. [Ref . 69: p. 393] Because of hi-s weakening
position, particularly after May 1960, when a big shake-up
in the Central Committee (CC) and the top state apparatus
occured, Khrushchev was probably reacting to internal pres-
sures rather than following an overall plan for the policy.
This is even more striking if one considers that while
Khrushchev was losing internal authority, his international
credibility, vis-a-vis the West, China and East Germany was
likewise falling.
Khrushchev, therefore, was unable to completely
dominate the foreign policy decisionmaking in the Soviet
Union during the Berlin crises. Considering growing chal-
lenges to his authority throughout the period, he was prob-
ably limited to only partial success in defining the vital
issues regarding Soviet Deutschlandpolitik, and thus likely
faced significant internal limitations on his control over
Moscow's foreign policy during the Berlin crises.
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Among others in the Soviet Politburo, Leonid
Brezhnev appeared to have learned well from his predecessor
and fellow Ukrainian. Regardless of the problems demanding
reform, the Secretary General should not take a position
against an opposition on a novel policy that has any notable
risk of failing, particularly if he could afterwards be
associated with that failure. Jiri Valenta develops this
cautious image of Brezhnev in describing the Soviet leader's
careful "flexibility" throughout the protracted decision-
making in the Kremlin on the Czechoslovak! an problem in the
summer 1968. In describing Brezhnev's ability to create a
"winning" coalition in the Politburo, Valenta states:
he (Brezhnev) seems to be more successful in
forging a winning consensus within the Soviet decision-
making collectivity than his predecessor, whose style in
the last years of his leadership antagonized his
colleagues an ultimately led them to unite against him.
[Ref. 16: p. 28]
The Czechoslovakian intervention was a turning point
in Brezhnev' s development as a strong Soviet leader. Prior
to the invasion Brezhnev did not impress most western
analysts as being a "primus inter pares" but rather a "great
compromiser" within a Kremlin of feeble decisionmakers, who
were driven more by crisis or opportunity than by design.
He fell back on organizational supporters who had proven
themselves dependable during Stalin's period, such as
leaders in the military and heavy industry, which was the
conservative, cautious approach.
Only beginning in 1969 did he show himself a more
skillful politician who was able to "borrow" programs of
others and keep the decisionmaking consensus in tact through
providing "a little something" to each important set of
players. In this mode, Brezhnev stayed in tune with
Kosygin, Suslov and Gromyko and slowly purged those with
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relatively stronger views, who advocated change such as Petr
Shalest and Aleksandr Shelepen. CRef . 83: p. 80] There were
no drastic changes in the top party or state apparatus
during this period. In 1971 four new members were added to
the Politburo, at least three of which, Kunayev, Scherbitsky
and Kulakov, could be counted on as likely supporters of
Brezhnev policies. CRef. 84: p. 1943
In 1969 Brezhnev also picked up his activity in
foreign affairs in which he gradually replaced Kosygin as
the Soviet Union's leading representative in negotiations
with the West. Possibly out of the lack of damages suffered
from tne Czech invasion in Western relations and the first
sparks of possible SALT I negotiations, Brezhnev was able to
begin designing a coherent plan for Westpolitik. This was
comprised of a European plan towards convening a European
Security Conference and completing a strategic arms treaty
with the United States. This assessment is drawn from the
relatively steady and pressing manner in which the Soviet
leadership pursued these objectives from. about 1969 to 1975.
Nineteen sixty-nine may have also been the point
where the leadership decided on what Vernon Aspaturian
called in 1970 "the root problem of all their problems, the
question of purpose." [Ref. 81: p. 916] Brezhnev and his
Politburo colleagues apparently chose the primacy of ruling
the state over directing a world movement. The consequences
of such a decision, with its roots going back to 1959 when
Khrushchev visited the U. S. for the first time, meant that
to become a global power certain actions must be taken and
decisions made to fulfill this role. Brezhnev demanded
recognition of superpower parity while striving for domi-
nance, the latter being perhaps the best way to assure main-
tenance of the former once it is achieved.
Brezhnev' s increasing control within the Kremlin
also significantly affected Soviet Deutschlandpolitik
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decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By slowly
eliminating the opposition and establishing a harmonious
foreign policy bureaucracy, he showed much success in
defining the vital issues in Soviet overall German policy.
Except for the period immediately prior to the Twenty-Fourth
Party Congress in March 1971, when he appeared to have taken
a few steps backward in the Berlin negotiations, Brezhnev's
Deutschlandpolitik seems to have had little domestic opposi-
tion during this period. Although bumping heads with
Ulbricht was apparent at times, Brezhnev's internal support
for this German policy probably grew stronger as he and
Gromyko chalked up increasing successes in Bonn and
Washington.
Following over 15 years of leadership stability and
continuity under Leonid Brezhnev, the Kremlin was suddenly
faced with a succession crisis during which three aging and
ailing leaders occupied and departed the top Soviet deci-
sionmaking position within two and a half years. This
changing, old and ill leadership, exacerbated by developing
Kremlin power struggles, was unable to provide little more
than a policy of crisis management. CRef . 36: p. 9]
The ill health of the Secretary Generals of the CPSU
during this period was so common that only 16 of 60 months,
from November 1979 to October 1984, was there a "healthy"
old Soviet leader in charge of the Kremlin. While Brezhnev
stabilized the leading CPSU cadres which led to a non-
eventful succession, he "neglected to create the conditions
which would institutionalize and pass it on to his succes-
sors". ERef. 85] Like his predecessors, Brezhnev used his
1 The term "healthy" here is the time during which the
press considered the Secretary General able to work at least
a few hours in the Kremlin a day. Obviously this includes a
lot of speculation, but it is not intended to be so accu-
rate, as it is to make a point on the gaps that had to be
filled while the Soviet leaders were incapacitated.
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leading position in the Party to consolidate and expand his
power over a decade and a half. In this he also personally
affected the manning of the Politburo to meet his needs.
TABLE IX
AGE AND EXPERIENCE OF FULL POLITBURO MEMBERS
(Fall 1984)
Name Birth Age Cand. Full Years as
Date Mbr. Mbr. Full Mbr.
Tikhonov 1905 78 1978 1980 3
Ustinov 1908 75 1965 1975 8
Gromyko 1909 74 ____ 1973 10
Chernenko 1911 72 1977 1978 5
Kunayev 1912 71 1966 1971 12
Andropov 1914 69 1967 1973 10
Grishin 1914 69 1961 1971 12
Shcherbitsky 1918 65 1961 1971 12
Romanov 1923 60 1973 1976 7
Aliyev
Gorbachev
1923 60 1976 1982 1
1931 52 1979 1980 3
Source: Vernon Aspaturian,.. "The Brezhnev Legacy:
Quartei
Leadership
Uncertainty in the Kreml in in Washinqton :lY/ Winter
1985.
A combination of leadership stability, ' considering that
severe changes in the Politburo were absent during
Brezhnev's tenure, the incredibly long lives of the men who
got there, and Brezhnev's practice of replacing departing
Politburo members with men of approximately the same age as
those departed, created a queer phenomenon in the Politburo
entering the 1980s. The most senior members were also those
with relatively recent Politburo tenure. (Compare Tables IX
and X. ) This structure also virtually guaranteed that
Brezhnev's successor would be drawn from the approximate age
bracket to which Brezhnev himself belonged. CRef . 85: p.
23] As the old guard passed on, another elderly, albeit




AGE AND EXPERIENCE OF FORMER POLITBURO MEMBERS
( 1980-1983)
Name Birth Death Age at Full Years as
Date Date Death/Removal Mbr. Full Mbr.
Pelshe 1899 1983 84 1966 17
Suslov 1902 1981 79 1955 28
Kirilenko 1906 1982 76 1962 21
Brezhnev 1906 1982 76 1957 26
Kosygin 1904 1980 76 1960 23
Source: Vernon Aspaturian, "The Brezhnev Legacy: Leadership
Uncertainty in the Kremlin" in Washington Quarterly , Winter
1985.
Yuri Andropov took over in November 1982, after
Brezhnev's death and an inconspicuous power struggle. The
colorless and unimpressive Konstantin Chernenko failed to
get support for his assumption of the top Party position
despite Brezhnev's earlier attempts to structure the
Politburo in a manner favorable for such a transition.
Although without the solid power base needed to do so,
Andropov quickly announced plans to rejuvenate the Party and
state system through reforms aimed at improved economic
efficiency. This obviously sent a growing shock wave
through the party apparatus which had been established based
on the Brezhnev principle of cadre stability.
Ill health and subsequent death of the old reformer
allowed the party apparatus to breathe easy again and prob-
ably contributed to Chernenko' s succession. Raised in party
life under the Brezhnev tradition, Chernenko would threaten
no one. He too was afflicted with poor health problems, not
surprising for his age, and other Politburo ' members carried
on their task of seeing to the affairs of the state.
The net affect of this weak, but non- turbulent lead-
ership condition during the succession was a subtle and
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uneven emphasis of various policy interests by their respec-
tive advocates within the party leadership. Gromyko and
Ustinov were part of Andropov's "class of '73", and prob-
ably had widening influence in foreign policy matters during
his rise and departure from power.
There were frequent signs, for instance, of
Gromyko' s anti-German influence during mid-to-late 1984,
when many considered that he was the major force behind
Moscow's fanatical anti-revanchist campaign. CRef. 86] He
also warned Honecker via Pravda of the dangers of getting
too involved in Bonn's financial traps and was the first
Soviet high party official to visit East Berlin after
Honecker postponed his trip to the FRG, delivering a fierce
anti-West German speech at the GDR's 35th anniversary
celebration.
The military and Gromyko' s Weltanschauung are not
necessarily congruous, although both support a hard line in
Soviet Westpolitik. This mixture provided, among other
things, a heavy hand in Afghanistan, incredible tolerance in
the Polish crisis and diplomatic incapacity in the Korean
Airline shootdown incident. If the West thought it was
difficult asessing Soviet motives during these years, the
Soviet's East European allies were probably even more
confused and worried since many of their interests depend
upon Soviet political and military power.
In the Afghanistan decisionmaking process, Valenta
assesses that Brezhnev and Kosygin were still involved in
the final debate, although in a strikingly weakened condi-
tion due to their health. He notes that an inner Politburo
group was formed to deal with the developing emergency in
Afghanistan on a day-to-day basis. CRef. 9: p. 226] Not
surprising, the KGB, the military and the Ministry of
11A11 three men were raised to full Politburo members
that year. I have borrowed this term from Dr. Aspaturian.
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Foreign Affairs were leading participants in this select
group. George Kennen suggests a bit stronger that Brezhnev
and Kosygin had little influence on this important decision:
It was a move decidedly not in character for either
Alexsei N. Kosygin or Leonid Brezhnev. (The one was ( of
course, ill and removed from active work. The limita-
tions on the other's health and powers of attention are
well known. ) Andrei A. Gromyko, too, is unlikely to
have approved it. These reflections suggest a recent
breakthrough, to positions of dominant influence, of
hard line elements much less concerned for world public
opinion, but also much less experienced than these older
figures. C Ref . 87: p . 1623
The Soviet handling of the democratization develop-
ments in Poland and near loss of power by the Polish
Communist party in 1980-1981 was much more stunning to East
European leaders than Afghanistan. For over eighteen months
the Kremlin appeared paralized and unable to make a definite
decision. In East Berlin and Prague the party leadership
must have asked themselves, and perhaps some Soviets, why
did the Kremlin allow such extraordinary display of
pluralism for such a long time, especially before the world
audience. And furthermore, were the Soviet military prepa-
rations in December 1980 and March 1981 only for pressure
purposes or signs of indecision? It is Charles Gati '
s
opinion that despite well know interests to prevent such
developments in Poland, the necessary decisions were simply
not forthcoming because "no Soviet leader wanted to be held
responsible for the failure of either policy option:
accepting the process of 'socialist renewal' or ordering an
end to it. " C Ref . 74: p. 85] In the debates over the
Czechoslovakian problem in the summer 1968 similar fears of
"failure" were eventually set aside to control the situ-
ation. The Politburo of the early 1980s was perhaps not up
to bold decisionmaking, at least this could be the percep-
tion by leaders in East Berlin or Prague.
121
Finally, the occurance of, and subsequent response
to, the Korean Airliner (KAL) incident has a taste of disa-
greement between the Soviet military and civilian leader-
ship. Although it is still unclear why, the Chief of the
Soviet General Staff Marshal Ogarkov was given an unusually
visible role as the Soviet spokesman in the aftermath of the
event. Was it because he was asserting exceptional power in
behalf of the military or did the civilian leadership delib-
erately attempt to saddle the military with the responsi-
bility of explaining the "misaction" to the world while they
sought to distance themselves from the KAL incident?
ERef. 85: p. 26] The subsequent demotion 'of Marshal Ogarkov
a year later under explained circumstances, if related,
would suggest the dissatisfaction with the military by the
civilian leaders.
The many mysteries of Soviet policies in the early
1980s have yet to be solved. They did, however, present
their allied partners with several uncertainties which
resulted in a relative decline in Soviet authority in
Eastern ^ Europe. With the increasing need to solve their own
problems, clarity of signals from Moscow is essential for a
conflict-free relationship. The transmission of signals was
even more disturbed, perhaps, due to the recall of the long-
time Soviet Ambassador to East Berlin, P. A. Abrassimov, in
June 1983. This overbearing and experienced diplomat
behaved virtually as a Soviet pro-consul, wielding enormous
power as the Kremlin's representative in East Berlin between
the years 1962 -1971 and 1975-1983. CRef. 88] Although his
removal may well have pleased the SED leadership, it could
also have added to the already complex task of correctly
interpreting the Soviet Union' s primary interests in Central
Europe.
What, then, was the effect of the Soviet's
Deutschlandpolitik? At worst there was little apparent
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success by any one leader or group of individuals, in
defining the vital issues involved in the current Soviet
Deutschlandpolitik during the entire period. Again, the
lack of unambiguous definitions subjects the resulting
policy to inconsistancies. At same time, it must be under-
stood that the Soviet policy was never really under any
apparent domestic pressure during the period until the East
Berlin leadership decided to take a bold step in its own
Deutschlandpol itik.
2. East Germany
Foreign policy decisionmaking in the German
Democratic Republic has a significantly different character-
istic from that in the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union
is totally sovereign in its decisionmaking processes, the
GDR, even more so than other socialist communist states in
Eastern Europe, must dovetail its foreign policy to satisfy
the major foreign policy interests in Moscow. Because of
its geographic and economic conditions, East German deci-
sionmakers are probably more constrained than any of the
other WTO members. During the early, difficult years of
establishing its international status, East Berlin's depen-
dence on Soviet support accentuated this requirement.
Two side effects are at play as a result of this
need to coincide their policies. First, the East German
leadership must enjoy the confidence of the senior Kremlin
leaders, risking loss of political power when this support
is lacking. Second, because the policies are to compliment
one another and the SED Secretary General is responsible for
this policy, he should have confidence in the senior Kremlin
leadership. The lack of confidence on his part would be
evident in the formulation or execution of East German
policy, which might then lead to the first condition,
resulting in his loss of power; e.g., Walter Ulbricht's
situation in 1970-1971.
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Walter Ulbricht' s control over East German decision-
making in the 1950s and 1960s may be likened to the ability
of the Persian kings' maintenance of their dynasties through
years of court intrigues. A master of communist party
maneuver and deception, Ulbricht was able to survive two
attempts, in 1953 and 1956, by Politburo members to dispose
him. In both cases, the opposition had the visible support
of leading party members in Moscow. CRef. 89: pp. 135-174]
He took advantage in both cases of popular unrest to prove
to his opponents that life would be even worse if he were
not at the helm. His seven years in Moscow during the war
as well as several years of doing battle within the German
Communist Party (KPD) prior to and immediately after the war
certainly provided him with ample learning opportunities and
strongly influenced him in the Stalinist methods of
survival. The latter point did not make Ulbricht a devout
follower of Nikita Khrushchev and the feelings were probably
mutual.
Ulbricht did learn during most of these close
encounters with the opposition and probably accepted the
Soviet role in East German affairs whether he liked the
leaders there or not. Internally, he was in an unchallenged
position in 1958, thanks to his latest round of purges. But
he needed some signs of economic improvement to hold off
another attack from within and from Moscow. The only person
close to Ulbricht in authority was Erich Honecker, who had
proven to be his most loyal supporter and party henchman.
CRef. 90: pp. 181-182] During the Berlin crises, Ulbricht
handled the Soviet leaders and was the main GDR spokesman on
Deutschlandpolitik, while Honecker was in charge of internal
security and national defense matters. The latter was the
individual within the GDR responsible for the construction
and physical security of the Berlin Wall in August 1961.
For their own reasons, the wall was a victory for both men.
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For Ulbricht, it allowed him more room for maneuver in his
present role, while for Honecker it was like money in the
bank by strengthening his position within the SED, gaining
increased confidence from Ulbricht and heightened prestige
in the eyes of the Soviet leadership. CRef . 90: p. 189]
Ulbricht' s power position in East Berlin was well
developed by 1958 so that his demands to the outside world
regarding overall German policy went visibly unchallenged
within the East German state. It appears as though he were
the main individual defining the problems and issues needed
to be solved through East Berlin's approach to
Deutschlandpolitik. If any one person could be associated
with the construction of the Berlin Wall, it would have to
be Ulbricht himself, though it was only a compromise to his
larger Deutschlandpolitik aspirations.
Many things had changed in the GDR during the next
decade, but decisive decisionmaking authority still rested
with Ulbricht and Honecker. The rapid developments in their
country brought about increased self-confidence, particu-
larly in Honecker. While Ulbricht still played the decisive
role, Honecker had moved much closer to contact with the
leadership in Moscow through the buildup and eventual East
German contribution to the "fraternal assistance" given to
Czechoslovakia. This increased Honecker' s involvement in
foreign affairs and his influence in Moscow. At this time
he probably began to relate to Leonid Brezhnev, with whom he
had much in common. Both men were realists for the future,
with a background in security and military matters and both
emphasized the necessity to utilize technological gains to
strengthen the economic and political forces in the
socialist camp. Both also had an appreciation for the need
to incrementally increase popular support through improved
production of consumer goods.
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In the late 1960s Honecker took on greater authority
within the party and developed popular support through
paying considerable attention to "the workers' and technoc-
rats' interests alike. The two leaders, Ulbricht and
Honecker, finally diverged in their thinking on the issue of
Deutschlandpolitik after the Brandt government came into
power. The Berlin issue best uncovered their differing
viewpoints. During the Four-Power Talks on Berlin, Ulbricht
would accept a Berlin accord and a rapprochement with Bonn
only if his maximalist demands were met. The most important
of these were Bonn's formal recognition of the GDR and the
acceptance by the Western Powers of East German sovereign
control over the access routes to Berlin. While these
demands necessitated external acceptance and emphasized
external legitimacy, Honecker placed greater importance on
internal legitimacy which was determined largely by domestic
actions. Honecker agreed to improvements in relations with
Bonn only if his Abgrenzung policy was successful and
supported by Moscow. Perhaps, because he was not head of
state, but responsible for security, he arrived at this
requirement rather than Ulbricht' s. In any case, Ulbricht
was demanding an ultimate change in the external environ-
ment, while Honecker was limiting his demands to the
internal situation. If the outside is unwilling to modify
its position, and Moscow wishes to press on with their
policy, the internal demands seem more realistic in Moscow's
eyes.
Wishing not to portray the transition from Ulbricht
to Honecker as a simple one, there was also Kremlin
intrigues involved. Gerhard Wettig notes that according to
some FRG reports, members of the SED CC had make contacts
with circles in the CPSU leadership who advocated rapproche-
ment with China in place of an East-West normalization in
Europe. Wettig further reminds us that Ulbricht avoided any
126
anti-Chinese polemics at the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress,
unlike the party leaders of Poland, Czechoslovakia and
Bulgaria. C Ref . 4: p. 923
Ulbricht had other characteristics which were making
him less desirable in Soviet eyes. He appeared increasingly
inflexible, which might not be too surprising for a man 78
years old, and his relationship with the Soviet Ambassador
to East Berlin, Abrassimov, was anything less than
congenial. C Ref . 913 Last but not least, Ulbricht began in
1970 a subtle campaign of showing increasing arrogance about
East German socialist accomplishments. His public boasting
went beyond the economic sphere, touching on ideological
superiority of the German socialist developments. He
carried this campaign even the Twenty-Fourth CPSU Congress
when he boasted before his Russian hosts that he was one of
the few surviving party leaders from the time of Lenin's
struggle, apparently assuming that this game him the right
to lecture his younger comrades in Moscow, including
Brezhnev. [Ref. 923
Although Honecker was equally as tough on the German
rapprochement issue, he accepted and accentuated Moscow's
leading role in all foreign policy matters. Perhaps in some
ways equally important to Moscow was his strict anti-Chinese
line. This does not suggest that he wasn't taking a
position that would move him in the quickest possible way to
the head of the SED, for, according to Heinz Lippmann,
Honecker was reportedly pressing to replace his boss as
early as June 1970. [Ref . 90: p. 2143
The rise of Erich Honecker was certainly not done
without his circle of supporters. As we can see, these two
power centers significantly clashed over our issue of
Deutschlandpolitik . The result was that during the tran-
sition period from Ulbricht to Honecker, there existed only
limited success in holding one common set of definitions of
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the vital Deutschlandpolitik issues, including their solu-
tions. Not only was Ulbricht's position weakened by the
Honecker group, but the latter needed time to establish
credibility in their policy following the change in party
leaders.
Despite some difficult economic times, Erich
Honecker' s power position steadily increased through the
1970s. Having established support from below as well as
from above, he was much more self-confident in his leader-
ship role and that of the GDR by 1980. The popular support
was derived through much greater attention given to the
needs and interests of workers and technocrats He appreci-
ated the need for cooperation among these groups if the East
Germans were to squeeze greater efficiency out of their
economic machine. In both word and deed the Secretary
General pressed the economy to improve the living standard
to reduce the discrepancy between the material life in the
East and West German states. [Ref . 24: p. 493]
Honecker was able to accommodate the technical elite
better than his predecessor. Although they still do not
participate in the decisionmaking forums, they are well
represented in advisory and functional positions throughout
the government. [Ref. 93: p. 263] These measures seem to
have increased cooperation and decreased conflict at these
levels. And, like his Soviet counterpart in Moscow,
Honecker established leadership stability among the party
cadres.
The support from Moscow was firmly established
through Honecker 's repeated exhortations on the Soviet
Union's leading role in the socialist world and his keeping
in close symmetry to Soviet Foreign policy actions. Even
while Honecker was attempting to "limit the damage" in
intra-German relations against Moscow's perceived interests,
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he continued to lay repeated stress on this close East
German- Soviet friendship.
The relationship between Honecker and the Soviet
decisionmakers following Brezhnev is still unclear. Some
analysts have suggested that Mr. Honecker misinterpreted
Chernenko's influence and misread the course Moscow would
take under his chairmanship. According to this argument,
while Honecker and Chernenko may have been in agreement on
East Berlin's approach to post-missile deployment
Deutschlandpolitikr Gromyko was the figure from which
approval was needed for his policy approach. Gromyko was
considered the leading Moscow opponent to Honecker' s policy
as it may have been perceived to conflict or interfere with
the Soviet Union's "punishment' approach towards the West.
CRef . 94] Although this scenario is among the most plausible
possibilities, there is no doubt that Honecker was under
added pressure during this period to determine the proper
sources behind Soviet decisionmaking and the essence of
their respective policy interests.
Nonetheless, within the GDR, Honecker appeared to
have enjoyed strong support for his Deutschlandpolitik.
Although more might be revealed on this later, he seemed to
have had much success in formulating his German policy from
his definitions of the vital issues involved. As has been
noted above, this was in rather distinct contrast with
Moscow' s lack of definition of these issues.
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III. DEPENDENT VARIABLE - USSR-GDR CONFLICT OVER
DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK
So far several causal variables influencing Soviet and
East German actions during the three case study periods have
been discussed in detail. It then becomes necessary to
highlight the specific interests and resulting points of
agreement and disagreement of both regimes in the "German
Problem" itself. Although these interests have surfaced,
often times quite randomly, in our discussion of the other
variables, it is beneficial to attempt to straighten out the
complex webb of immediate interests perceived by the main
players in Moscow and East Berlin. In doing so, it will be
clearer to us which points in the disputes were most highly
contentious.
A. CASE #1 - "THE BERLIN CRISES 1958-1962"
The first three leading interests for the Soviet Union
in their low risk gamble on Berlin were closely connected.
These were: (1) A renunciation of nuclear weapons by Bonn,
even if semi -imposed by the Western powers; (2) An indepen-
dent Berlin, free of allied military presence and a much
weaker West German connection; and (3) Recognized sover-
eignty for the East German regime, which included, above
all, GDR control over all access routes to Berlin from the
Federal Republic.
After Khrushchev's subtle ending of the crises in
October 1961, one could obviously see that perhaps only the
first one had been achieved since the costs of the other two
had risen to unacceptable levels for Moscow. The construc-
tion of the wall provided a partial solution to the control
interests in so far as it ended the mass exodus of East
130
German refugees. But the all important recognition of a
separate, socialist GDR was not squeezed out of Khrushchev's
crisis diplomacy.
Some may consider the nuclear weapon the emphasis on the
nuclear weapon interest as a revisionist view. Be this as
it may, sufficient evidence has been presented, by analysts
and observers close to the crisis, to support the assessment
that this interest was initially the primary motivating
force in Khrushchev's initiating the 1958 crisis. The
Soviet's fear of a remilitarized, nuclear armed, revanchist
West German has already been clearly stated. The Soviets
chose Berlin, a fairly controllable issue geographically and
militarily, to open the discussion again on the German
Problem.
Although overlooked in the West as common communist
anti-German polemic, the main theme of the 27 November 58
deadline note was directed at the failure of the Western
allied powers to effectively prevent Germany from becoming a
threat to Europe, i.e. the Soviet Union, while the Soviets
had done their part in their post-war policy in the GDR.
This failure to carry out the agreements allowed the
Soviets, according to their argument, to consider the
Potsdam Agreements "null and void", including the Western
allied rights in Berlin as a whole. High on the list of
Western power failures was allowing the Federal Republic to
rearm, joining NATO, and the current discussion of possible
nuclear missiles in the Bundeswehr. The note reads on this
subject:
the governments of the three powers, far from
doing this, on the contrary have sanctioned the setting
up of a West German army and are encouraging the arming
of the Federal Republic of Germany, disregarding the
commitments assumed at Potsdam. Furthermore, they have
included Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc,
which was set up behind the Soviet Union's back, and, as
is clear to everyone, against the Soviet Union, and are
now arming • Western Germany with atomic and rocket
weapons. [Ref. 95: p. 252 Note: Emphasis added.]
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The deadline note, with its "Free City" proposal, was,
as Jack Schick convincingly argues, a test proposal for
changing the status quo in Germany and possibly, Europe.
CRef. 38: p. 19]
The first step was to get the allied powers to accept the
"historical" changes that had taken place which included a
new status for Berlin. This, according to Schick, would
psychologically prepare the West for "other" realities, as
the Soviets called them, of two Germanies and the creation
of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. CRef. 38: p. 19]
One can thus see how closely connected all of these three
interests were held together.
Another significant point to consider is Ambassador
Kroll' s information regarding Soviet intentions at the time.
It is his belief that the Soviets main consideration
regarding their Deutschlandpolitik in the fall 1958 was
their fear of Bonn acquiring nuolear arms. [Ref . 69: p.
388]
This belief was probably partially based ©n an unusual
set of diplomatic moves in Moscow a week before the deadline
note was delivered. According to Kroll, the Austrian ambas-
sador, Baron von Bischoff, was given a note by Gromyko,
which was meant to be passed unofficially to Kroll. The
main points in the note were:
1) The Soviet government insists that the Federal
Republic reject atomic weapons armament;
2) The Soviet government insists on a peace treaty with
Germany;
3) The Soviet government suggests a gradual relaxation of
tensions and improvement in relations between the two
Germani e s ; and
4) The Soviet government would welcome recognition by
Bonn of the democratic republics in Eastern Europe.
CRef. 69: pp. 389-393]
Mr. Kroll placed much emphasis on Gromyko ' s apparent
desire to get this message to Bonn prior to the deadline
note,- attempting, perhaps, to ward off any misinterpretation
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by Bonn of Moscow' s main interests. It is also quite
possible that this was an attempt by the Soviets to strike
up a bilateral deal directly with the West Germans. Also
from Kroll's perspective, there was absolutely no desire on
Moscow's part for a reunified Germany under the Western
concept of the term. Kroll learned through third parties
that in private conversations Khrushchev made it very clear
that he did not consider reunification a possible solution
to the German Problem. CRef. 69: pp. 434-435] The following
quote is from Khrushchev's discussions with SPD chairman
Erich Ollenhauer in the spring 1959:
Why do you absolutely insist on reunification, Herr
Ollenhauer? Things are going quite well without reuni-
fication! As a Marxist you must understand quite well
that an area that has been granted with the achievements
of socialism can never again reject thes achievements.
Such would be a step backwards. [Ref 69: p. 431]
The need to stop the tide of refugees flowing out of the
GDR is based in ideological and economic conditions.
Ideologically, the thousands of Germans who left the
socialist way of life for the capitalist were creating an
internationally visible example of rejection of the Soviet
system.
Economically, at least one third of the refugees were
young persons between the ages of 20-35, a group that was
badly needed for filling the skilled labor requirements in
the work force. As has been noted above, the East German
economy was in no condition to continue to suffer such
losses at that time. For this economic reason and the need
for Moscow to publically bestow an internationally recog-
nized sovereignty on his regime, Ulbricht applied continuous
pressure on Khrushchev to sign a peace treaty with the GDR.
In contrast to Stephen Larrabee's argument that
Khrushchev was only bluffing in his threats to sign a peace
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treaty with the East Germans, this author believes that if
the costs had not risen during the course of the crisis he
would have done so. Although not without certain payoffs in
the end, the Berlin crises failed to achieve their original
objectives because the West kept increasing the costs to the
Soviet regime. [Ref . 52: pp. 441> 444] A peace treaty would
have granted Ulbricht his demands while also limiting access
to West Berlin dependent upon East German approval.
Contrary to Larrabee's contention that Bonn's recognition of
the status quo in Eastern Europe was Khrushchev's main goal,
Ambassador Kroll had noted that during this period none of
the Moscow leadership, including Khrushchev, expected Bonn
to formally accept the German borders as they existed at
that time. [Ref. 18: p. 46], [Ref. 69: p. 450]
There are two other important interests which the
Soviets held throughout the Berlin crises. First, the weak-
ening of the Western ties to Berlin would inevitably weaken
Western influence, particularly American, in West Germany.
It would also lead to an effective reduction in the American
commitment in Europe as it is perceived both by the
Americans and the West Germans. Convinced that the American
allies would not fight to defend Western occupation
1?
rights, * Khrushchev may have seen strong possibilities to
prove the Americans' lack of the capability and willingness
to prevent Soviet challenges in Berlin or, perhaps even
further west. According to Khrushchev, the pulling of the
Berlin lever could force the West to acknowledge a shift in
the international balance of power in Europe in favor of the
Soviets. [Ref. 96: p. 9]
1 2
-^According to Slusser, Khrushchev told John J. McCloy.
the chief U. S. negotiator in the bilateral disarmament
talks, that he believed this to be the case. See Slusser,
ref. # 96, p. 91.
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Finally, it is necessary to mention the strong possi-
bility of an earnest desire on Khrushchev's part to reduce
or end tension in Berlin. No doubt his methods for accom-
plishing this can now be properly considered suspect.
Nevertheless, by bringing the principle sides to the negoti-
ating table, a new settlement, based upon the new "reali-
ties" as he saw them, could have, and did, lead to a less
hostile environment, given the Western allies were willing
to accept some losses in light of the new "realities". In
the global arena he was also aiming for such an arrangement.
Propaganda intentions aside, there may have been consider-
able sincerity in Khrushchev's words below from an article
by him in Foreign Affairs in October 1959.
It is therefore, only necessary to overcome the diffi-
culties born of the Cold War in order to find the way to
an agreement on West Berlin and on the wider question of
the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German
states-. This is the way to ease international tensions
and to promote peaceful coexistence. CRef . 97: p. 13]
Despite his willingness to create the crisis environment to
achieve certain above-mentioned objectives, in the end the
interests to avoid increased conflict with the West took
precedence over these other interests and led to either
their postponement or abandonment.
During the Berlin crisis period Walter Ulbricht's regime
interests in the German Problem were quite concise and
uncomplicated. The number one concern was to exercise
control over all of Berlin. The Western allies, however,
did not accommodate the East German leader in this desire.
Short of this, Ulbricht perceived a need to gain control
over the access routes between the FRG and West Berlin and
to contain the Western, i. e. West German, influence
emanating from West Berlin.
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Following the Soviet Union's treaty with East Germany in
1955 granting the GDR the freedom "to take decisions on all
questions pertaining to its domestic and foreign policy,
including its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany
and the development of relations with other states,"
CRef . 95: p. 163] Ulbricht began to increase his pressure on
Moscow for a peace treaty granting him sovereign rights to
claim Berlin as his territory. With the peace treaty, of
course, would have to come the Soviet resolve to support the
GDR in implementing these rights. By 1958 Khrushchev was
convinced that a peace treaty may resolve the "abnormal"
situation in Berlin. While Ulbricht was emphasizing the
need to "enforce the legitimate sovereign rights of the
German Democratic Republic in the whole of Berlin and to
place West Berlin under the authority of the German
Democratic Republic [Ref. 98 ]> the Soviets introduced the
.Free City plan, which was a necessary compromise on Berlin
from a GDR standpoint, considering the de facto rights of
the Western allied powers in the city.
The Free City plan was a main proposal of the initial 27
November 1958 deadline note. In it the Soviets admit that
the plan "would be a concession, a definite sacrifice by the
German Democratic Republic for the sake of strengthening
peace in Europe" CRef. 95: p. 261] since the city lies
totally within GDR sovereign geographical jurisdiction, yet
would be extremly limited in political control. The alter-
native to the Free City proposal was the unilateral signing
by the USSR of a peace treaty with the Ulbricht regime.
Either option would relieve Ulbricht' s primary concerns
relating to the Berlin problem. These were:
1) Lack of recognition of GDR sovereignty;
2) Occupation forces within GDR territory;
3) Foreign military troops in West Berlin;
4) Lack of control over lines of communication connecting
West Germany with West Berlin;
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5) Uncontrolled air transport between the FRG and West
Berlin;
6) Western military missions in West Berlin and Potsdam;
and
7) Unrestrained propaganda and intelligence activities in
West Berlin. CRef. 99]
Ulbricht did not hide the fact that he thought any negotia-
tions on Berlin was a compromise. Just prior to the
erection of the Berlin wall, for example, he stated:
The German Democratic Republic is ready to negotiate the
settlement of all questions resulting from the abolition
of the occupation regime in West Berlin by the conclu-
sion of a peace treaty with the GDR - insofar as these
questions concern the sovereignty of the GDR. This is a
concession the GDR is making which the governments of
the Western powers should not misunderstand. CRef. 98:
p. 983
Beyond the immediate Berlin interests, Ulbricht and the
SED leadership had two other major concerns at the time; one
external and the other internal. First, Ulbricht needed a
peace treaty to prove the GDR's legal and sovereign interna-
tional status to the rest of Europe and beyond. The treaty
would have forced the Western powers to have to deal
directly with the GDR for their continued existence in and
access to West Berlin. The Free City plan may have also
accomplished this since it included a clause requiring
recognition of the two German states.
Internally, the East Berlin leadership needed to control
its borders so it could regenerate its economic capabilities
and develop an internal legitimacy originating from a unique
socialist German identity. The flow of refugees, growing to
several thousand per month in 1961, was extremely costly to
their labor force. At this time Ulbricht turned his trade
emphasis from the West to East to break the dependence on
West German imports.
One needs enhanced visibility glasses to be able to pick
out the conflict between East Berlin and Moscow in this
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case. A better term in this situation is probably "tactical
disagreement. " Although both Ulbricht and the Kremlin
agreed on the GDR' s need for sovereignty over its own terri-
tory and international recognition of East Berlin's legal
status, they did not agree on the length to which the
Soviets should have gone towards achieving these goals.
While threatening possible conventional or even nuclear war
to back up the option to sign a Peace Treaty with East
Berlin, and thus give it control over West Berlin, the
Moscow leadership opted for much less dramatic action in the
end, when the potential costs involved rose unacceptably for
the Soviets.
The most visible result was the Berlin Wall. For
Ulbricht, this was a compromise which he was forced to
accept. The Soviets achieved more through the crisis,
however. Not only did the wall seal off much of the West's
influence and control the refugee problem, the process
leading up to it did influence the Western powers towards
keeping nuclear weapons out of West German hands.
B. CASE #2 - "DETENTE IMPOSED 1968-1972"
No matter how important the German Problem was perceived
to have been the Soviet leadership during the detente
period, it was never an Existenzfrage as it was to the East
German leaders. To the Soviets, it was one thread, albeit
an important one, making up the overall fabric of their
detente strategy in Europe. Their primary concerns were to
continue exercising their control over East Germany and
other East European states combined with a gradual improve-
ment in relations with the West Europeans.
First and foremost among Soviet interests remained the
nuclear weapon issue. Until it was written in a legal
document that Germany would not build, own or control
nuclear weapons, the Soviet leadership would remain fearful
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of a nuclear armed, revanchist Germany. This came out in
most every major speech by Khrushchev and Brezhnev during
the 1960s regarding West Germany. While the fear of an
American nuclear attack had been reduced during this period,
the Germans with tactical nuclear weapons, the respected
German technical, military know-how and a strong European
sense of the past could just ruin the Soviets future designs
in Eastern Europe. Understandably, with the creation of the
Social-Liberal coalition in Bonn under Brandt and their
signing of the Non-proliferation Treaty one month later,
this concern was substantially alleviated.
High on the Soviet lists of priorities was 'the recogni-
tion and maintenance of the German Democratic Republic as a
separate state. Throughout the early-to-mid 1960s the value
of an East German ally grew as the East Germans proved to be
economically powerful, ideologically dependable and politi-
cally obedient. Two decades of political and economic
investment into the East Berlin regime was beginning to bear
fruit for Moscow by the late 1960s. During the summer 1968,
some Kremlin -leaders were probably surprised to see what
they had helped to create over the years. The East German
leadership was more than willing to help the Soviet solve
their problem in Prague. The requirement, therefore, to
retain the East German state as an independent member of the
socialist bloc had been well established by 1970.
Almost as important was to move the Bonn government to
recognize the status quo in Eastern Europe, including the
separation of the German nation into two distinct states.
This legal recognition of the postwar boundaries would do
much to reduce Soviet fears of a grand West German surprise
attack to revise them. The first order of business would be
to complete Renunciation of Force treaties with Moscow and
then with the other East European states. Next, one docu-
ment could summerize the West German acceptance of the
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entire existing European order. This may be applying too
much hindsight to Soviet intentions, but the fact remained
that Brezhnev and the other Soviet leaders eventually real-
ized that their cherished ESC could only come about via
Bonn. Furthermore, the desire to achieve the ESC goal
steadily grew as the new Social-Liberal coalition in Bonn
showed greater signs of going along with the Soviet's plan
of Bonn's recognition of the status quo before any substan-
tial benefits could be gained through improved relations
with Eastern Europe. In the negotiating process, this goal
forced the Soviets to compromise on their above-mentioned
goal of getting Bonn to formally recognize East Berlin's
international status.
Another Soviet German Problem interest was the reduction
of Western influence and presence in West Berlin. Social
stability would remain threatened in East Germany as long as
West Berlin remained an outpost of Western military, polit-
ical social influence. During the 1960s, the Berlin wall
could never be quite high enough to keep out the desires and
dreams of capitalist living. In this interest, the Soviets
faced two major obstacles. First, the arrangement was well
founded in legal terms, and second, the British, French and
Americans were determined to stay and exercise these legal
rights. These obstacles proved insurmountable during this
period, resulting in the Soviet's relinquishing this
interest to other, more viable ones.
The long-standing interest to reduce American influence
in the Federal Republic continued to remain a valid objec-
tive in Moscow. Many opportunities arose in the late 1960s
towards achieving this long term goal. Disenchantment with
U. S. Southeast Asian involvement, widespread civil unrest in
Europe and the coming to power of the first West German
Social Democratic party made one easily imagine a Western
Europe without American troops stationed throughout. The
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Soviets saw their strategy as a zero-sum game, and the goal
of a rapprochement with Bonn and the formulation of an ESC
was an important part of it.
A significant motivator behind the Brezhnev
Deutschlandpolitik was the vast realm of technological and
economic benefits through increased contacts. The economic
miracle in West Germany developed an industrial-
technological economic base, of which Moscow felt it needed
a greater share. Furthermore, many products unavailable
from the West Germans themselves, might be available from
the British, French or Americans via the German connection
once it was established.
Finally, the inverse of the rapprochement process was
also a Soviet interest; that of limiting intra-German
contacts. Just as the GDR creates an avenue to increased
Soviet influence in Western Europe through the FRG, opening
contacts with the latter creates opportunities for increased
Western influence in East Germany. While the Kremlin
leaders appreciated and supported the formation of the SED
Abgrenzung policy, the Soviet leaders also feared too much
intra-German discussion, which might someday lead to inde-
pendent action outside of their control. Although this may
not have seemed very likely in 1970, this became, in fact, a
more plausible possibility in 1984. In addition, trusting
the Germans is not one of the Soviet's fortes.
East Germany's German Problem interests had increasingly
become tied to the problem of its own identity. Twenty
years after its founding, the GDR still remained in 1969 an
unaccepted member of the international community beyond the
socialist bloc. International identity and domestic legiti-
macy remained the central issues for the SED leadership.
During this entry period into becoming accepted into the
international community, 1968-1972, the East Berlin leader-
ship was forced to readjust the priorities of their inter-
ests to fit the situation.
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The reality of the German Problem was being shaped
primarily by Moscow and Bonn, which demanded constant
adjustment on the part of the SED leadership. The ability
to recognize reality and to modify goals and policy to match
the changing interests was the crucial difference between
Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker.
The foremost interest to the East Berlin leaders was to
establish a unique identity for the East German state. As
mentioned above, this objective had two components; an
internal and an external. The former required the creation
of a credible, separate socialist German identity for the
East Germans. This demanded a revision of German history to
show a precedent of a socialist tradition as a dominant
force in the German past. This also demanded convincing the
population that the socialist way of life was morally and
socially superior to their degenerate Western cousins.
These were obviously complicated so long as West German
media continued to fill the airwaves with news broadcasts
and other forms of "propaganda", and as long as the majority
of the East Germans had spent most of their lives in a
prewar world. While the former required an active policy
"offensive" on the part of the SED ideologues, the latter
was merely a matter of time.
The external component, which had internal ramifica-
tions, was quite straightforward. Ulbricht badly wanted the
GDR to be held in the international community as a unique,
sovereign state, solely represented by the SED leadership
and accepted as an equal to other states, especially the
Federal Republic. The latter 1 s influence in the Western and
Third World were major constraints in accomplishing this
objective. As the Brandt government gradually convinced
their East Berlin counterparts that they were willing,
unlike their predecessors, to treat them as equal partners,
the SED leadership became more flexible. Erich Honecker and
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his supporters were willing to accept this recognition of
German equality as a compromise on their formal recognition
demands on Bonn in exchange for GDR recognition by the rest
of the international community.
Even more than their Soviet protectors, the East Germans
had reason to fear a "readjustment" of the postwar borders
by a powerful West German army. More than once in the 1950s
and 60s did West German politicians mention that they
considered the situation as "abnormal" and the formal policy
of the Adenauer government had been to strive towards reuni-
fication. To the SED this meant nothing less than extermi-
nation of their positions of power in the East. The
Soviets, of course, never let the SED forget this either.
For this reason a formal renunciation of force agreement
with the Bonn government was of outstanding importance. The
East Germans neatly included this renunciation of force
13
statement into their draft treaty between the two states
The Basic Treaty did, in fact, combine this renunciation of
force clause with a statement on the inviolablity of borders
and the respect of territorial integrity.
A third major interest to East Berlin was to get West
Berlin recognized as a independent political unit. No less
than in the past, West Berlin still represented a lack of
complete GDR sovereignty over its territory. Only by
severing the political ties to the FRG could Ulbricht claim
East German control over the transit routes to the city and
work towards further removal of the Allied presence there.
Finally, there existed an interest to establish limited,
yet controlled, contact with the West Germans. The
emphasis, here, was on the controlled aspect. For various
"13
Article III of the Draft Treaty on the Establishment
of Equal Relations , 17 December 1969.
Article 2 of the Treaty on the Basis of Relations
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic , 21 December-T972.
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reasons, leading segments within the SED saw some value in
establishing improved relations with the FRG. Preconditions
to these improvements were, of course, to be treated as
equals and to be able to control the level and degree of
such improvements. Increased intra-German relations could
well lead to economic benefits to East Berlin and prove to
the outside world that they existed on equal terms. It
would also increase East Berlin's leverage in attempting to
achieve their interests in the German Problem
Since there had been no precedent for "good" relations
with their West German neighbors, it was impossible for
Ulbricht or Honecker to predict the effect this might have
on their domestic situation. Given the already existing
complications, and the recent memory of the Prague Spring,
the SED leaders forecast the worst. It was Honecker,
together with a few other SED leaders responsible for
ideology, Verner and Norden, who went to work on a policy
designed to counter the ill effects of such contacts. This
policy, given the title Abgrenzung , or delimitation, has
been mentioned several times above. Any success of any
rapprochement with the West Germans could only be possible
to the extent that this policy succeeded in convincing the
East Germans that the people they were dealing with in the
West were not national compatriots, but the opposition in a
class struggle for social survival.
The relative importance of these interests became the
main source for conflict between Moscow and East Berlin in
this case. How and when to achieve GDR recognition and the
extent of East Berlin's control over West Berlin and its
access routes were two major objectives, on which agreement
between Ulbricht and the Brezhnev leadership slowly grew
further and further apart. As Ulbricht became entrenched in
his demands on these issues, the Soviets saw opportunities
regarding other interests that were to be lost if they
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acceded to the East Germans' demands. Although more
apparent than the Ulbricht-Khrushchev disagreements, outward
signs of tension between the East German and Soviet leader
were only infrequently noticeable. The dispute ran deep,
however, and continued for about 18 months, culminating in
the eventual change in leadership in East Berlin.
To Moscow's advantage, the solution had begun to work
itself out through the developing domestic struggle in the
SED leadership. Neatly accomplished with certain, although
discrete, CPSU involvement, the change of leadership
produced an SED leader who could see the "realities" of the
Soviet Deutschlandpolitik much better than Ulbricht.
Although Honecker was as unwilling to yield on the value of
the above objectives, he certainly saw great merit in
working closely with Moscow towards achieving them.
C. CASE #3 - "HONECKER' S DETENTE 1979-1984"
The official Soviet position by 1980 was that the German
Problem no longer existed; there were two independently
recognized German states. The latter fact recognized,
according to the Soviets, the post World War II situation in
Central and Eastern Europe and an agreement between the
Allied powers was properly regulating a peaceful environment
in Berlin. This attitude obviously ignored the position
held by Bonn on holding open the possibility of future
reunification by peaceful means and the Western powers'
formal position that the four Allied powers still maintained
a legal responsiblity for Berlin and German as a whole. As
events developed in Central Europe in the early 1980s, it
appeared as though many leaders in Moscow would even agree
that there still existed a German Problem.
Moscow's premier interest in this area was, in reality,
never threatened during this period. This interest was the
preservation of domestic stability in East Germany from
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possible outside encroachment. Although perhaps perceived
by some Kremlin leaders to have been possibly weakened
through intra-German contacts, Honecker's thorough
Abgrenzung policy kept personal contacts to a minimum while
actually using the governmental level contacts to improve
his domestic legitimacy.
The Soviet interest to maintain its control, for polit-
ical leverage purposes, over intra-German relations and West
Berlin - FRG connections formed the basis for Soviet disa-
greement with Honecker's Deutschlandpolitik. Moscow had
made significant investment in forming the detente relation-
ships which led to improved West Berlin cooperation and
increased intra-German contacts. This created a linkage
mechanism according to which Bonn was dependent upon Soviet
and East German cooperation for the continuation and
improvement of these ties. Based on this deepening rela-
tionship, Moscow has exploited Bonn's desires in attempts to
alter FRG policies in Moscow's interests. The best example
of these interests during the latest period were the delay
or postponement of the intermediate range nuclear missile
deployment and the continuation of trade relations despite
increased superpower tensions.
The Moscow leadership offered both rewards and punish-
ments for non-compliance. In the missile issue, Brezhnev,
Andropov and Chernenko made it clear to West German politi-
cians that intra-German relations could not flourish "in the
shadow of American missiles". Relations between the FRG and
the East Europeans and the Soviet Union would be very much
damaged by Bonn's continued support of the NATO deployment
policy.
In West German-Soviet trade relations the Soviets also
let it be known that these were mutual interests between
themselves and not an issue for American dictates. After
Afghanistan, the USSR improved the access to Berlin for West
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Germans, thus using its role as arbiter to make Berlin an
"oasis of detente", hoping to prove to West German officials
that there are tangible rewards to be gained if they refuse
to follow the American policy of East-West tensions.
CRef. 30: p. 20]
Ms. Stent has pointed out the fact that the Soviets have
often stressed the economic benefits available to the West
Germans in continued trade relations between the two coun-
tries, while also emphasizing the folly of German compliance
with American embargo policies. CRef. 30, ] CRef. 100]
According to Moscow's argument to the Germans, the Germans
would only be punishing themselves, most specifically the
Ruhr working class families, by following a hard line
economic policy to compliment their political policies.
Bonn might also reap benefits in acting as a moderating
force within NATO. Chancellor Kohl did in fact appear to
play this role in his efforts to soften American arms
control and East-West trade policies. CRef. 44: p. 36]
The Soviet Union' s power over West Berlin and
intra-German relations can be used as a means to hold these
as a carrot or a stick with not only the West German regime,
but also with the East Germans. This was painfully driven
home to Honecker in the summer 1984 when Moscow proved that
it still set the limits to the timing and degree of permis-
sible contacts.
Another important German Problem interest for Moscow
leaders was to reduce, but not eliminate, U. S. influence in
the Federal Republic. Over the decades the Soviet leader-
ship has come to appreciate the moderating influence the
United States can play on the West Germans. Although the
powerful role the Americans play in Europe certainly limits
the Soviet's room for maneuver and influence in the region,
it also has had a dampening effect on the role of the FRG
within Europe. Should the West Germans possess the power to
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move away from the United States in" Europe, this would prob-
ably mean its domination of Western Europe would increase,
thus leaving Moscow with a more powerful, less predictable
West Germany, possibly with nuclear weapons. CRef. 100: p.
250]
Finally, the Soviet Union in the 1980s must always keep
a watchful eye on the growth of West German influence on
the GDR, especially the possibility of increasing nation-
alism. Out of solely security concerns, the Soviets could
not imagine a unified German state dominating Europe again.
The temptations of Western life-styles and economic success
remain potentially reinforced through greater social and
cultural contacts, which, when combined with daily West
German media access, threatens the ideological stability
existing in East Germany. The tempo of intra-German rela-
tions must not get out of hand whereby the two German states
develop a more autonomous bilateral relationship. Although
there was never any question of Honecker becoming another
Tito or Ceausescu, his policies in 1983-1984 may have been
misinterpreted by a divided and inexperienced Soviet leader-
ship as questioning his subservience to Soviet
Deutschlandpolitik concerns.
In consonance with Moscow's thinking, the SED leadership
considered the German Problem solved after Bonn's conclusion
of the Moscow, Warsaw and Basic Treaties. The Helsinki
agreements also provide the East Berlin regime with further
proof of their de jure international sovereign status.
Apparently Honecker has not considered the modus vivendi
over West Berlin disturbing enough to question its future
status.
The initial fears Honecker experienced of a further
breakdown of domestic legitimacy as a result of increased
intra-German contact were effectively countered through the
Abgrenzung policy. By 1980 the generation of young East
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Germans entering the work force was born after the construc-
tion of the Berlin wall, with physical access to the West
never really being more than a remote option. Combining
this with effective propaganda and a steady improvement in
the standard of living in the East, the SED leadership could
deal with their Western neighbors with much more confidence
than ten years before.
The most important interest to Honecker and his fellow
Politburo members in forming his Deutschlandpolitik was the
preservation and continued development of a distinct
socialist German identity. Only this identity would give
the East Berlin regime its long-sought legitimacy from its
own population and abroad. In any dealings with Bonn the
East Germans repeated that only through their sovereignty
being respected could there be any productive business
between the two states. In this theme is also Honecker'
s
demand that Bonn recognize East German citizenship as one
separate from the Federal Republic's and that the diplo-
matic representative missions in the two countries' capitals
be upgraded to full ambassies. These moves would be final
steps that, according to East Berlin, need to be taken to
put their relations on an equal basis as those with other
states. On the other hand, these were the two main areas
where Bonn refused to compromise further in the Basic Treaty
negotiations. It was clear afterwards that these points
were noted in the treaty as areas in which both sides "agree
to disagree".
Whereas the above demands had almost created an impass
to improved intra-German contacts by 1980, Honecker surpris-
ingly lowered their priority in the next eighteen months,
perhaps with the urging of Moscow, to make way for his next
According to West German law, any East German coming
to the West is considered a West German citizen. This
policy is rooted in the sole representation claim but also
is part of the one German nation concept.
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order of interests; the continued development of
intra-German contacts at the governmental level. Perhaps
surprising to many SED leaders, there proved to be several
benefits for East Berlin in these contacts over the decade
of the 1970s. These boosted the regime's internal and
external legitimacy through satisfying domestic pressure to
cooperate with their Western capitalist neighbors and have
signalled to the West Germans and others that they are not
an iron-curtain system unable to liberalize itself.
Increased family contacts, although severly limited,
involved the permission of over 25,000 East Germans to enter
the FRG over the past twelve years is the best example of
this. East Berlin has learned that releasing dissidents and
unemployables makes better public relations and economic
sense than to house them in jails or pay their welfare
costs. As has been mentioned above, there has been substan-
tial economic stakes involved in the intra-German contacts.
A deal has been continuing between Bonn and East Berlin,
according to which the former is granted greater human
contact and freer movement between the two countries and the
latter receives economic, technical and financial support.
Not surprising, both regimes are bargaining for benefits in
those areas from which they primarily draw their popular
legitimacy; political benefits for Bonn in return for
economic benefits for East Berlin.
Erich Honecker apparently hoped to draw increased pres-
tige for himself and his regime in conducting a first-ever
head-of-state visit to the Federal Republic. For these
reasons the visit rested on such GDR requirements as: the
visit must take place primarily in the FRG capital; and
discussions on a common communique must begin beforehand so
that the wording would be virtually agreed upon prior to the
16This includes mostly pensioners, prisoners and the
chonic unemployed.
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visit. CRef. 101: p. 22] Although the West Germans proved
themselves insensitive to the prestige element, Honecker
probably felt this important for both his domestic stability
and in his relations with Moscow. The latter particularly
so if he could prove to his Soviet allies that his approach
could produce substantive results. Among the issues seen as
substantive to the East Berlin officials at the time were
the agreement by Bonn and East Berlin to make a joint
Renunciation of Force declaration and a settlement on the
inter-German border marking along the Elbe river.
[Ref. 102: p. 32, p. 22]
Another important interest to the East Berlin leadership
in their Deutschlandpolitik was to project the GDR as an
independent and important player in European affairs. The
pains of recognition left to the past, it became increas-
ingly important to bolster its image realm of influence
within Europe. Again the competition with Bonn's status in
West European affairs may have played an influencing role.
Together with the above interests, Honecker never missed
the opportunity to present his state as a responsible,
peace-minded member of the international community.
According to Honecker, the fundamental differences between
the social systems in the GDR and the FRG, and their commit-
ment to opposing alliances makes it necessity that the two
countries work towards reduced tensions during difficult
times in superpower relations. Upon this thesis he estab-
lished his policy of "limiting the damage" caused by the
NATO deployment of the Pershing II missiles. CRef. 103]
Over a period of about one decade East Berlin and Moscow
were for a second time in dispute over the GDR's role in
Deutschlandpolitik. This time, however, the roles had
reversed; the Moscow leadership was restraining, rather than
pushing, East Berlin leaders in their conduct of
intra-German relations.
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The two main interests causing this conflict were
tightly intertwined. While there were strong indications
that Honecker wished the GDR to play a greater role in
European Security policy, his unique road towards this goal
lie in his relations with Bonn. Not only did the Kremlin
fear possibly losing its control, and therefore its
leverage, over intra-German contacts, the East German lead-
er's actions psychologically appeared in Moscow as a redefi-
nition of the SED's traditional role within the parameters
set by Soviet hegemony. CRef . 36: p. 16 3
The resultant dispute was in some ways the most visible
ever between these two leaderships. However, very little
apparent harm was done since the bulk of the dispute was
conducted through the media. The outward appearance was
probably much greater than the dispute's real potential for
negatively affecting the relations between the two coun-
tries. Miscalculations and misperceptions were likely key
players, since a resolution came in a rather swift and
low-key manner. Although Honecker retreated from his
earlier prompting of greater policy roles for the smaller
European states and cancelled a highly visible trip to West
Germany, the GDR continued their low profile contacts with
Bonn . The new Kremlin leadership probably came out of the




A. BERLIN CRISES 1958-1962
1. Setting the Stage
In reviewing the Berlin crises of 1958-1962 it is
important to recognize that it was a Soviet diplomatic
offensive against West Berlin which carried on, at various
tension levels, for over four years. Or as Drs. George and
Smoke have put it, "the deadline crisis of 1958-1959 and the
crisis of 1961 can usefully be seen as a single tapestry, a
long dual over Berlin which did not fade away until 1962
when the United States again asserted its strategic
superiority. " CRef . 52: p. 395]
The roots to the deadline crisis, which can be
considered as the official beginning of the Berlin crises,
are found in several events which took place in 1957.
Following a NATO Council endorsement of the introduction of
American-controlled nuclear weapons in Europe in May 1957,
debates formed within the alliance during the following
summer. These were especially heated up by the French posi-
tion demanding joint, allied control over the weapons. The
strategic importance of the basing of IRBMs in Europe
increased drastically in the eyes of the NATO defense plan-
ners in late August when it was learned that the Soviets had
successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile
( ICBM) and again in October when the Russians proved the
first to succeed in puting a satellite into orbit, which
they called Sputnik. In mid-December 1957 the NATO Foreign
Ministers agreed in Paris to the following plan: (1) The
deployment of IRBMs would be based upon bilateral negotia-
tions between the United States and interested allied
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governments; (2) the actual decision to use the missiles
would be a joint decision; and (3) nuclear warheads would
be stockpiled in Europe under the control of Supreme Allied
Commander Europe ( SACEUR) , U.S. General Lauris Norstad.
Understandably, this NATO decision came as a signif-
icant blow to Moscow's sense of security in Europe, particu-
larly since West Germany was among the "interested allied
governments" who might not just have the missiles on their
territory, but also under their control. A prominent
supporter of West German acquisition of nuclear missiles was
SACEUR, himself, General Norstad. He stated in in February
1958 that a West German -nuclear force was "absolutely indis-
pensable" for a balanced and credible NATO nuclear deterrent
in Europe. CRef. 104: p. 62]
Besides threats to the individual NATO states and
their populations of total annihilation in the event of war
in Europe, the Soviets attempted to bring this issue to the
negotiating table. A few days prior to the December NATO
decision, Soviet Premier N. A. Bulganin proposed a summit
conference to discuss the creation of a nuclear-free zone in
Central Europe, which would include both Germanys, Poland
and Czechoslovakia. The central role of the nuclear weapons
issue played in the Soviet government's initial moves in the
Berlin crises, particularly as perceived by the West German
Ambassador in Moscow, has already been discussed above. In
light of this high level of importance this issue occupied
in Soviet decisionmaking, it is remarkable today to note the
lack of Western perception of this factor throughout the
crises. An observation of one significant example of this,
and not intended as a criticism of the individual given that
latter day analysts have the benefit of historical documents
and hindsight, is the absence of any mention of the Soviet
concern over the deployment of nuclear weapons in West
Germany in a Rand Study on the Berlin issue completed in
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preparation for the Foreign Ministers Conference held in May
1960. Later revised and expanded, again without mention of
this concern in Moscow, the study was one of the first
complete research products dealing with the Berlin crisis at
that time. CRef . 105]
Not surprising, the nuclear weapons topic sparked an
incredibly heated debate in the Federal Republic. After
intensive and violent debate in the spring 1958 in the
Bundestag , the lower house and primary legislative body in
the FRG, the CDU/CSU won the debate authorizing Chancellor
Adenauer and Foreign Minister Strauss to accept the West
German participation in the NATO nuclear weapon deployment
scheme. [Ref . 104: p. 93] Despite the hysteria building up
on both the Soviet and West German sides over the missile
issue, on other levels thes two governments were taking
their first significant steps towards diplomatic normaliza-
tion since their establishment of formal relations in 1955.
The signing of an agreement in April 1958 opened up
increased West German trade for the Soviets in return for a
loosening of Moscow's emigration roadblocks allowing thou-
sands of ethnic Germans from the Volga region and other
areas in the USSR to emigrate to the Federal Republic.
CRef. 106: p. 304]
Walter Ulbricht certainly could not be pleased with
any Soviet agreements which might reduce tensions between
Moscow and Bonn. West Berlin was the sorest issue facing
Ulbricht at the time and any accommodation between these two
would mean a loss to Ulbricht' s demands for sovereign
control and reduction in FRG influence in the city. On the
other hand, Adenauer's government had not the slightest
inclination to reduce its political and cultural ties with
the city. Their connection was brought, in Bonn's view,
even closer by the 21 May 1957 Federal Constitutional Court
finding that "Berlin is a land (state) of the Federal
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Republic of Germany and the Basic Law applies basically in
Berlin also." CRef. 95: p. 210]
This court ruling and other factors were behind
Ulbricht's note to each of the four Allied powers in
September 1958, which reminded them of their responsibility
and the necessity to prepare a peace treaty with both German
states. This note was only an indication of the probable
growing pressure Ulbricht was putting on the Soviet leader-
ship to solve the Berlin problem.
That some common approach was agreed upon between
Ulbricht and Khrushchev shortly afterwards is suggested by
arguments that Ulbricht made in a speech he delivered on 27
October 1958, which was printed in Neues Deutschland the
following day. The speech took place two weeks before
Khrushchev' s speech in Moscow, in which the Soviet leader
first suggested a Berlin ultimatum, and an entire month
before the deadline note. The main argument of all three
messages was that while the Soviets had fulfilled their
obligations in the Potsdam Agreement, the Western Powers had
not. Therefore, Moscow had the right to consider void all
the rights given them under the agreement. This meant that
the control of Berlin could be returned to the German
Democratic Republic under the established norms of sovereign
rights recognized in international law. It is highly impro-
bable that Ulbricht could have made this argument without
the Kremlin's consent, and even less likely that Khrushchev
picked up on this argument after Ulbricht introduced it. In
any event, it is quite probable that the Soviet deadline
note, delivered to the three Western Allied Powers on 21
November 1958, was motivated by Moscow's interest to satisfy
pressure from Ulbricht and the desire to use this low risk
lever to pressure the Western powers into negotiations on
the German Question, with the hope that the latter would
lead to an agreement on a non-nuclear Germany.
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2. The Deadline Crisis
The 27 November deadline note began the first of the
two Berlin crises leading to the building of the Berlin wall
in August 1961. The Soviets conveyed four major points in
the note:
1) The Western Powers no longer had legal occupation
rights in Berlin;
2) West Berlin should be made a Free City with control of
access turned over to the sovereign GDR government;
3) The Soviet government proposed to make no changes in
guaranteeing access to western occupation forces
military traffic for a period of six months; and
4) If after this period negotiations towards reaching an
appropriate agreement are not made, the Soviet Union
would unilaterally affect the planned measures through
agreements with the GDR. [Ref . 95: pp. 249-263]
While Khrushchev was clearly respecting U. S. deterrence
capability in Berlin, he also realized that through a low
risk option of using the "threat" of coercive action, he had
good reason to believe that his military, diplomatic and
psychological advantages, given Berlin's geographic and
historical conditions, gave him a high probability of
success.
The Western response in December 1958, and primarily
orchestrated by Secretary of State Dulles, while agreeing to
negotiations on Germany as a whole, rejected the Free City
proposal and ignored Moscow's deadline requirement.
CRef. 38: p. 36] Since opening negotiations on Germany was
the first intended step towards his goal, the Soviets had,
thus far, not lost anything, despite the rejection of their
first proposal. The cohesion among the NATO powers, and the
degree to which they felt they had a continuing role in
Berlin and the German Problem, would largely determine the
measure of "gains" available to the Soviets through
negotiations.
Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan was in
Washington in early January 1959 and had already presented
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Secretary Dulles with an outline of the forthcoming note
when it was introduced as a draft Peace Treaty proposal on
10 January. Apparently Mikoyan stressed Moscow's willing-
ness to negotiate. His visit and the 10 January note
convinced many in Washington of the Soviet's serious
interest in negotiations, all deadlines aside. CRef. 38: p.
37] Ulbricht, on the other hand, was not as pleased with the
Western response and on 8 January published a several page
"Reply of the Government of the German Democratic Republic
to the Government of the USSR" in Neues Deutschland . Its
thorough repetition of Berlin's historical background, all
of which was in the deadline note, and its extremely harsh
tone suggests Ulbricht may have intended to remind
Khrushchev of the original East German goals. Showing
Ulbricht' s frustration and impatience, the note states:
The government of the German Democratic Republic, on the
other hand, considers the present misuse of West Berlin
as intolerable. It holds the view that thirteen years
after the end of the war, and. in view of the flagrant
disregard of the Potsdam Agreement and other four power
agreements on Germany by the USA, Great Britain and
France, there could be no more justification for the
maintenance of privileges of thes states in the form of
the occupation regime in West Berlin. CRef. 98: p. 68]
Furthermore, the "reply" speaks of the 27 November deadline
note as a Soviet announcement of their decision to "transfer
to the German Democratic Republic all functions temporarily
exercised by the Soviet authorities. " CRef. 98: p. 68] This
conscious misinterpretation may have been to mislead the
East German public of Soviet commitment to the East German
demands on Berlin, thereby creating additional pressure on
the Kremlin during the upcoming negotiations.
Within a month after the Twenty-First CPSU Congress
Khrushchev lifted the deadline on negotiations on 2 March
1959 while agreeing to a Foreign Ministers Conference on
Germany. Although this ended the "deadline" crisis, and
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eased tensions somewhat between the two military blocs, the
internal disagreements within the alliances continued to
flourish as both sides worked towards a common proposal to
present at the upcoming conference.
3. Negotiations
The Western powers held together remarkably well
throughout the negotiation period despite rifts that devel-
oped and gradually grew to cause more acute problem s later
in the crisis. The Foreign Ministers Conference met in
Geneva from 11 May to 5 August 1959. Both East and West
Germany were allowed to attend as observers. Prior to the
conference, signs by the British of an overwillingness to
negotiate angered leaders in Bonn, forcing Adenauer to join
deGaulle in a solid "European" front. Both sides held a
firm ground. Repeatedly Gromyko called attention to the
NATO decision to introduce nuclear weapons in Germany, but
Washington did not take up the issue as relevant to their
negotiating position. During late May and early June, under
closed sessions without the German delegations, Western and
Soviet proposals and counterproposals were exchanged in
quick succession, raising the hope of a tentative area of
agreement. On 10 June, however, after Ulbricht's visit to
Moscow, Gromyko returned to the earlier Soviet proposals to
include more deadline threats. CRef. 38: p. 85] Should the
West reject his proposal, Gromyko said, the Moscow leader-
ship would not "confirm it agreement to the continuation of
the regime in West Berlin. " After this was vehemently
rejected by the Western Ministers, the conference stalled
again, which was good reason to call a recess for three
weeks. Upon reconvening, the Western position held together
further despite extremely skillful negotiating by Gromyko.
He quickly determined the limits of a united Western posi-
tion and held his ground from that point, pressing for a
split.
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The Foreign Ministers agreed to another recess after
President Eisenhauer announced on 3 August that Khrushchev
would visit Washington for a bilateral summit in September.
Although nothing was agreed upon regarding Berlin during the
First Secretary's visit with Eisenhauer, the fact that it
took place seriously exacerbated Moscow's growing rift with
China. CRef . 14: pp. 356-357] The trip was a stark signal
to the Chinese as to where Khrushchev's priorities were and
the Chinese tension would affect Soviet decisionmaking on
Berlin over the following two years.
4. Pressure Builds for a New Crisis
The chiefs of state who followed up on the Geneva
conference in summit diplomacy in 1959 and I960, in efforts
to reach a breakthrough in the negotiations impass on the
German Problem, were no more successful in such endeavors
than their foreign ministers had been earlier. In fact,
while the Foreign Ministers were at least working on similar
proposals and within a common forum, the summit process took
place in varied bilateral and multilateral forums, creating
competition and suspicion among the allies on both sides,
particularly in the two German capitals. Perhaps in
response to pressure from domestic critics, Khrushchev
revived his threat of a separate peace treaty with the GDR
in January and March 1960. Ulbricht, in the meantime,
attempted to negotiate directly with Bonn by sending
Adenauer a letter proposing a "German Confederation and Free
City" in Berlin in late January. Ulbricht must have been
aware of several possible points in his favor at that time.
These were, namely: Khrushchev's desire, and perhaps need,
to deliver a Berlin victory to the Presidium; the increasing
pressure developed through Chinese dissatisfaction with
Soviet foreign policy; and the growing rift among the NATO
partners over a solution to the German Problem. The U-2
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shootdown, which Khrushchev used as his excuse to "torpedo"
the Paris Summit Conference in mid-May I960, also created
long felt shock waves within the Soviet leadership.
CRef. 82: pp. 97-122]
The shootdown incident, and its immediate negative
effect on Sino-Soviet relations, forced many in Moscow to
question Khrushchev's foreign policy with the United States,
China and Germany. The changes which resulted within the
Soviet leadership have already been discussed. (pp.
100-102) In addition, the renewal of public discussion of
West German control over atomic missiles in July did not
improve Khrushchev's internal position any. While NATO and
the U. S. were still conducting studies on the correct
deployment policy to implement, the Eisenhauer
Administration verified that it would support a West German
request for the missiles if the NATO plan so stipulated.
Bonn denied claims that they were requesting any specific
type of missiles, like for example, the IRBMs that were
currently being deployed in West Germany under U. S.
control, but stated that they would "accept" any missile
system which NATO found appropriate for their defense.
CRef. 107: p. 2623
At this stage Khrushchev may have felt the need to
increase the pressure on Bonn and the Western powers while
limiting his involvement and, therefore, responsibility, in
doing so. This might then explain why the Soviets author-
ized Ulbricht to begin imposing traffic restrictions on West
German and West Berlin traffic at the end of August 1960.
By order of the East German Interior Ministry, Ulbricht
began a selective blockade of West German traffic to West
Berlin and closed the sector border between East and West
Berlin for five days. CRef. 38: p. 130] This action became
the first in which Pankow so openly violated the quadripar-
tite status of the city while simultaneously treating East
Berlin as a legal part of the GDR. CRef. 108: p. 21
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In September the GDR imposes further unexpected
restrictions by refusing to recognize West German passports
while accepting West Berlin identity cards. This was to
emphasize Pankow's recognition of West Berlin as a separate
legal entity, in line with the Free City proposals.
Additionally, Ulbricht demanded that the Western powers
remove their garrisons in the city by 1962. CRef . 38: p.
130 3 Adenauer unsuccessfully responded to these restrictions
by announcing the cancellation of a new .inter-zonal trade
agreement, scheduled to take effect on 1 January 1961.
Ulbricht' s threat to cut civilian rail traffic to West
Berlin from the FRG eventually brought the two sides to the
negotiating table. Ulbricht agreed to remove his threat to
restrict West b Berlin access in return for restoring the
interzonal trade agreement, but the original access restric-
tions to East Berlin remained unaffected.
Behind Ulbricht' s actions was perhaps his belief in
Soviet economic support, considering the Soviet Union had
recently guaranteed an increase in the delivery in raw
materials to the GDR on 30 November. CRef. 106: p. 315]
Ulbricht was in no way enjoying a stable economic situation.
In December, the government economic planning apparatus had
to present the Central Committee with a new Seven-Year plan
because the apparent failures resulting from the one intro-
duced only two years earlier. Moscow provided further
relief a few months later by granting the East Germans
another credit allotment of over 2 billion marks. The
199,188 refugees who had crossed over to the West proved
that the mass exodus was on the upswing again. Since 1956
an average of almost 17,000 refugees per month who were
leaving the East meant a tremendous loss of skilled and
unskilled labor needed for the postwar recovery of the East
German economy. During the spring and summer months of 1961
the average refugee flow was almost 18,500 per month to the
West. [Ref. 109: p. 20]
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The U. S. , on the other hand, found itself without
many options, other than verbal protests and to symbolically
drive about East Berlin to show the flag. The discovery of
the lack of available effective options was to alarm the
newly-elected President Kennedy when he entered office and
reviewed the Berlin situation. CRef . 52: p. 414]
Further military events occured in the fall 1960
which most likely increased internal pressure on Khrushchev
to reach a "German Agreement". Chancellor Adenauer resumed
his request for nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr in
October and a month later, on 26 November, the NATO advisory
council approved NATO shared control of nuclear weapons.
Although certainly more subtle, but nonetheless, unnerving
to Moscow leaders, may have been the selection in December
of the senior Bundeswehr military officer, General
Heusinger, to a two-year term as chairman of the NATO perma-
nent military committee in Washington, D. C. CRef. 107: p.
455]
5. The Berlin Crisis 1961
Unbeknown to the players involved, events and strat-
egies layed out in the spring of 1961 set the stage for the
Soviet-GDR decision to heighten the crisis once again that
following summer. While the pressure on Ulbricht's regime
was increasing daily due to the refugee problem, it was also
gaining influence in Moscow. The best indication for this
was the March WTO meeting approving the reequiping of the
East German army with the latest Warsaw Pact weapons. It
was also a sign that this force was considered fit to
fulfill a military mission which might soon be forthcoming.
The Bay of Pigs disaster could not have created too
positive an impression of Kennedy on Khrushchev. This
perceived weakness combined with Kennedy's new nuclear
weapons policy in Europe and the refugee problem were most
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likely the key factors behind Khrushchev's actions following
the Vienna summit meeting. On 10 April the Kennedy
Administration unveiled its deterrence policy in Europe at a
NATO meeting. The shift was definitely towards greater
conventional options prior to escalation to the nuclear
level. Inherent in this strategy was not only the lack of
emphasis on tactical nuclear missile deployment in Europe
but also the decision to set aside any discussion on sharing
their control with the NATO allies. To Khrushchev this
could easily have been understood to mean that Kennedy was
more reluctant than his predecessor to rely on nuclear means
of deterrence. A crucial question remained, however; how
reluctant?
To test this Khrushchev revived the pressure on the
United States during the Vienna summit and shortly after-
wards presented another ultimatum in a speech to the Soviet
people on 15 June 1961. CRef . 96: p. 6] He restated the
Soviet six month deadline for an agreement on Berlin that
was presented in Vienna: "We are asking everyone to under-
stand us correctly: The conclusion of a peace treaty with
Germany cannot be put off any longer, a peace settlement in
Europe must be achieved in Europe this year." CRef. 96: p.
73
On the same day Khrushchev delivered the above
message, Ulbricht held a news conference at which he drama-
tized the insecurity of the access routes to Berlin and once
more threatened to interrupt air access as well. His main
focus, however, was on the peace treaty and the need for the
GDR to be granted its rightful sovereignty. Secondary to
the peace treaty goal were plans to seal off West Berlin
which were modestly revealed during the news conference. In
response to a question as to whether Ulbricht had decided to
make the Brandedburg Gate the city limit and "to accept the
full consequences of this", Ulbricht stated:
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I take your question to mean that there are people in
West Germany who want us to mobilize the builders in the
capital of the GDR to erect a wall ... I am not aware
of any such intention. CRef. 90: pp. 186-187]
While Kennedy and his advisors were still working
out an appropriate response to Khrushchev's 15 June speech,
Khrushchev announced his intentions to participate in an
escalation game to outbid the West if necessary. On 21
June, he delivered in the Kremlin a speech marking the twen-
tieth anniversary of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union.
Dressed in a lieutenant general's uniform, Khrushchev
presented the military with a number of concessions in the
course of the speech and through his references to the
Berlin situation and the nuclear testing issue, implied that
the Soviets were ready to apply the necessary military
options to meet the challenge over Berlin. Three weeks
later he put more substance behind the Soviet military role
in the Berlin threats when Khrushchev announced on 8 July a
one-third increase in the Soviet armed forces budget and the
suspension of the troop cut program he had begun in January
1960. CRef. 11: p. 94] The speech also centered on Berlin
and the Soviet-GDR peace treaty, treating the latter as
though it accomplishment were only a matter of time.
After the conclusion of the treaty, the Soviet Union
will lay down all obligations it has hitherto discharged
on the communications lanes with West Berlin. In short,
the government of the German Democratic Republic will
enjoy full sovereignty over all its territory, just like
any other independent state. [Ref. 96: p. 53]
Khrushchev then ended the next section of the speech by
expressing an explicit commitment to sign a German peace
treaty with the GDR, regardless of a possible military
response from the West:
We shall sign the peace treaty and order our armedforces to administer a worthy rebut to any aggressor if
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he dares to raise a hand against the Soviet Union or our
friends. CRef. 96: p. 54]
Throughout July the Soviet leaders launched a verbal
offensive around the world to maintain the heightened pace
of the Soviet pressure on Berlin. An integral part of this
strategy was to attempt to create greater rifts among the
Western allies, thereby weakening any common response to an
actual substantive Soviet action. CRef. 96: p. 65] The East
Germans joined in this campaign with similar threatening
speeches and the passage of a "German Peace Plan" by the
Volkskammer on 6 July. This propaganda document declared
the "conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany has become a
necessity that can no longer be postponed." CRef. 110: p.
2] Certainly meant to prepare the East and West Germans for
some unsettling events which would likely occur if the peace
treaty were soon signed, it may also have been another one
of Ulbricht's discreet messages to Moscow of the SED's impa-
tience. As this Soviet-East German pressure intensified in
July, over 800 East Germans were fleeing to the West per day
through West Berlin, half of which were under 25 years old.
To make the situation worse, the Western media continually
focussed on this tide of refugees, making this rejection of
the communist system a worldwide spectacle. This, in turn,
only increased the pressure on the Soviets and East Germans
to seek a prompt solution.
On 25 July Kennedy announced the American response
to Khrushchev via a nationally televised speech. In this
response, Kennedy clearly stated the American's determina-
tion to defend their rights in West Berlin. He divulged a
number of U. S. measures designed to increase U. S. conven-
tional and nuclear military readiness and signal their
determination to the other side. It was a strikingly strong
response which was not dependent upon the cohesion of the
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American allies. The declared strategy, which was "a series
of decisions by the administration", was unilateral in
design and action. This greatly reduced Khrushchev's hopes
of a weakened Western response through quarrels among the
allies.
Robert Slusser makes a convincing argument that
Kennedy's speech forced Khrushchev to decide between the
maximum objective of forcing the West into accepting a new
status for Berlin through Moscow's signing of a peace
treaty, or the minimum objective of sealing off the East
German regime, thereby shutting off the escape route to the
West. CRef. 96: p. 93] The speech also raised the stakes
"to a level which the Soviet Union could not afford to
match". CRef. 96: p. 93] The result was Khrushchev's deci-
sion to settle for the minimum objective, despite the pref-
erence in Moscow, and even more so in East Berlin, for the
grander maximum objective. Within a few days after Kennedy's
speech, probably, according to Slusser' s estimate, on the
27th, Khrushchev opted on the plan to proceed with building
the wall. CRef. 96: pp. 93-95]
Having chosen the minimum objective, the next course
of action was to prepare for its implementation. This was
done by keeping the tensions around the issue high through
Soviet and East German spokesman, who stressed their inten-
tions to carry out the maximum objective. This type of
political deception would warn the West against intervention
in Soviet actions around Berlin and would provide a since of
relief in the West when the actual Soviet move proves to be
markedly less endangering than that expected. The result,
hopefully, would be inaction on the Western side. Beginning
around 2 a.m. on 13 August, elements of the National
People's Army (NVA), the frontier troops and the
Volkspolizei, assisted by the more zealous members of the
German Communist Youth organization (FDJ), began
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constructing a barbed-wire fence around the Western Sectors
in Berlin. The Soviet "Forces in Germany (GSFG), whose
recently reappointed commander, Marshal I. S. Konev, was
recalled from retirement on 10 August, remained inconspi-
cuous, but ready, in the background. This was the work of
the East Germans, and more specifically, Erich Honecker, who
was appointed responsible for the organization, implementa-
tion and security for the operation. CRef. 90: p. 186] By
16 August all access to West Berlin from East Germany was
completely sealed off, except for the guarded transportation
routes to the Federal Republic.
6. The Crisis Recedes
It was difficult for the West to fully understand
Moscow's goals beyond the Berlin wall solution. The Soviet
levels of interest in the German Problem were divided among
the Presidium leadership, which lent to a confused medley of
Soviet statements on Berlin. The military and Gromyko were
showing a hard line; Koslov, who was in favor of a hard
line, disclosed in North Korea that the deadline was once
again over and Khrushchev attempted to present himself as
only interested in peace, not offering any openings for
negotiations, but also avoiding the threatening talk of
mid- summer. There were other pending concerns for the
Presidium which apparently found greater attention among the
Kremlin leaders. Disarmament talks with the United States,
while in danger of collapsing due to the tensions over
Berlin, were, in fact, showing some headway and the
resumption of nuclear testing by both superpowers revived
the discussions on test ban negotiations. The growing
problems with China were still looming over the horizon as
the CPSU prepared for the Twenty-Second Party Congress to
begin in late October 1961.
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During the Party Congress the final lingering fires
of the Berlin crises were sparked, kindled and finally
snuffed. In his opening speech on 17 October, Khrushchev
noted the willingness of both sides to reach a settlement of
the German Problem and rejected again the notion of a Soviet
ultimatum on the issue. On this he stated:
In proposing a conclusion of a German peace treaty, the
Soviet government has been presenting no ultimatum but
has been moved by the necessity of finally settling this
compelling question ... we shall not in that case
absolutely insist on signing the peace treaty before 31
December 1961. C Ref . 96: pp. 309-3103
While this came as a relief to Western officials, Ulbricht
was in no way pleased, and according to a Western journalist
present at the Congress and who observed Ulbricht at this
moment, he certainly did not act like he was pleased at all.
CRef. Ill: p. 3.3 A few days later, however, Ulbricht had his
opportunity to present his views as to how the Soviets
should solve the German Problem. He skillfully ignored
Khrushchev's conciliatory action in lifting the deadline and
made it quite clear that the "conclusion of a peace treaty
with Germany is the most urgent task. " CRef. 96: p. 356]
His argument that the immediate danger of war emanating from
the West because of the abnormal situation in West Berlin
necessitated an immediate conclusion of a peace treaty came
very close to contradicting Khrushchev's recognition that
the Western powers were showing a certain understanding of
the German Problem.
This act of defiance most probably had the support
of certain members of the Moscow leadership, most likely,
Koslov. Mr. Slusser's comprehensive analysis of the
Koslov-Ulbricht connection at this point is very enlight-
ening. According to his work, an acute crisis in the CPSU
leadership allowed Koslov to counter Khrushchev during the
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congress over the Berlin issue, which, with the support of
Ulbricht and the Soviet military command in Germany, was
brought to .a new mini-crisis with the West by challenging
existing Western rights in Berlin. Beginning on the 22nd of
October, Ulbricht' s Volkspolizei and border guards attempted
to demand checking the documents of U. S. personnel entering
East Berlin. The obstruction by the East Germans continued
to heighten the situation, in reaction to which U. S. tanks
pulled up on the U. S. sector border. On 27 October, ten
Soviet tanks moved into position along the sector boundary
facing their U. S. counterparts. Finally, sixteen tense
hours later, the Soviet tanks turned and moved back from
their positions along the border. CRef. 96: p. 423 3 This
retreat occured only after an arrangement was made among the
Soviet Presidium leadership. In this agreement, according
to Slusser's analysis, Koslov would call back the Soviet
tanks in Berlin, support Khrushchev in his renewed attack on
the Anti-Party group, join in condemning the Albanian party
leadership and follow Khrushchev in rejecting the Chinese
criticism of this condemnation. In return, Khrushchev had
to explicitly disavow the rapidly evolving cult of person-
ality being built up around him and formally acknowledge
Koslov' s position as the No. 2 man in the party. During the
last days of the Congress, these conditions were all met.
After the conclusion of the Congress the Berlin
crisis was allowed to dwindle away. The lack of any further
military response, so long as Western military access was
unhampered, Kennedy's change in U.S. nuclear weapons
strategy in Europe, i.e., not granting shared control, and
his demonstrated buildup of American conventional and
nuclear strategic forces convinced the Kremlin leadership to
settle for the minimum objective. Ulbricht may not have
gotten his primary interests fulfilled, and apparently was
not satisfied with Khrushchev's change in policy priorities,
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but were it not for Ulbricht's pressure throughout the
crisis, he may not have even gotten a wall to guard.
B. DETENTE IMPOSED 1968-1971
1. Entering the Czech Crisis
Although the Czech crisis is our official starting
point for this case study, history is too complex to be able
to choose a specific date and try to explain a phenomenon
simply from that time onward. Therefore, we must briefly
discuss the changes in West German-East European relations
in 1967 to better understand- the Soviet and East European
Deutschlandpolitik following the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
As a result of gradual changes in Bonn's Ostpolitik,
particularly following the construction of the Grand
Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, and the lack of
political integration of the Warsaw Pact East European
states, a growing divergence in East European Westpolitik
became apparent in the winter of 1967. The new government
in Bonn highlighted the following principles on which they
were to base their foreign policy:
1) The willingness to relinquish any claim to national
control over nuclear weapons;
2) The question of Germany's borders could only be
settled in a peace treaty with a unified Germany;
3) The Federal Republic was sole representative of the
German people and could not recognize the GDR;
4) It was prepared to establish contacts with the other
part of Germany in hope of solving intra-German prob-
lems and the conclusion of a renunciation of force
agreement; and
5) The Federal Government was interested in concluding
renunciation of force agreements and establishing
normal relations with East European states. C Ref . 4:
P. 35], CRef. 106: p. 330]
Romanian leaders were the first to respond to Bonn's
appeals. Bucharest's establishment of diplomatic relations
with Bonn in January 1967 not only implied a lack of respect
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for East Berlin's interests, but the breaking of a solemnly
sworn pledge within the Pact not to recognize the Federal
Republic prior to its recognition of the GDR. CRef. 4: p.
383 Worse yet, Hungarian, Czech and Bulgarian leaders also
showed an interest in Bonn's offer. CRef. 18: p. 109] The
Soviets, while initially reserved and perhaps even inter-
ested, soon realized, with fraternal advice from Ulbricht,
that there were inherent dangers in this policy.
Ulbricht was able to fully express his distress at
the WTO Foreign Ministers conference in Warsaw in February
1967. The GDR representatives argued that in offering to
improve its relations- with the East European countries, Bonn
was trying a policy of divide and conquer, which was
hostile, rather than conducive to, the cause of peace and
detente. CRef. 4: p. 38] Ulbricht' s demand, which was
supported by the Polish leader, Gomulka, was that the allies
must show unconditional solidarity with the GDR if they
wanted to safeguard their own interests. Included in this
solidarity was the respect for the GDR requirement of full
recognition by Bonn prior to entering into a political and
diplomatic relationship with the Federal Republic. Except
for Romania, the GDR demands were supported, albeit for not
altogether similar reasons, and accepted at the conference.
The Soviet leadership, while supporting Ulbricht and
Gomulka, took a somewhat "hesitant and equivocal" stand on
the issue, perhaps not yet fully decided on whether the
possibilities for opportunity with the Grand Coalition might
outweigh its effect on Soviet-East European relations.
A few months later, however, Moscow appeared to have
decided for bloc unity over immediate opportunism in its
Westpolitik. At the Karlovy Vary Conference of European
Communist Parties in late April 1967, the Soviets clearly
supported a harder line on the Federal Republic in order to
achieve greater Pact unity. The final conference
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declaration on "Peace and Security in Europe" set the
following four conditions for the creation of security in
Europe:
1) Recognition of existing borders in Europe;
2) Recognition of two distinct and sovereign German
states;
3) Bonn's renunciation of access to nuclear weapons "in
any form ; and
4) Bonn's recognition of the invalidity of the Munich
treaty "from the beginning". CRef . la: p. 113]
Despite Moscow's support for the GDR demands,
Ulbricht may well have understood the difference in perspec-
tives on which both leaderships were working. While Moscow
was hostile towards Bonn, it also held out possibilities for
improved relations with the FRG if Bonn were to show greater
"realism" in its policy. This dual policy towards the West
Germans was based on the hope that when Bonn realizes its
lack of success in Eastern Europe, it would be impelled to
make concessions on Soviet terms. CRef. 18: p. 118] East
Berlin's fears of a possible sell out by Moscow were not
without foundation. When Bonn shifted its concentration of
efforts from its East European neighbors to Moscow in late
1967, these fears were again fueled, particularly since the
Federal Republic and the Soviets were undergoing a dialogue
on a renunciation of force agreement. Under pressure to set
Ulbricht as ease, the Soviets pressed a hard line with Bonn
through continually drawing in other Deutschlandpolitik
issues on which Bonn refuse to negotiate. CRef. 18: pp.
130-142] The talks were discontinued in July, five weeks
prior to the Soviet-led invasion into Czechoslovakia.
The crisis building up in Czechoslovakia in the
summer of 1968 created a framework for Moscow's attitude to
the Federal Republic during that period and immediately
after the invasion. Although Bonn's new Ostpolitik did not
cause the developments in Prague, contrary to claims made by
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the SED, Bonn's attempt to seek accommodation with East
European regimes was intended to dispel the fear of West
Germany by these countries. This fear had been constantly
stimulated by the Soviets to form a common source of cohe-
sion among the East European states. As socialist unity was
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appearing to fall apart in response to Bonn s appeals, the
Soviets were able to justify, with the strong urging on
Ulbricht and Gomulka's part, the military actions in
Czechoslovakia through attacking West Germany's imperial-
istic and revanchist aims in that country and throughout the
Central European region.
2. The Czechoslovakian Invasion and its After-effects
Strangely enough, the effects of the long debated
decision to use military force to end the reform movement in
Prague placed West Germany-East European and Soviet rela-
tions one step closer to rapprochement. Stephen Larrabee
has appropriately summed up this paradox:
While the invasion was essentially a reflection of the
weakness of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe and a
response to forces which were accelerated by Bonn s
Ostpolitik, it helped to create the very conditions of
stability that allowed Moscow to gradually abandon the
German bogey and move towards a rapprochement with Bonn
shortly thereafter. C Ref . 18: p. 156]
Moscow indicated within three months after the 21 August
1968 invasion that the leadership was again interested in
resuming dialogue with Bonn on the renunciation of force
issue. Foreign Minister Gromyko ' s relatively conciliatory
tone towards the FRG in a speech before the United Nations
and his meeting with West German Foreign Minister Willi
Brandt while in New York on 8 October 1968, the first
17Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations with Bonn
on 31 January 1968.
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meeting between the Foreign Ministers of these two countries
since 1962, were positive indications of this Soviet
interest.
In 1969 the Soviet-West German climate further
improved. The growing storm along their eastern border with
China and the linkage policy developing in the
Nixon-Kissinger plan for arms negotiations, in which the new
administration was tying European detente in with improve-
ments in SALT negotiations, were other factors contributing
to the changes in the Bonn-Moscow relationship.
A shift in the Soviet position was evident during
the "mini" Berlin crisis in February and March 1969. The
East German government sent threatening protests to the
Federal government in early February and announced a series
of measures they would take should the Bundestag convene the
Bundesversammlung in West Berlin. 18 Ulbricht was in Moscow
at this time and the Soviets stepped up their statements,
hinting at the possibility that Moscow might not tolerate
much longer the inconveniences of the Western presence in
Berlin. [Ref. 4: p. 49] Both Soviet and East German mass
media adopted a harsh tone during the early days in
February. American diplomats let their Soviet counterparts
know that, in addition to their continuation of exercising
their "rights" in West Berlin, continued tensions created by
the Soviet side could have negative affects on American
cooperation in questions of arms control. Soon afterwards,
on 12 February, the Soviets de-escalated their campaign and,
despite continued anti-West German polemics over the issue,
none of the threatened measures were carried out. This
reassessment of priorities most likely took the East Germans
by surprise, who shared none of Moscow's interests which led
18
""This is a special meeting of the West German Bundestag
to elect the Federal president. It had met every five years
in Berlin since 1954 for this purpose.
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to the latter preventing the GDR from taking actions which
they seemed to have agreed upon previously. CRef . 4: p. 50]
Furthermore, as the Soviet leadership saw an opportunity to
barter with Bonn on this issue, granting border passes to
West Berliners to visit East Berlin in exchange for Bonn
moving the Bundesversammlung to another location, the GDR
representatives sabotaged the arrangement when it came to
negotiations. The Soviets were probably embarrassed in the
turn of events and likewise able to learn something about
dealing with their East German allies. Although the GDR
harassed traffic for a few days during the session, the
meeting was able to take place in West Berlin on 5 March
without significant problems. CRef. 112]
American concern for Soviet restraint in Berlin was
evident in Nixon's talks with Soviet Ambassador Anotolii
Dobrynin in mid-February, whereby the President reportedly
told the Ambassador that a new crisis over Berlin would
certainly jeopardize the SALT talks and upset the progress
in expanding the Non-Proliferation Treaty. CRef. 113]
Nixon's visit to West Berlin in late February also made it
clear that his administration would not separate Soviet
actions in areas of American interests in Europe from the
general problem of East-West relations. In addition to
appreciating this distinct connection, the Kremlin leaders
also understood that any acceptance of the status quo in
Europe, perceived by Moscow as important to reducing the
chances of another Prague spring, would have to start with
West Germany. It was this country to which most of the
postwar border changes were affected and upon which the
security of Western Europe rested.
3. The Budapest Appeal
The Budapest meeting of the WTO Political
Consultative Committee (PCC) on 17 March 1969 was the next
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forum at which the Soviets would rejuvenate their serious
efforts towards convening an European Security Conference,
the goal of which would be the formal recognition of the
status quo in Eastern Europe. An important watershed in
Soviet Deutschlandpolitik, the document released to the
public differed in several respects from previous declara-
tions. The earlier "anti-revanchist" and "anti-
militaristic" polemics were absent and Bonn was not singled
out for special treatment as in the Karlovy Vary communique.
The requirements for West German participation in a security
conference were milder than previously presented. These
included:
1) Inviolability of existing borders, including the
Oder-Neisse and intra-German borders;
2) Recognition of the existence of the GDR and the
Federal Republic;
3) West German renunciation of the claim to sole repre-
sentation of all Germany and of control over nuclear
weapons; and
4) Acceptance of West Berlin as having a special and
separate status from the West German state.
CRef .. 114: p. D 151]
Conspicuous was that these demands were required to be met
for the end product, i.e. by the end of the conference, and,
unlike previously, were not necessarily to be met prior to
Bonn's participation. This was confirmed by the Soviet
Ambassador to Bonn in later discussions. [Ref . 4: p. 521
At the same time, the Soviets wished to signal to
the West a greater commitment to improve thier relations
with them, the Budapest Appeal created a tool for the East
European allies to demand greater flexibility in their rela-
tions with West Germany. No doubt, Romania, who was not a
member of the Karlovy Vary conference, sought to utilize the
results of the Budapest meeting to legitimize its own
efforts to expand contacts with the West. Soon after the
meeting, Hungary, too, began to readjust its stand towards
the West. CRef. 18: p. 1993 It is therefore understandable
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that the wording of the appeal was not agreed upon without
dispute. The GDR-Polish position was opposed, according to
information passed to a West German reporter in Budapest, by
the Romanians and, in a more cautious manner, the
Hungarians. Support from the Soviet side, when requested by
the East German delegation, was refused. CRef. 4: pp.
52-53], CRef. 115: p. 3] The Soviet position was most likely
responsible for the survival of the more conciliatory line
towards the West Germans.
4. The Prague Proposals
From the Budapest Appeal onwards, the Soviets gave
increasing signals that they wanted improved relations with
Bonn. Of course, there were two problems to be solved
within the alliance in the meantime. The first was the
above-mentioned freedom the East European allies took upon
themselves in interpreting the Budapest results. A confer-
ence of the WTO Foreign Ministers was called in late October
to develop a bloc-wide plan for future Westpolitik. While
this meeting brought the Soviets a good two steps forward in
planning the way towards rapprochement with the West Germans
and, therefore, closer to and ESC, the second problem,
Ulbricht's vehement rejection of bypassing his maximal
demands as preconditions for negotiations, the Soviet
leadership was forced to take one step backwards at a Moscow
summit meeting in December 1969.
The Prague meeting marked a new stage in developing
differences between the GDR leadership and other members of
the Pact, particularly the Soviet Union, on the question of
how to respond to the new SPD government in Bonn. The
convening of a European Security Conference was again the
main topic of their Prague Proposals, issued after their
two-day meeting on 30 and 31 October 1969. The proposals
accepted the bilateral approach and hardly directed any
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demands at Bonn. CRef . 116] Both of these points were
strongly opposed by the GDR. Ulbricht felt his only
protection of this sovereignty and guarantee of recognition
of his regime by the Western states lay in a multilateral
plan binding on all Pact states with preconditions to nego-
tiations encompassing his maximalist demands. The most
important of these were de jure recognition of the GDR and
recognition of Berlin as a separate legal entity, specifi-
cally not part of the Federal Republic. The Brandt govern-
ment had taken exactly the opposite position. Namely,
arguing that bilateral renunciation of force agreements with
the Pact states was the most important step towards a relax-
ation of tensions in Europe. This presented Moscow with a
dilemma - accept Brandt's approach, which would open up
almost immediately the opportunity to deal with Bonn on
several issues important to Soviet interests, or back
Ulbricht' s demands, which might forestall the talks needed
to initiate the convening of an ESC indefinitely.
In November Ulbricht' s situation became more aggra-
vated. On 25 November the Brandt government announced its
willingness to enter into discussions on outstanding prob-
lems with Poland, Ulbricht' s final ally to that point.
Furthermore, three days later, the Federal Republic signed
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thus securing one more of
Moscow's most critical goals and removing a major obstacle
to improved Soviet-West German relations.
Responding to his worsening case, Ulbricht travelled
to Moscow on 1 December 1969, two days before a quickly,
assembled, "unofficial" meeting of the Warsaw Pact was held
in the city. It seems quite clear that the purpose of the
meeting was to overcome some of the difficulties between the
GDR and Moscow, which had arisen in the past several months.
[Ref . 4: p. 56] The communique issued upon its closing
appeared to be the product of a compromise. Although
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demanding de jure recognition of the GDR, this was not set
as a precondition for further talks. CRef. 117] The Soviet
leaders make the bilateral approach the official policy to
follow, while at the same time almost assigning a "division
of labor" to the various East European states in their roles
vis-a-vis. C Ref . 118: p. Ill] The latter probably also
included a tentative time line for the development of these
relations. Given his unsuccessful attempt to persuade his
allies, Ulbricht would make his own interpretation of the
GDR's role in intra-German relations.
5. Brandt, Erfurt and Kassel
On 22 October 1969 the German Social Democratic
Party and the Free Democratic Party formed the first
non-CDU/CSU West German government since the republic's
founding. The former mayor of Berlin and foreign minister,
Willi Brandt, was chosen as Chancellor. Brandt wasted
little time in indicating his government's increased will-
ingness to normalized relations with Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. Within one week of forming his new govern-
ment, Brandt announced Bonn's readiness to recognize the
"existence" of the GDR as a second state in Germany. As
noted above, by the end of November, he sent positive
signals to Moscow in signing the NPT, and by offering to
begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on a renunciation
of force agreement. At the same time, he urged his Western
allies to pursue their Berlin talks with Moscow as vigor-
ously as possible. CRef. 71: p. 366]
The GDR quickly responded to Bonn by presenting an
East German draft treaty on 17 December to the Federal
Republic which was part of Ulbricht' s interpretation of the
Pact's bilateral policy. It was also, however, an indica-
tion that East Berlin was still reacting to events, rather
than controlling them. CRef. 118: pp. 111-112] As Edwina
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Moreton has pointed out, the draft worked both as a sign to
Moscow that Ulbricht had acquiesced in the principle of
bilateral contacts with Bonn and, by presenting his maximal
demands, it could buy Ulbricht some time since he knew the
Brandt government was unprepared to accept the terms. In
addition, the draft provided an explicit layout of East
Germany's base for negotiations and made it clear that
further discussions would not simply be on West German
terms. CRef. 118: p. 112]
Soviet Ambassador to East Berlin, Abrassimov, met
several times in December with East German leaders. While
this was probably to keep the SED informed of Moscow's
exchanges with the Federal Republic, it is quite plausible
that Moscow was urging Ulbricht to be more responsive to
Bonn's willingness to talk. CRef. 118: p. 114] These meet-
ings with Abrassimov may have become more significant for
intra-German dialogue in January 1970, when the Soviet
Ambassador met Ulbricht on the 16th, two days after Brandt's
"State of the Nation" address. In the speech on the 14th,
Brandt announced that concrete proposals would soon be sent
to the GDR and rejected Ulbricht' s demand for unconditional
recognition in place of his formula of "special"
intra-German relations. In a full international press
conference held on 19 January, the SED First Secretary
restated the basis upon which he would frame any negotia-
tions with the Federal government, a position he held until
his eventual removal a year later. International recogni-
tion would stand as his single-most important goal. Stating
this point as the central requirement for peace in Europe,
Ulbricht stated quite categorically:
The establishment of relations under international law
between the FRG and the GDR is a basic condition also
for normal relations between other states of the Warsaw
Treaty and the Bonn government. CRef. 118: p. 115]
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Signs of Soviet influence were visible in his refraining
from commenting on West Berlin and his statement that the
GDR would await the results of the Soviet Union's negotia-
tions with Bonn before concluding a treaty with Bonn. This
point on waiting would reoccur in later developments .
By mid-February 1970, the exchange of notes between
Bonn and East Berlin had established the consensus that both
sides wished to meet for an exchange of views. Snags devel-
oped, however, over the GDR's setting of preconditions and
intention to limit the talks to the issue of diplomatic
relations. Gromyko ' s four-day visit from 23-27 February
appeared to have helped things along. In their joint commu-
nique, the GDR declared its readiness to regulate its rela-
tions with Bonn and other states, without mentioning any
requirement of full recognition. CRef . 119]
Shortly after Gromyko' s visit, East Berlin announced
its readiness to conduct "constructive, business-like nego-
tiations" with Bonn. [Ref . 120] More snags had to be worked
out in March during the preparatory talks, but eventually, a
certain degree of motivation on both sides made way for the
first meeting between Willi Stoph and Willi Brandt in
Erfurt, East Germany on 19 March 1970. With greatly
differing motivations on both sides, the least of which on
the GDR side appeared to be to negotiate, the only agreement
to emerge was that a second meeting should be held in
Kassel, West Germany on 21 May. Basically, both sides reit-
erated their known positions.
Before the second round took place in Kassel,
Ulbricht headed a GDR delegation in Moscow. According to
the West German newspaper, Die Welt, news leaked out after
the second Brandt-Stoph meeting that the Soviets and East
Germans had agreed to delaying tactics to be adopted at the
Kassel meeting. The Soviets convinced the SED leaders to
prevent a complete breakdown of the talks, although
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approving an East German intransigent position. The end
result was to be a suspension of the talks for an indefinite
period. The Soviets, apparently, did not wish to convey to
their West German counterparts the impression that East
Berlin was giving in. ERef. 4: pp. 72-73] As a result, the
second meeting at Kassel saw Stoph adopt an even harsher
stand, yet not find any excuse to break off the discussions,
despite the many opportunities to do so given the unruly
demonstrations held during the visit. ERef. 71: pp.
380-386] A "pause for thought" was called before further
meetings would be arranged.
6. The Road to Moscow
Already in December 1969 exploratory talks on a
renunciation of force agreement between the Soviet Union and
the Federal Republic had taken place. From these talks both
sides concluded that the other was interested enough to
begin further discussions. Through three further phases of
talks, from January through May, Egon Bahr, the West German
spokesman, succeeded in getting the Soviet side, represented
by Gromyko, to accept Bonn's concept of "inviolable" border
in place of Moscow's preferred term "unchangeable". This
protected the FRG position that the final border question is
only subject to a peace treaty conducted with the Four
Powers in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. Bahr also
was able to get the Soviet Union to drop a passage regarding
the ratification of the NPT. ERef. 18: pp. 230-232]
Finally, during the final phase of the talks in May the
Soviets agreed to drop its intervening rights under Article
53 and 107 of the U.N. charter as well as accepted the
stipulation contained in the "Letter to German Unity".
ERef. 18: p. 234] The latter reaffirmed Bonn's ultimate
political goal was for peaceful reunification.
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By 22 May a rough draft had been worked out, subject
to further negotiations. Domestic political differences put
off the final negotiations between West German Foreign
Minister Scheel and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko until 27
July. The two Foreign Ministers initialled the final draft
on 7 August and Chancellor Brandt travelled to Moscow to
sign the treaty on 12 August. After signing, Brandt took
advantage of the opportunity to speak with Brezhnev. Among
the topics discussed, Brandt mentioned a possible link
between the Bundestag ratification of the Moscow treaty and
"progress" on the Berlin negotiations. While this
distressed the First Secretary, Brandt added, "But the
politico-psychological situation in the Federal Republic is
such that we expect wider approval of the treaty if there is
progress on Berlin". CRef . 71: p. 3403
For the Soviet leadership the treaty was seen as an
event of "great historical significance". CRef. 121: p. 32]
One of the final changes achieved by Gromyko was an inclu-
sion in the preamble of a paragraph regarding both sides'
determination to improve" economic, scientific-technical and
cultural relations. This is indicative of Moscow's interest
to open up increased exchange in these areas, particularly
in trade and scientific-technical, through the conclusion of
this treaty. Besides Bonn's renunciation of force, the
treaty also gave Bonn's explicit acceptance of the postwar
boundaries, including "the Oder-Neisse line which forms the
western frontier of the People's Republic of Poland and the
frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic. " [Ref . 122] This recognition
represented their main goal of postwar Soviet diplomacy in
Europe. This and the Brandt government's signing of the NPT
were major victories for the Brezhnev leadership.
The SED leadership could find very little in the
Moscow treaty, with which to be pleased. By Moscow's public
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acknowledgement to the world of its confidence in positive
changes in West German policies, it robbed Ulbricht of his
important policy justification mechanism of presenting West
Germany as being the number one enemy. Furthermore, the
treaty did not correspond to any of Ulbricht' s maximal
demands. Recognition of the East German state by the FRG
was not made a precondition for the agreement and the
wording allowed for the possibility of a future German
reunification. At most, in the treaty Bonn recognized the
present borders of the GDR. The agreements in the treaty,
in Ulbricht 1 s view, were achieved at the expense of East
German claims. Not able to openly oppose the agreement, the
SED, in Neues Deutschland
. briefly reported the "good news",
which they followed with the usual East German demands on
the Federal Republic. CRef. 4: p. 75]
The official GDR government comment on the Moscow
Treaty was published in Neues Deutschland on 15 August 1970.
After giving it ritual approval, the response indicated the
East Berlin leadership had chosen to interpret the treaty in
their own particular light. It was viewed, for example, as
a lever to pressure the FRG into diplomatic recognition,
arguing that "the obligations in the treaty between the USSR
and the FRG consequently require that normal diplomatic
relations be established henceforth. " [ Ref . 123] In
addition, the article asserted that there was no longer any
excuse for third countries to avoid establishing diplomatic
relations with East Berlin. The Soviet's disapproval of
this interpretation was expressed in Pravda' s omission of
these paragraphs when it reprinted the GDR's Council of
Ministers comment the same day. [Ref. 124]
A conference of the PCC of the Warsaw Pact was held
in Moscow on 20 August, probably to discuss the significance
of the Moscow Treaty within the framework of the Pact's
objectives and to press for unanimous approval of the
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document. CRef. 4: p. 76] The additional purpose of
preventing the SED from setting out on any obstructionist
policy must also be considered. One can assume Moscow'
s
strongest argument was that this opened the way to a
Security Conference. The final communique, which was rather
weak, did, in fact, make this the central point upon which
there was general agreement. No mention was made in refer-
ence to upgrading East Germany's international status.
CRef. 125]
7. The Four Power Talks on Berlin
The Four Power negotiations on the status of Berlin
became the hottest and finally the turning point in the
disagreement between the SED and the leaders in the Kremlin.
Back in late March 1970, upon the Western initiative, talks
opened regarding the status of Berlin. Initially, during
the spring and summer of 1970, the intransigent Soviet posi-
tion, so totally opposed to the West, suggested to many that
there would be little hope for a successful agreement. The
Soviets were demanding loosened ties between the FRG and
Berlin and were unwilling to discuss access rights.
CRef. 4: p. 82] On these main issues the SED and Soviets
were in basic agreement. In their willingness to negotiate
in the first place, however, was confirmation of the Soviet
Union's continued support of the Four Power status, the very
thing the Soviets had been criticizing the West for since
the beginning of the Berlin deadline crisis in 1958. During
this period, however, the Soviet Union had continued its
presence in West Berlin (the Soviet War memorial and their
claims to administrative rights in the Spandau Prison).
Despite what they may have been telling their East German
allies, it is doubtful whether Moscow ever wished to relin-
quish its occupation rights over the GDR.
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The atmosphere changed somewhat when the talks
resumed in September 1970. The West German Bundestag had
made it known that there was a linkage, or Junktim, between
its ratification of the Moscow Treaty and a "satisfactory"
settlement on Berlin. CRef . 126] Although the Soviet
position became only slightly more flexible, the little
progress achieved was just enough to motivate the
participants to continue their efforts. On 4 November,
however, the Soviet representatives showed much greater
interest in discussing the topic of access to the city from
West Germany. Later in the month other signs of progress
were discernable during the negotiations. Bonn, and the
other Western Powers added increased pressure on the Soviet
Union when Foreign Minister Scheel suggested that the
Polish-West German treaty, initialed in November, could only
be ratified if there were an acceptable Berlin accord.
Then, in December, the NATO ministers agreed to a linkage
between their support for an ESC and a satisfactory
conclusion of the Berlin negotiations. CRef. 127: p. 62]
Throughout November, Ulbricht thought it essential
to remind his Soviet allies, through statements and actions,
that East German interests were not to be overlooked. While
Ulbricht noted the need for greater "consultation between
the fraternal parties", he refused to attend the Hungarian
Party Congress, at which the Soviet leaders intended to use
for an informal summit meeting to work out differences of
opinion among the East European leaders. Instead, Gromyko
was forced to travel to the GDR for talks which apparently
produced no further understanding. They did agree, however,
to settle their differences at a meeting of the PCC on 2
December in East Berlin. [Ref. 118: pp. 168-169]
During this same time, the West German CDU/CSU were
holding a party caucus in West Berlin. Ulbricht, withing
perhaps to show both East and West his potential power in
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this situation, directed serious traffic delays from 29
November until 2 December. It is uncertain the level of
support which the Soviets placed behind this particular
display of sovereignty. We are fairly certain, however,
that Brezhnev and Ulbricht clashed strongly at the East
Berlin conference. CRef. 118: p. 169], C Ref . 4: p. 88]
Ulbricht is reported to have accused the Soviet leadership
of sacrificing vital East German interests and may have
brought up the Chinese accusation of a Soviet "betrayal" of
the GDR to gain leverage at the conference. CRef. 4: p. 88
>
fn . 36] The conference ended with the participants endorsing
Brezhnev's earlier formula; i.e., progress is possible if
both the needs of the West Berliners and the sovereign
interests of the GDR are respected. They also officially
proclaimed their "unanimous solidarity with the policy of
peace pursued by the German Democratic Republic.
"
[Ref. 128] Although the SED leaders did manage to get reaf-
firmed support of their claim to recognition, it again was
not mentioned as a precondition for further negotiations.
When the four Ambassadors returned to the Berlin
negotiations on 10 December, the Soviets returned again to a
hard line position taken two months earlier. In concert
with this attitude, East German authorities once more initi-
ated traffic harassment from 19 to 22 December during an SPD
party meeting. The GDR had also entered into talks with
West German officials, hoping to arrange an agreement on
traffic access. Although the West Germans refused to
discuss Berlin issues, including access at this time, the
internal debate in Bonn over the correctness of SPD
Ostpolitik and certain U.S. criticism of Brandt's Berlin
policy, may have been behind Moscow's stiffening line at
this time, hoping for Western concessions due to the weak-
ened front. CRef. 127: pp. 63-66] The shift by Moscow may
also be explained by the growing instability problems in
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Poland in mid-late December, resulting in possible increased
criticism within the anti-West German circles in the Soviet
leadership. Some analysts have noted SED cooperation with
Brezhnev's critics in the Soviet party apparatus, among whom
were advocates of a rapprochement with China in place of an
East-West settlement in Europe. C Ref . 4: p. 92]
During the winter of 1971, the East Germans
continued with harassment on the access routes to Berlin,
sometimes causing delays of up to thirty hours at the border
check points. According to an editorial in Neues
Deutschland , these were legal countermeasures caused by the
West German government's attempts to misuse West Berlin.
[Ref. 129] The misuse referred to by the editorial were
reported demonstrations of West German presence in the city,
such as FDP and CDU/CSU meetings in West Berlin in January
and March. Credible evidence of Soviet support was the
Soviet Union's interference in Allied military air traffic
for the first time in eight years.
The Soviet negotiating position during this time,
while flexible on some individual points, remained uncompro-
mising over matters of principle. In the few months before
the CPSU Congress, the Brezhnev leadership may have felt
strung between facing criticism from domestic and allied
opponents. If they compromised on these principles, partic-
ularly after having been set under pressure by NATO to nego-
tiate in their favor, they would be left open to criticism
at the congress, while also knowing that the foundations
laid for a long-sought security conference might crumble if
too harsh a line were taken. Also East Germany was facing
the harshest winter in years, which, like Poland, exacer-
bated its economic difficulties. Brezhnev may have read-
justed his priorities by replacing Berlin with concerns over
instability in Eastern Europe. The Soviet representative in
the Berlin negotiations, Ambassador Abrassimov, and other
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high-ranking Soviets reassured the Western side that there
was still optimistic reasons to continue the talks despite
their disappointing pace.
Brezhnev achieved a victory over the opponents of
his foreign policy strategy during the Twenty-Fourth Party
Congress in late March and early April 1971. In April the
Soviet leaders apparently made the decision to advance its
Westpolitik through adopting a more lenient attitude on
Berlin, significantly improving the possibilities for agree-
ment. A major obstacle still remained, however; Ulbricht
and the East German demands
Ulbricht' s fall from power in East Germany in April
1971 was brought about by primarily internal SED actions,
with apparent, and crucial, support in Moscow. It is neces-
sary to deviate somewhat to discuss the background to his
dismissal as SED First Secretary. Domestic opposition to
Ulbricht' s approach to intra-German contacts probably coal-
ized during the spring and summer of 1970, between and imme-
diately following the Erfurt and Kassel meetings. Erich
Honecker, responsible for security, and Albert Norden,
responsible for ideology within the SED, began in their
speeches to present an ultra-hard line vis-a-vis Bonn, with
special emphasis on the contrasting class and social systems
facing one another along the inter-German border. According
to their argument, the imperialistic and militaristic West
German system is totally incompatible with the peaceful
socialist system in the GDR. [Ref. 130] It is important to
note that while Ulbricht was primarily concerned with the
prestige benefits resulting from international recognition,
which, according to Ulbricht, must come through any substan-
tive intra-German rapprochement, these two members of the
SED leadership, and later also General Heinz Hoffmann,
Minister of Defense, were focussing on the problems of
internal instability resulting from closer intra-German
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contacts. Probably raising their concerns, for example, was
the reaction of the East German local population to Brandt's
visit to Erfurt. CRef. 71: pp. 371-372] Hence, the
formulation of the policy of demarcation or Abgrenzung in
late summer, early fall 1970. CRef. 131], CRef. 132]
The principle difference between the two factions
involved the dispute over the best tactics for achieving
international recognition. The Honecker group eventually
accepted the Soviet argument that GDR recognition could only
come about through the normalization process, and quite
possibly at the later stages of this process. CRef. 133: p.
A3] Throughout the process, Moscow would protect the basic
sovereign rights of the GDR in international negotiations.
This is why the group that took up the banner of Abgrenzung
also reinforced the need for the GDR to forge even closer
ties with the Soviet Union.
As long as Ulbricht could be reassured by his Moscow
supporters that recognition would remain part of the deal,
he could be brought along on a cautious road to improving
relations with Bonn. After waiting out the Moscow Treaty,
and later the Warsaw Treaty, however, he was no longer
convinced that Moscow was holding up their part of the
bargain. Finally, when Ulbricht got a grasp on the compro-
mises Moscow was willing to make on Berlin in the Four Power
talks, Ulbricht established his final, uncompromising
stance. Without Moscow's willingness to adopt his demands,
Ulbricht' s goals and future as East German leader were
clearly limited.
In addition to his divergent Deutschlandpolitik
views, Ulbricht increasingly come to underscore the impor-
tance of independent German accomplishments in economic,
political and ideological spheres, oftentimes emphasizing
their unique departure from the Soviet model of development.
CRef. 134] In the years after the Czech invasion, he seldom
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missed an opportunity to emphasize the fact that the GDR had
developed an independent ideological base for moving on its
own right road to socialism. Given his strong support for
Moscow's political leadership, particularly in foreign
policy, these exclamations could be reconciled with the main
stream of Soviet European goals. CRef. 134: p. 57] When,
however, he became a burden on these goals, as through his
inflexible stance regarding relations with Bonn and the
GDR's role in Berlin matters, reconciliation became less of
a viable option. The knowledge of this may have motivated
him to use his speech before the Twenty-Fourth Congress as a
"crowning" opportunity to underline the SED's "special posi-
tion" in the alliance and boast in front of his Russian
hosts that he was one of the few surviving party members who
knew Lenin.
Honecker, on the other hand, remained conspicuously
silent on foreign policy issues, i. e. not supporting or
openly criticizing Ulbricht, from mid-summer 1970 through
the spring of 1971. CRef. 118: p. 183] He and his
supporters, apparently waited until the proper opportunity
arose before any decisive move to take power. Although
necessarily appreciating Ulbricht' s declining influence in
Moscow, they were careful not to underestimate the old man's
political cunning, a mistake made too often by opponents in
the past.
As is fairly well accepted by Western analysts,
Walter Ulbricht was removed during mid- late April by a
combination of internal SED opposition and the lack of
support in Moscow, although some place greater emphasis on
Moscow's role. CRef. 91: p. 568] His replacement by Erich
Honecker was followed, perhaps, by a deal between Honecker
and Brezhnev. Meetings between these two leaders occured
frequently during May and June. If the SED would go along
with trusting the Soviets to securing GDR interests in the
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Berlin settlement, Brezhnev would support the SED Abgrenzung
as the East Germans wished to apply it. CRef . 118: p. 188]
In May the ambassadorial talks on Berlin took on a
new turn when the Soviet position showed a more conciliatory
attitude. This began a wave of efforts on both sides to
separate political issues from practical matters, where
possible, in order that the momentum would continue. On one
side, the West, was preparing to accept a change in the
legal connection between the Federal Republic and West
Berlin, while the other seemingly received approval from the
East Germans for improved and guaranteed transit arrange-
ments. As these two points were separated and worked out on
their own merits, there was a clear tendency to come to an
agreement on practical considerations. [Ref. 4: p. 106]
This took most of the summer to accomplish, with frequent
Soviet-East German consultations along the way. This was
particularly true in August when Abrassimov and Gromyko met
with Honecker several times to discuss the last remaining
controversial issues and get the SED's final approval. The
four Ambassadors signed the agreement on 3 September 1971.
The Four Power Agreement on Berlin called for the
GDR government to negotiate transit accords with the Bonn
government and work out details on travel, communications
and exchange of territories with the West Berlin Senate.
These were to be concluded prior to any formal
implementation of the Berlin Agreement. After considerable
pressure from Moscow, often personally from Gromyko or
Brezhnev, the East Germans were able to set aside their own
obstructionist interpretations of the Berlin accord to
complete their work with the West Germans and West
Berliners. The Soviet leadership was in a hurry for its
enactment because of the linkage that became explicit
between the opening of the preliminary ESC talks and the
completion of the complete Berlin agreement. Bonn, on the
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other hand, continued to insist on "satisfactory" agreement
on the Berlin issues before ratification in the Bundestag of
the Moscow Treaty.
The final ratification in Bonn of the Moscow Treaty
was completed on 19 May 1972. The Berlin Agreement,
including the supplementary intra-German transit and travel
agreements, went into force on 2 June. Finally, the way was
clear for the Soviet Union's long-sought European Security
Conference. For the East Germans, they had gotten their
hands wet by the transit negotiations with their counter-
parts in Bonn. Although the continued negotiations were
laborious, they eventually led to the conclusion of the
Basic Treaty between the two German states, establishing the
norms for their future relations. And, as was perhaps prom-
ised in Moscow, the GDR state was formally admitted into the
international community of states in 1973.
C. HONECKER'S DETENTE 1979-1984
1. The Brezhnev Approach
The high point in East-West relations had been
reached in the mid 1970s, following the conclusion of the
Helsinki accords in August 1975. The resulting recognition
of the postwar status quo, together with the United States'
recognition of the Soviet Union as an equal in superpower
status by way of the SALT I Treaty (1972), were crowning
achievements for the Brezhnev- led Soviet leadership after
many long years of endeavor. The intense military modern-
ization of the Soviet armed forces and their cautious imple-
mentation through strategic opportunism during a period of
weak American leadership in the late 1970s led to a gradual,
but steady, worsening of American-Soviet relations. During
the 1980s, in words at least, there was atmosphere that
often reminded some of the earlier cold war relations.
Interestingly enough, just as these two superpowers had to
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"persuade" their "Germany" into a complimentary normaliza-
tion of relations in the heart of the detente years, and not
without conflict as we have noted, as the two larger states
sought their separate ways, each found it had to do some
pulling to get their "Germany" to follow suite.
As the German Democratic Republic celebrated its
30th anniversary in 1979, it enjoyed diplomatic recognition
by over 123 foreign states, not including the "special"
status from the Federal Republic of Germany. CRef. 20: p.
993 Obviously, it too had grown in international stature
during the 1970s. Beyond the existence of these relations,
East Berlin placed much emphasis on building the GDR's image
in Western Europe and in the Third World. Without repeating
what has been already been discussed in detail on East
Germany's active role as a Soviet proxy in Africa, Asia, and
Central America, suffice it to note that in the period
1977-79, Honecker had extended his foreign policy interests
notably beyond the strictly European sphere of his pred-
ecessor. . In intra-German relations, Bonn's claim for
"special" status had not adversely effected East Berlin's
international status as had been feared. Nor did the many
governmental and technical contacts lead to a loss of ideo-
logical purity within the heart of the party members.
Abgrenzung was also proving more successful than originally
thought.
In face of a hardening of the NATO attitude towards
the Soviet bloc military modernization, Brezhnev opened a
"Peace Offensive" strategy through diplomatic and propaganda
channels. Beginning around 1978, all the Pact states were
to implement this program in the "spirit of Helsinki". Its
primary goal was to break the popular support for NATO's
military modernization program, the apex of which was the
December 1979 NATO decision to deploy medium-range tactical
nuclear missiles. Moscow's strategy was originally well
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suited for the latter since NATO adopted a dual-track
approach, according to which the final deployment decision
would be made dependent upon the outcome of possible
negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
There was a four year grace-period during which attempts
would be made to negotiate the reduction of the Soviet SS-20
missiles before the final decisions would be made. This
left considerable time for the Warsaw Pact to attempt to
influence the West in the issues as well as room for
different options on both sides for solutions. Whereas
Brezhnev may have imagined one set of options, not matter
how limited, Andropov, Chernenko, Gromyko and other influen-
tial Kremlin leaders during the period, may have had other
preconceived outcomes. Honecker, on the other hand, had
little choice but to adjust and accept the Soviet option
predominant at any given time during the grace-period. This
may not have been an easy task for the East German leader.
As part of Brezhnev's peace offensive, he announced
in October 1979 that the USSR would withdraw over a division
of Soviet ground troops, about 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks,
from its forces in the GDR. This unilateral move was meant
to exploit domestic political opposition in Western Europe
to the NATO modernization program. Another major character-
istic of Brezhnev's approach was the emphasis on the contact
between the leaders of the major powers and their foreign
ministers, i. e. summit diplomacy. This was probably because
of the extensive media coverage given the Soviet position in
the Western country when such meetings occured, thus
providing Moscow with additional propaganda support in the
Western world.
The Federal Republic was a major avenue for this
purpose, since Bonn has strong motivations to keep their
Soviet relations on good standing and the influence Bonn
could exert in NATO forums. This last point was
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particularly true during the latter half of the seventies,
when West Germany's Helmut Schmidt filled the leadership gap
created by a weakened American presidency within the NATO
decisionmaking circles. During a time when U. S. and Soviet
leaders were not talking with one another, Brezhnev and
Schmidt met four times from May 1978 to November 1981.
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and West German Foreign
Minister Genscher were also to fill in when the highest
level meetings were not possible, such as Gromyko ' s visit to
Bonn in November 1979 in his attempt to forestall German
support for the NATO missile deployment.
Presumably, Brezhnev's support for high level
contact with the FRG included his eventual approval of an
intra-German summit meeting. Originally planned to take
place in 1980, Chancellor Schmidt's first visit to the GDR
had to wait until two more years after he made his surprise
announcement in December 1979 of plans to visit the Eastern
half of the nation. Honecker was prompted by Moscow in
January 1980 to postpone the first time, reportedly because
Brezhnev wanted his opportunity to visit Bonn first. This,
then, would prove Bonn's willingness to highlight ties to
Moscow despite the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan.
CRef. 1353 First, however, the West German Chancellor
travelled again to Moscow in June to act as a Western
spokesman and, in fact, also for exactly the above-
mentioned reason. Both sides wished to show their "desire
for cooperation and concord", emphasizing the importance
they both play in keeping a European peace and the mutual
economic and scientific-technical benefits they had drawn
since the signing of the Moscow Treaty. CRef. 1363 This
justification for continued healthy relations with the




These meetings were in May 1978, June and December
1980 and November 1981.
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a few years later. Brezhnev also used the visit as an
opportunity to convey to his guest, and to the American and
West European public, the news that the Soviet Union was
willing to begin bilateral talks with the United States on
arms control, including medium-range nuclear missiles.
In August 1980, it was Schmidt's turn to cancel the
East German visit. Polish unrest was much closer to home
than Afghanistan, and Bundestag elections were due in
October. Schmidt saw the possibility of being surprised by
an Easter bloc intervention in Poland during his visit.
CRef. 137] Given the issues and the atmosphere of
intra-German relations at that time," little could have been
expected to result from the meeting, thus subjecting his
coalition to greater criticism prior to the elections.
CRef. 138] In fact, there were two more meetings between
Chancellor Schmidt and Brezhnev before the West German
leader met his counterpart in the GDR.
In December 1980 Brezhnev travelled to Bonn and
eleven months later Schmidt paid a return visit to Moscow.
These visits were intended to serve predominantly symbolic
purposes; both sides wished to signify that thy adhered to a
commitment to reduce tensions and come to an acceptable
political balance in Europe. CRef. 43: p. 59] Apparently,
by this time Brezhnev felt more confidence in the value,
versus the possible costs, in a German summit meeting, which
he probably approved during Honecker's visit with Brezhnev
in the Crimea in August 1981. As Neues Deutschland reported
on the unofficial visit by their chief in the Crimea:
The discussion partners are of the opinion that exten-
sive international exchange, including political contact
between Chiefs of State of differing social systems, are
particularly worthwhile and necessary during the present
complicated situation. CRef. 139]
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East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer noted in his
speech before the U. N. General Assembly on 25 September that
the GDR would aid in "preserving detente as the dominating
tendency in international life" during the 1980s.
CRef. 140: p. 1123] The East Germans were thus announcing
their readiness to play an active part in preserving detente
in Europe, which might affect the entire East-West political
climate.
In mid December Helmut Schmidt met with Erich
Honecker for three days at a secluded retreat house at
Werbellinsee, just outside of Berlin. Although highly
symbolic, both leaders did walk away with a small bit to
report to their supporting constituencies. In return for a
six-month extention of the Swing credit and assurances that
an arrangement for future Swing credits could be arranged in
the spring, Honecker told Schmidt that emigration rules to
the West would be eased in the future and that there was a
strong commitment by the GDR leadership to continue and
improve intra-German relations. He also accepted an invita-
tion for a reciprocal visit to the Federal Republic. On the
final day of Schmidt's visit, however, Polish tanks rolled
throughout Poland as martial law was declared. The SPD's
Ostpolitik took another blow as a result of this action in
Poland.
The East Berlin leadership did, indeed, improve the
level of intra-German contacts beginning in 1982. This
improvement followed a period since 1977, during which the
intra-German dialogue had been drastically reduced to
practically a whisper. By 1981 many in West Germany,
including Schmidt's coalition partners in the FDP were ques-
tioning the value of strenuous efforts on Bonn's part to
keep the contacts alive. This was particularly true
following the Afghanistan invasion, declaration of martial
law in Poland and East Berlin's drastic increase in the
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mandatory daily monetary exchange (Zwangsumtausch) for
Western visitors to the GDR in October 1980. The latter
move doubled the required daily exchange, raising it to OM
25 at an exchange rate of one Deutsche Mark to one Ost Mark
for all adult visitors, without any exceptions for
pensioners, and required a OM 7. 50 exchange for children
under 16 years old. Previously pensioners and children were
excluded from the Zwangsumtausch. CRef. 1413 Visitors from
West Berlin were required to exchange four times the earlier
OM 6. 50 per day. These measures were substantive reflec-
tions of the SED's Abgrenzung policy to limit West German
influence through the overall decrease in intra-German
contacts. The end effect for both sides is revealing.
While for Bonn, the number of West Germans travelling to the
GDR ans East Berlin dropped in 1982 from an annual average
since 1978 of over 8 million visitors to around 5 million,
Honecker was able to substantially increase the amount of
West German Marks received from these "contacts". ( 1981 =
DM 75 million vs. 1982 = DM 125 million) CRef. 1423
Immediately following the announcement of these
financial measures, Honecker, in a speech in Gera in October
1980, attacked Bonn's interpretation of intra-German rela-
tions and the 1972 Basic Treaty. He demanded Bonn's recog-
nition of East German citizenship and the establishment of
"normal" diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Before this occurs, according to Honecker, there would be
little success in improved relations between the two German
states. CRef. 1433
Besides the fear of possible liberalization move-
ments springing up out of rising expectations from Western
contact, which then might disturb the economy as in the
Polish situation, there were certain explicit signs of
rising interest among East Germans in the life across the
western borders. Throughout the 1970s, East Berlin allowed
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some one thousand legal emigrations per year to the Federal
Republic. Applications for emigration to the West rose to a
high of over 150,000 in the year 1976. Following the easing
of emigration regulations in 1982-83, this number triple to
an estimated 500,000 in 1983. A growing number of these
applicants have been young persons under 25 years.
CRef. 1441
An obvious question arises here; namely, why then
did Honecker move towards a more conciliatory attitude
towards Bonn in late 1981 and into 1982. Two important
reasons stand out. First, as part of Brezhnev' s peace
offensive 'towards Western Europe, the GDR's increase in
intra-German relations would increase the stakes with which
Bonn could be threatened to lose should the Geneva negotia-
tions not produce the satisfactory results for the Soviet
Union. In this case, Moscow would need to pressure indi-
vidual NATO governments, but primarily the Federal Republic,
into a delay or rejection of the missile deployment option.
The meaning of this approach increased if the SPD-FDP coali-
tion were to become dependent upon Deutschlandpolitik
successes versus NATO nuclear missile deployments. Although
this never became true in the 1980s, it was economic differ-
ences which brought the collapse of the SPD-FDP coalition in
the fall of 1982, Brandt had done this in 1970-1972 and it
may have been conceivable to Moscow that a similar situation
could redevelop.
The second motivator for East Berlin's change in
policy was economic interests. Although the Five Year Plan
1981-1985 called for an increase in trade with the Soviet
Union to be accompanied by corresponding decreases in trade
with Western Industrialized states, particularly the FRG, a
substantial number of East German economic planners pressed
for increased trade with the West in order to obtain and pay
for new technology and modernization of East German
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machinery. CRef . 32: p. 40] Looking to the East, these
planners were faced with rising costs for energy from the
Soviet Union and unreliable Polish deliveries of coal and
other raw materials. Other economic realities were the need
to reduce its trade deficit with the West, which could be
done by utilizing the interest-free credit from Bonn of up
to DM 850 million per year, which was to expire in June 1981
if not renewed. The credit situation and need for western
industrial-technological hardware combined with the rising
cost of oil from the USSR, subsidies for which were cut by
10% in 1982 by Moscow, led the East Germans to tighten their
belts in 1982. They exported as much as possible to the
West and imported only the hardware items they needed for
immediate industrial modernization projects.
The lack of consumer goods led to food and other
consumer goods shortages in 1982 that were reminiscent of
the postwar years. Signs of unrest emerged and the memory
of events in Poland were still quite fresh. For the first
time in 16 years, the GDR achieved a surplus in intra-German
trade in 1981. West German Economics Minister, Lambsdorf,
met in March 1982 with East German party and state economics
officials, including Politburo member, Gunter Mittag, to
discuss the future intra-German economic relations. The
meeting took place "in the spirit of the meeting at
Werbellinsee" , meaning that the determination both heads of
state expressed in December 1981 for improved contacts also
set the tone for the economic discussions. E Ref . 145 3 By
June, agreement was reached on a gradual reduction of the
"Swing" credit, allowing it to drop in steps to DM 600
million per year by 1985.
Whatever plans Honecker had worked out with Brezhnev
in dealing with Bonn were greatly disturbed by two events in
the fall of 1982. In October the SPD-FDP coalition in Bonn
fell apart, giving rise to the formation of a center-right
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coalition between the CDU/CSU-FDP. In November General
Secretary Brezhnev passed away, being succeeded by Yuri
Andropov, who at 68 years of age, was the oldest successor
in Soviet history.
2. The Andropov Approach
The new Kremlin chief appeared to continue the same
basic approach towards the West as his predecessor. With
Reagan and the Geneva negotiations, a tough line, little
signs of flexibility and the same old allegations of U. S.
attempts to upset the strategic balance so long fought for
by the Soviet Union. Regarding NATO and the Federal
Republic, the former might still be convinced of the Soviet
Union's security needs and peaceful intentions, and the
latter still useful as a megaphone to European American
audiences.
In the Soviet determination to stir up opposition to
the nuclear missile decision among the West Europeans,
Moscow stepped up its support, verbal and financial, to the
anti-nuclear movements in the NATO countries. This was espe-
cially true in the Federal Republic, where the movement was
getting much publicity and where the first Pershing II
missiles were scheduled to be deployed at the end of the
following year.
By early 1983, Andropov probably did not have too
many illusions as to President Reagan's flexibility in the
Geneva negotiations. The next best option was to attempt to
draw the FRG closer, where possible, to political and
economic interests with in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. During Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow in July
1983, the Soviets made and effort to point out that "the
importance of a constructive dialogue at the summit level
cannot be treated too lightly". CRef. 146: p. 47] In a
rather cold, but business-like manner, the West German
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visitors were reminded of their vast interests vested in
Soviet-West German relations, be they economic or political,
and told that these interests might well be at stake in the
upcoming decisions on adding new missiles on German soil.
Yuri Andropov warned Kohl that the USSR had deliberately
maintained Berlin as an "oasis of detente" since the wors-
ening of East-West relations, thus reminding the Chancellor
of Bonn's dependence on Moscow for tolerable conditions with
the GDR. CRef. 147: p. 29] The Soviet leader also accepted
an invitation to visit the Federal Republic in the near
future.
At this time, around mid 1983, Andropov began to
become ill and slowly faded from the Soviet decisionmaking
scene. Before his departure, though, Honecker and Andropov,
or his supporters, may have come to an understanding on a
common approach to Bonn during the crucial months ahead.
Depending strictly analytical speculation and hindsight,
Andropov may have agreed to keep its pressure on Bonn and
its doors open to communication. The negotiations in Geneva
must also continue if there was any hope of delaying a
German decision on deployment, since hope inthe negotiations
was the SPD's strongest counter- argument against deployment.
Honecker, for his part, would treat the Kohl government with
moderation, holding out for any significant improvements
regarding Bonn's interests, but careful not to stop the
dialogue altogether through subtle concessions. The ulti-
mate costs to Bonn, then, would remain high. As to whether
the leaders agreed to who determined the moment when they
should call in their chips is unclear since Andropov died
and Honecker resisted this move for almost one year.
3. The Credit Connection
In fulfilling his part, Honecker may have seen such
opportunities knocking at his doorstep that he stayed in the
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subtle accommodation mode much longer than his senior allies
in Moscow desired. There was a distinct upswing in
intra-German activity in 1983. However, to Honecker, the
term "intra-German ties" can be translated into meaning
getting more West German economic aid. While not ignoring
his Abgrenzung rhetoric, Honecker avoided personal attacks
on the Bonn leadership, emphasizing the need to conduct
their relations with one another based on mutual respect and
non-discrimination.
In May Honecker postponed his FRG visit a first
time, claiming the attitude in the Federal Republic was not
conducive to "successful dialogue". He was not far from the
truth in this assessment because an incident in April, in
which a West German had died while being questioned at an
East German border post, had created quite a stir among the
Bavarian CSU wing of the conservative party in Bonn.
Strangely enough, a month later, the chief of the
CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, reveals a DM 1 billion loan by
various West German banks, and guaranteed by the Federal
Bank in Bonn, to the East Germans. Strauss was one of the
major facilitaters in the deal. This was not trade
connected, like the Swing credits, and must have been
approved by Moscow prior to its acceptance, given the polit-
ical atmosphere and the financial commitment involved. In
return for the loan, East Germany eliminated the
Zwangsumtausch for children, agreed to improve their border
guards' discipline and gave further assurances of increased
emigration permits to the West. CRef . 138] Reportedly, East
European diplomats in East Berlin substantiated Moscow'
s
approval to improve these German ties as a continuing means
to lure the West Germans away from the missile deployment.
CRef. 149]
Purely in economic terms, Honecker was already
receiving over DM 1 billion annually from Bonn for traffic
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access and communication maintenance and improvements with
West Berlin. This is in addition to the over DM 16 billion
in trade with the Federal Republic each year and is separate
from the above loan. Later in the year, about the time the
Bundestag approved the missile deployments in November, word
was circulating in Bonn that the GDR was seeking another
loan to improve its DM 11-12 billion debt to the West, of
which nearly half was to come due at the end of 1983.
Although the credit deal for another DM 950 million was not
completed until July 1984, the preparations may have been
initiated between the lower level bureaucrats late in 1983,
thus easing the pressure from the earlier creditors. The
substantial trade surplus with the Western countries in 1983
also helped East Berlin out of the credit pinch.
4. Honecker's Approach
As Andropov had used Kohl's visit to Moscow in July
1983 to warn of the repercussions to Bonn's interests should
they sanction the deployment, both East German and Soviet
spokesmen repeatedly pressed home the point that
intra-German relations could not flourish "in the shadow of
American missiles". In October Honecker, himself, in a open
letter the Chancellor Kohl, warned of a new "ice age" in
their relations and appealed "in the name of the German
people" to stop the upcoming deployment plans. [ Ref . 36:
p. 8] By this time, October-November 1983, Moscow and East
Berlin were forced with the dilemma of how to implement the
threats and "punish" Bonn for its backing of the NATO dual-
track decision. Honecker may well have realized that any
serious "punishment" to Bonn was going to affect his regime
more than Moscow and perhaps, more than Bonn's. For East
Berlin would have to bear the major burden of any sanctions
imposed by the Pact states in intra-German affairs,
resulting in a substantial loss from the extensive financial
and economic ties that had been built up in the past decade.
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The relative decline of a responsive central deci-
sionmaking authority in Moscow resulting from the prolonged
illness of Secretary General Andropov, and the resulting
succession struggle that ensued, showed an inability to
implement or impose a coherent bloc strategy. This, in
turn, weakened the Soviet's ability to enforce bloc disci-
pline. Given the need to forge a clear consensus on the
Pact reaction to the final deployment decision and the power
struggle taking place in the Kremlin, as evidenced by the
conflicting signals coming from Moscow, the Soviet Union
ultimately pursued a reactive policy to events developing in
Central Europe, particularly in regard to the relations
between the two German states. E Ref . 36: p. 9 3 Furthermore,
other Eastern European states used this confused state of
Pact affairs as an opportunity to pursue and defend their
own national interests by attempting to expand their room
for maneuver.
The West German Bundestag on 22 November 1983
approved the immediate deployment of American • made and
controlled Pershing II intermediate-range nuclear missiles
on West German soil. Within a few days the first missile
convoys arrived in West Germany and the Soviets used this as
their excuse to break off all arms control negotiations in
Geneva. This move was unmistakenly a sign to Western
leaders and to Honecker that the Soviets must make a deci-
sion on how to implement the long-threatened "countermea-
sures. " Honecker, however, did not hesitate to set his own
plan in action. Speaking only a few days after the Soviets
departed Geneva, Honecker gave an extremely conciliatory
speech before the SED Central Committee, stressing the need
to "limit the damage" in intra-German contacts and to
preserve the achievements of the past, despite the fact that
the West German decision caused "serious damage" to the
European . system of treaties, including the Basic Treaty.
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Although admitting that "the situation is no longer what it
used to be," Honecker went on to express his hope that
"sooner or later disarmament negotiations will achieve posi-
tive results and that detente will be continued.
"
CRef. 150]
Honecker' s remarks before the Central Committee
carried three significant departures from the Soviet posi-
tion at that time. First, although stating the deployment
decision caused serious damage to the so-called Eastern
treaties, he implicitly disavowed previous Soviet-East
German claims that the deployment would violate these
treaties. He endorsed these treaties as continuing to be "a
good foundation for the development of peaceful relation-
ships between nations. "
Second, Honecker' s remarks implied that the only
"countermeasures" to be taken would be the military ones
already announced by the WTO r i. e. the deployment of a new
generation of tactical nuclear missiles in the GDR and
Czechoslovakia. After defending their "unavoidable" deploy-
ment, he then admitted that they "did not evoke jubilation
in our country". His main answer to "What is to be done?"
was to place even more importance on the policies of
peaceful coexistence between nations of different social
orders.
Third, his emphasis on continued negotiations and
dialogue, combined with his assessment that the GDR would
"carefully examine every reasonable proposal by the FRG to
bring relations between the two German states onto a normal
level", strongly suggests Honecker' s disapproval of Moscow's
handling of their part in the anti-missile deployment
effort, i. e. walking out and slamming the door in Geneva.
Since the Kohl government was almost bending over
backwards to prove its seriousness to keep the intra-German
dialogue alive, it appeared that any "damage" which Honecker
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hoped" to limit was not self-imposed but rather Moscow
directed. In the early months of 1984, Honecker backed up
his words with actions by opening a flood gate of official
emigration to the West, allowing over 36,000 East Germans to
move to the Federal Republic in 1984, more than three times
the 1983 figure. CRef. 36: p. 103 At Andropov's funeral in
late February 1984 in Moscow, the two German leaders issued
a joint statement on the importance of avoiding nuclear war
and of using "common sense" to prevent "the course of inter-
national affairs from getting out of control". CRef. 36: p.
113 Also in February Neues Deutschland printed a speech by
Honecker in which he rearticulated his view that
intra-German relations are necessary for the "peaceful
future for both German states" and the importance of seeing
that cooperation prevail over confrontation. CRef. 1513 On
the economic side, East German officials concluded an agree-
ment with Volkswagen to produce car engines in the GDR and
talks between the two states' financial bureaucracies were
leading to another large loan to be guaranteed by Bonn.
CRef. 1523
Moscow's response to the "new situation" during the
first three and a half months of 1984 was remarkably vague.
Although notably cold in diplomatic exchanges with the
Federal Republic, the Soviets initially refrained from
commiting itself to the threatened "punishment" or to
keeping open the doors to communication. CRef. 153 3 This
period of indecision opened the way for the birth of polemic
disputes among the East European allies over their "special
role" in facilitating peaceful relations in Europe during
times of strain between the "great powers. " Hungary opened
the quarrel in late October when former Hungarian Ambassador
to Moscow and East Berlin, and then CC Secretary responsible
for foreign relations, Matyas Szuros, delivered a lecture on
reconciling international and national interests in the
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formulation of socialist foreign policy in Hungary. The
primary contents of the lecture were reprinted in the
Hungarian journal, Tarsadalmi Szemle , in January 1984. The
Secretary's remarks, which must have been received in Moscow
as borderline heresy, raised the issue of differing national
and international interests among various states, but
particularly between larger and smaller states. He further
maintained that there was no longer any question of uncondi-
tional subordination of national interests to international
interests since the respective national and international
obligations of socialist countries had changed. Among these
obligations lie the possibility of continuing relations with
capitalist countries during periods of a deteriorating
climate in overall East-West relations. In asserting "at
the same time their national and common interests, all
socialists states must take advantage of such special
possibilities. " CRef . 1543
The Czech communist party made the next blow in
March through an article harshly criticizing any notions
concerning independent foreign policy aspirations and
rejected the "special role" of "smaller states" in their
attempt to facilitate compromise between "great powers".
Certain criticism of departing from the socialist communi-
ty's common foreign policy approach also appeared to be
directed at East Berlin's policy as well. This was followed
afterwards with a response by Hungarian Secretary Szuros,
who defended his position. [ Ref . 155: p. 27] These state-
ments were favorably echoed in the East German press.
Moscow finally showed where it stood in reprinting a
slightly edited version of the Czech article in the Soviet
foreign affairs weekly, Novoe Vremya , coupled with a very
hard line article in the April edition of Voprosv Istorii
KPSS. CRef. 36: p. 11]
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This hard line position apparently did not predomi-
nate at the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' conference in
Budapest in mid April. The final communique issued on 20
April was unclear in defining the next moves the Pact states
would take. CRef. 156: p. 36 3 The Federal Republic was not
mentioned or referred to in the statement either. The sense
of moderation and vagueness projected by the message
reflected an apparent lack of consensus among the Eastern
bloc members.
5. The Kremlin Reacts
Any doubts as to the Soviet Union's view towards the
Federal Republic were finally swept away in late April and
early May when the Soviet press opened a massive anti-West
German "revanchism" campaign. This may have been planned to
coincide with the 39th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi
German in the Second World War. In early May the Soviets
bro"ke with earlier policy toward the FRG by putting Bonn on
a level with Washington for its imperialistic and militar-
istic ambitions'. Direct connection was made between the
CDU/CSU and the German fascists of the past. For the first
time in over ten years, Moscow was attempting to revive the
German bogeyman in the hope of creating greater socialist
unity, the message being: bloc unity is necessary to defend
socialism against the onslaught of this revived enemy. It
became clear after a few more press attacks that Bonn was
not the only intended target. This campaign was to signal
to East Berlin to reduce its ties with Bonn so as to punish
it for its INF decision.
The SED, however, was not willing to roll over so
easy. At the Eighth SED CC plenum in late May, the party
defended its "offensive peace policy. " Although extolling
the strict Soviet line on the negative effects of the
deployment on European security and the Soviet demands for
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the immediate halt to NATO's missile deployment, Politburo
member Kurt Hager avoided any direct attack on the Kohl
government in his speech before the CC. He recalled the
GDR's geographical and historical responsibility to do all
it can to prevent war from reoccuring on German soil.
Additionally, Hager noted a "community of responsibility"
and a "security partnership", in which "both countries
actively contribute to bringing about improvements in the
situation after the start of the {missile} deployment."
[Ref . 157 3 The East Berlin government accompanied these
remarks with continued dialogue with Bonn, including setting
a tentative date for Honecker's FRG visit and, in late July,
an agreement in Bonn to guarantee the second major loan to
East Berlin. The latter was soon followed by an East German
announcement that certain travel restrictions would be
lifted beginning 1 August. C Ref . 158 3
Moscow heightened the dispute with East Berlin in
printing an article in Pravda on 27 July titled, "In the
Shadow „of American Missiles", which explicitly warned that
East-West relations could not be -viewed in isolation from
the overall international situation. The latter was charac-
terized by an American-West German effort to "undermine the
GDR's socialist system." [Ref. 159] The article reminds its
readers, in Bonn and East Berlin alike, of earlier remarks
by Honecker, in his Gera speech given two years earlier,
that Bonn's position on GDR citizenship and the establish-
ment of embassies were regarded as obstacles to improved
intra-German relations. "Since then", the article points
out, "these issues have not been resolved . . . " Neues
Deutschland reprinted the article on 28 July but also
responded by reprinting two days later an article from the
Hungarian trade union press, Nepszava , which supported
Honecker and his policy with the FRG. Hungary was not
totally a third party in the dispute, however. The leaders
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in Budapest were hoping to hold on to an ally in the pursuit
of their own policy of continued contacts with the West,
including visits to Budapest in 1984 by Margaret Thatcher,
the Premiers from Finnland, Sweden, Belgium and Norway as
well as Helmut Kohl and Italian Prime Minister Craxi.
CRef. 160]
The battle of the communist press continued in a
Neuss Deutschland editorial on the ninth anniversary of the
Helsinki Final Act. The article primarily repeated
Honecker's main points made before the Central Committee in
November 1983, i.e. the need to "limit the damage" and to
maintain "dialogue between states of different social
systems. " [Ref . 161] Although the editorial attacked the
United States, again the Kohl government was spared.
Perhaps the most disturbing to Kremlin leaders was the
reference to GDR's independence in their internal and
external affairs. The next day Pravda countered with an
unsigned editorial which charged Bonn of resorting "to
economic levers in an attempt to break up the peaceful
postwar arrangement in Europe and, in particular, to disturb
the stability of the GDR. " By mentioning the recently
arranged bank loan to East Berlin and the reciprocal moves
by East German authorities to liberalize travel restric-
tions, the article was taking another step towards openly
criticizing Honecker's Deutschlandpolitik. Furthermore, in
referring to the same terms which Honecker used in his
speech, such as "limiting the damage", in its criticism, the
Soviets were making a personal attack on the SED Secretary
General. CRef. 162] Still not giving in, Keues Deutschland
did not reprint the Pravda editorial, but, chose instead to
reprint a TASS commentary by the former Editor-in-Chief of
Izvestiia
. Lev Tolkunov. This article, which suggests more
than subtle differences among the Soviet leadership, in
stating that continued relations with those in the West "who
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have a realistic assessment of the international scene,"
could produce results, implied that Honecker's loan deals
were not all that damaging to the socialist cause. In addi-
tion, he was of the opinion that detente still had a role in
the future and was not a part of the past. CRef . 163] The
Hungarian press contributed its further support for the East
German position in an article published on 5 August praising
the GDR's foreign policy. CRef. 164] By this time the major
news services were covering the dispute on a daily basis.
Amidst continued press attacks on West German
revanchism, Honecker took the offensive in mid August to
defend his policy of "limiting the damage" in intra-German
affairs. In a lengthy interview carried in Keues
Deutschland , Honecker resorted to his original arguments on
the "necessity of doing everything possible" to work toward
a condition of peace in Europe through a "community of
responsibility". Among these main arguments, the East
German leader also provided Moscow with some lines by which
they could take delight in referring to revanchist tenden-
cies among certain "forces at the right in the West. " Again
he avoided direct criticism of the Kohl government.
Although he listed the areas of concern which the East
German government wished negotiated during the upcoming
visit, such as the Elbe river border marking issue, respect
for East German citizenship, ending the activities of the
Salzgitter registration center and the upgrading of the
diplomatic missions, these were not set as preconditions to
future improved relations. CRef. 165] The same day TASS
released a limited edited version in English. The next day,
however, the news service released a severly edited Russian
text which focussed only on Honecker's comments about
Soviet-GDR friendship, revanchism in the FRG, East German
rejection of national reunification and criticism of
American foreign policy. CRef. 36: p. 59]
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On 20 August Neues Deutschland reprinted the Russian
version of the TASS article, a move intended to reveal to
its readers the official Soviet interpretation of
Deutschlandpolitik as they view it. The next day Neues
Deutschland also reprinted various articles on the dispute
from both Eastern and Western media sources. The SED was
thus trying to keep the issue public, presenting the picture
of who stood where in the dispute. Besides more support
from the Hungarians, Honecker also involved Romania in the
matter in late August by attending Ceausescu's 40th
Anniversary of Romania's "liberation" from fascism.
Honecker was the only Warsaw Pact Head of State to attend
the ceremonies, since the others were "protesting" Romania's
maverick attendance at the Los Angeles Olympic games.
6. Honecker Retreats
On 4 September 1984 the chief of the East German
mission in Bonn announced the postponement of Honecker'
s
visit to the Federal Republic, stating certain "debates"
among the Bonn leadership created an atmosphere "unseem-
ingly" and "detrimental" to the visit. CRef. 166] For most
West German diplomats in Eastern Europe, and many West
German political leaders, this came as little surprise since
the East Germans had been indicating for several weeks that
Bonn's political and media handling of the visit showed
little understanding for the East German's difficult situ-
ation. This was later confirmed by many West Germans, them-
selves, when the postponement opened up discussion on "what
went wrong. " [Ref . 167]
The postponement of the FRG trip, together with East
Germany joining the Moscow-orchestrated "anti-revanchism"
campaign, slowly brought the open dispute to an apparent
end. Throughout September little was published on
Honecker' s Deutschlandpolitik, except, when pushed, it was
215
noted that East Berlin still desired continued dialogue with
the Federal Republic, although, for the time being, only at
the lower working levels. Indeed, low-keyed talks continued
on 15 different levels and despite the increase in harsh
East Berlin rhetoric, intra-German dialogue continued to
show accomplishments through to the end of the year. At the
35th Anniversary of the GDR at the end of September,
Honecker's stiff attacks on the " Federal government in Bonn
proved to the Soviet Politburo and his Soviet guest at the
celebrations, Gromyko, that the SED had begun to march in
tune with the Kremlin's drummer. CRef. 168]
Among other reasons, Moscow was concerned about
their overall influence in affecting East-West relations,
particularly when an issue of security is at stake, and the
loss of authority in Eastern Europe during the dispute
period in 1984. Obviously, the weakened leadership in
Moscow had many interests at levels with which the East
Berlin leadership did not concern itself.
Honecker, on the other hand, perceived opportunities
to improve his domestic and international standing in
economic and political areas. These opportunities, which
arose from situations in the East and the West, had to be
measured against the costs of rebuking Soviet demands. But
just as the Soviet leadership void earlier in the year later
filled with a solid policy towards the Federal Republic, to
which Honecker inevitably had to adjust, the economic and
political benefits from his policy on intra-German relations
were drastically offset by increasing costs due, in large
part, to bungling West German politicians in Bonn. Honecker
could not afford to continue to defend his argument for open
dialogue with a West German government that misunderstood
the sensitivities of his political situation. [ Ref . 167]
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE ASSESSMENT
This study has surveyed a better part of twenty-five
years of East German- Soviet relations, focussing on periods
of dispute over their respective Deutschlandpolitik. One
could note that the variables affecting the decisionmaking
in both countries evolved significantly over this quarter
century. The perceptions of the individual leaders of their
government's role in influencing political changes in Europe
and, in the Soviet's case, beyond, affected the substance of
the conflict as well as the level of intensity. A summary
of the interest areas we have covered will help to evaluate
the whole set of variables involved in order to assess their
relative causal importance and to test if the original
hypotheses hold true.
On the following pages two tables are presented, which
are meant to assist in sorting out the variables used in the
study and how they compare with one another. The first
table displays the valued importance of interests to each of
the two countries and the level of internal foreign policy
control by its leader. The second table compares these
levels against the other country's to determine convergence
of interests or synchronization of the level of foreign
policy control. The latter comparison is presented against
the dependent variable, or level of discord over
Deutschlandpolitik between the two countries.
The relative values used in Table XI are from two sepa-
rate scales. For displaying the relative importance of
foreign policy and economic interests in East Berlin or
Moscow in a given case, the values are measured on the
following scale:
Little -> Some -> Substantial -> Very Important -> Crucial.
217
<4-l
o c r-i i CU
CTi>iO 1 >xC J3 CU 1 -H — 1
^Ht- U P 1 E PU 1 u E 1 P U 1
(1) (U-H-P 1 O 0) 3 1 3 O 1 P 3 1





U 1 (0 P
•H 1 •H r-l 1 c CU 1 CU —1 1
E I -P (0 1 r-1 1 H 1
O 1 S •H 1 >*p p 1 P •H 1
C. 1 <o U l p p p 1 P U 1
O 1 4-> 3 i cu o •H 1 i-l 3 1
U 1 CQ p 1 >a »H . 1 rH P 1
U 1
3




J 1 73 1 r4 —1 1
fcu 1 ^H 1 (0 1 (0 1
2 1 i-l 1 •H 1 1-1 1
O 1 1 CU cu p CU p 1
U 2 l hH hH 1 rp C 1 rH C Ip p P (0 p (0 1
H •o p p 4-> •p 1 p p 1
W l-i I -H •H 1 •H n •H CQ 1
-4 | iH 1 rH •H 1 rH XI fP Xt 1
> X 1 3 3 I






<; 0) a c c CU CU 1
CuZ 0) • (0 rH r-4 1
oqs i-l -i (0 u >*p cu >*p P CU P 1
u 0) 3C a i-l p E p p P E P 1
oo 4-> W-H CO 0) cu o •H o H 1
z c IX! p >a CQ >a rH CO —1 1hH rH mo (4 E E
1—
1
usco P il 1-1
X z<: P a
E
u OS •H w H-tJ o rP -p p
CD CdZ • 4-1 rP c 1 c
< >HH 04 < O cu 1 (0 CU 1
H MfH •H rp >»p CU 1 >rp —1 1HO c to* rP u p pp E 1 p p p 1
<Cd D> • <D 3 p CU o cuo p 1
kJbt •H D > P •H i >a CQ >a iH 1
Cdlu a) • U -4 1 E I £ •-t 1
cs< i p
1 o




CQ p rH rH P 1
< C -I a -H (0 1 (0 a i
h-t (0 (B 1 CO •H 1 -H (0 1
PS 4J (1) •H >»p 1 1-1 P 1 p >nP i
< a a o p p 1 u c 1 c p p i
> <u o 3 <U 1 3 (0 I (0 CU O 12^ P >a 1 p +1 1 p >a i
H 3 U £ 1 u CQ 1 CQ E lZ W •H XI i XI H 1
u 3 1 3Q CQ 1 CQ
z
w











2 p a) 0) CU 1 >*p •H 1 P P 1
t-i co a E E 1 p p U i e a i
« o O o 1 CU 3 1 (0 <0 1
a i-i CQ CQ i >a P i p p i
3 i E U 1 CQ CQ 1
Id
1 +








-P OS OS as
C CO es 1 CO OS 1 CO os i
3 CO a 1 CO Q 1 CO a i
O D o i D a 1 D CQ O i
u
1 P
1 CUT? 1 CU CU 1
C tn 1 P <1> 1 Xl-> I
•rt"p 1 C W i us i
r-l CQ i cu o 1 CU (U 1
01 P-H i pa l C-P l
<o cu p i co E 1 O <D 1
U CQU I Qh i XQ I
218
Another scale is used to display the levels of internal
foreign policy control by the particular Party leadership
during each case for each country. The values are measured
from the following scale:
Little -> Some -> Much -> Very Much.
The values applied to these interests are derived from the
analysis completed in the first section of this study.
Understanding the limitations involved, a best effort has
been made to make objective value assessments of these
interest-s after analyzing the answers to the common ques-
tions asked in each case, given the available historical
evidence. The determination of the values displayed in
Table XI is the prerequisite to comparing these values and
therefore being able to test the hypotheses.
Table XII presents this comparison vis-a-vis the level
of discord between the USSR and the GDR over
Deutschlandpolitik. The table's values are based on a
simple scale:
Low — > Medium — > High.
The resulting values are derived from the degree of correla-
tion found in Table XI and the level of discord values have
been formulated based upon the analysis discussed in the































































































































































































It may now be useful to restate the two central hypoth-
eses of this study:
1) The greater the convergence of political and economic
foreign policy interests between the USSR and GDR
leadership, the lower the potential for conflict over
questions of German Policy; and
2) The greater the synchronization of foreign policy
control between the Soviet and East German leader-
ships, the lower the potential for conflict over ques-
tions of German Policy.
The results of this study generally support the first
hypothesis. The second case involving the downfall of
Walter Ulbricht did involve both the highest degree of
conflict during the entire period and one can note the
lowest levels of interest convergence. The other two cases
have very similar levels of interest convergence, yet have
different resulting levels of conflict or dispute.
One problem obviously lies in some inherent assumptions
found in these comparisons and variables. In looking at
Table XII, we assume an equality among the variables in
their relative affect on the resulting level of conflict.
This is an incorrect assumption and can lead to the situ-
ation above, i. e. , common independent variables with a
dissimilar dependent variable. While all the interests have
been considered important enough for consideration as inde-
pendent variables warranting their study, they have at
different times, significantly different levels of impor-
tance relative to one another and to the dependent variable.
While these variables have been analyzed and compared inter-
nally to determine their values through cross-case compari-
sons, no measuring standard existed to determine their value
relative to other variables within each case. For example,
both East and West European interests have been analyzed for
their importance to Moscow and East Berlin relative to their
respective Deutschlandpolitik across all three cases. Yet
no questions were asked as to the relative importance of
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either of these two sets of interests within each case on
the resultant level of conflict or dispute. To best under-
stand the relative comparisons presented in Table an addi-
tional weighting mechanism need be created to better
appreciate the different causal affects each dependent vari-
able has within each case.
In evaluating our findings in the light of the second
hypothesis, another snag is found. The assumption that the
level of synchronization of foreign policy control is an
independent variable may be incorrect. Since the level of
synchronization is highest in the very case that results in
the highest level of conflict and is identical in the other
two cases showing differing levels of conflict, a problem
exists in the original hypothesis. Two likely possibilities
exist to explain this: first, that there exists no correla-
tion between this variable and the level of conflict, or
second, that this is actually an intervening variable rather
than an independent variable. In the latter case, this
variable would have a given affect upon the dependent vari-
able when considered in conjunction with other (independent)
variables. This author supports the second explanation
based upon his belief that foreign policy decisionmaking
mechanisms in totalitarian regimes occupy a vital spot on
the main arteries of those countries' international rela-
tions. In this study convincing evidence revealed insta-
bility in relations between the two leaderships whenever a
non- synchronous situation existed.
A continuation of this study, then, must consider an
analysis of the variables within each case in order that the
results of the cross-case analysis may be best appreciated.
It should also consider the level of synchronization of
foreign policy control as a possible intervening variable
which would mandate searching for the areas where it
combines with other variables to impact on the dependent
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variable. Future studies might also consider other indepen-
dent variables not included here, such as: regime credi-
bility; domestic stability; national identity; or others
more closely related to relations with the Federal Republic
of Germany.
Looking towards tomorrow, my best evaluation concludes
that the GDR's improved identity crisis will have a dynamic
affect on other variables which could gradually increase the
probability of conflict or disagreement. For example, in
search for a more outstanding role in the future European
setting, East Berlin may try to readjust both its economic
structure and trade relations, even so incrementally, to
better utilize its comparative advantages in the World Trade
Market and protect itself from political or economic black-
mail from the East.
The East Germans may also move towards greater bilateral
relationships with the United States or China. These
changes, of course, might also effect changes in East
Berlin's West German relations. Whereas the Kremlin leader-
ship could perhaps take time in reacting to such changes in
East Berlin's Extra-European interests, the slightest read-
justment in East German relations with West European nations
requires Soviet coordination to avoid disagreements over
Deutschlandpolitik. The identity problem (or solution)
could also manifest itself in attempts by East German ideo-
logues to present East Germany as the "most successful"
example of socialist development based on their past social
and economic achievements. This would seem to be best
applied in Third World relations, where East Berlin could
compete to some degree with Moscow for influence should they
tire of playing the proxy role for the Soviets.
The Federal Republic should remain the central focus for
both Moscow and East Berlin. This triad, however, is built
on very different supporting interests, as has been
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highlighted in this study. Both communist states will move
towards or away from Bonn according to their perceptions of
opportunity or threat. Bonn, on the other hand, can manipu-
late the level of both, but must always watch over its own
substantial interests in both sides. The keys to these
relations appear to be in the individuals leading these
three regimes. The character, experience and level of
support they command for novel policy has been a distinctive
and decisive feature in all three cases. Likewise, this
condition should not change in the future. The new
Gorbachev leadership in Moscow and a forthcoming succession
within this decade in East Berlin rearranges the cards for a
new set of player relationships and opportunities.
The economic variable will probably always be a sensi-
tive factor leading to possible future Moscow-East Berlin
disputes. The main reason for this is because of their
trade relationship. East Berlin is far more dependent on
Soviet raw materials than the Soviets are on East German
products, although the latter is a great bargain. Another
reason would be responding to pressures for reform. The
faults in the centralized command economy cannot be forever
hidden and the East German leaders may see it beneficial to
reform their economic system is such a way so as to best
utilize some of the proven advantages of centralized control
with greater western-style rationalization measures. Such
changes depend largely on the future elite structure of the
East German leadership, whether the technical-economic
elites increase their influence in the party decisionmaking
apparatus.
Although the results of this study suggest the level of
foreign policy control is probably not an independent vari-
able, it most likely does occupy an important role in
affecting GDR-USSR conflict. It may be the final weak or
strong link between harmony or dispute at times when other
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variables would suggest a conflict situation. As noted, the
relations still need to be better defined, yet the unques-
tionable continuation of these two totalitarian regimes
points towards the future importance of the relationship
between each side's ability to control its definitions of
the Deutschlandpolitik issues vital to their overall
interests.
As the Soviets have shown since 1980, Eastern Europe is
moving further and further away from the days of military
solutions to political problems. The strange coalition
between East Berlin and Budapest must bring an extremely
uncomfortable foreboding to the leaders in the Kremlin. The
East European leaders may see new opportunities to further
integrate their political and economic interests as a group
to develop leverage against Soviet hegemony. While
depending upon and extolling Moscow's security interests
vis-a-vis the West, these leaders may with greater self-
confidence and social domestic stability, East Germany
included, seek to increase their room for maneuver in
domestic and foreign affairs.
A final word needs to be mentioned on Berlin. This city
is a symbol for the fact that the German Problem still
exists and cannot be concealed. Whether it be seen in the
legal documents of the Four Power Agreement of the daily
transit of military trains carrying the American, French or
British flag, through East German territory, East Germans
cannot ignore forever the fact that they are the most
burdened by the German Problem, other than the West
Berliners, themselves. The time will come again when East
Berlin leaders will press for a new arrangement for the
city. This may be without tensions and it may be in total
agreement and cooperation with the Soviets, but it will
occur. Our Western leadership must be sensitive to the many
variables involved, some of which have been highlighted
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through this study, when the time comes to renegotiate the
status of Berlin and reattempt to settle the German Problem.
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